Office of the Historian

259. Message From Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Riyadh, December 3, 1973.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to oil.]

1.
On 3 December 1973 Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Shaykh Kamal Adham, [1 line not declassified] both provided identical information [2 lines not declassified] as follows:
A.
King Faysal has agreed in principle that Prince Fahd should accept your invitation to visit Washington prior to 8 December.2 This decision was being finalized in a high-level Saudi Government meeting [1 line not declassified].
B.
King Faysal’s only reservation has been that he wants to be sure that Prince Fahd has “something in his hand” when he goes; this was the subject of intense consideration within the Saudi Government 3 December.
C.
The proposition before the King in the meeting cited above is that Prince Fahd should travel to Cairo immediately, with Kamal Adham, in order to obtain President Anwar Sadat’s agreement for Prince Fahd to present the following proposal to you on 6 December 1973 in Washington.
(1)
If all parts of the six-point ceasefire agreement are implemented prior to the 18 December peace conference, all oil production limitations and embargoes will be lifted in their entirety before the peace conference convenes. The Saudi Government’s target date for an announcement of this would be during your 14–15 December visit to Jidda.
(2)
The Arab action would necessarily contain a warning that if the peace conference does not produce a “reasonable” step-by-step agenda for implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 “in all its parts”, and if progress toward that end is not forthcoming at a “reasonable” pace, the oil limitations and embargoes will be reimposed. Prince Fahd stated that this is a necessity in order to secure the concurrence of the other Arab leaders.
(3)
A second condition would be that this proposition must remain absolutely Top Secret between King Faysal, Prince Fahd and Kamal Adham on the Saudi side and you on the American side until the following two things have been accomplished: first, the securing of the concurrence of President Sadat, Hafiz al Asad of Syria and Honari Boumedienne of Algeria, and possibly of the Kuwaitis also, although the latter are regarded by the Saudis as of less importance in this respect; secondly, agreement between Prince Fahd and you privately in Washington this week on the exact timing and details of the handling of the public announcement.
(4)
The definition of “implementation of the six-point ceasefire agreement” was left deliberately vague, pending Fahd-Adham talks with Sadat in Cairo en route to Washington. Definitions of “satisfactory” agenda for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and of “reasonable” pace of progress toward final settlement were also left imprecise by design.
2.
The question of Jerusalem was not raised by either Prince Fahd or Kamal Adham in their 3 December talks [2 lines not declassified].
3.
[4 lines not declassified] Assuming that King Faysal formally approves the final proposition as set forth above, a decision will be made later 3 December as to what overt reason Prince Fahd will give for his sudden visit to Washington via Cairo. [10 lines not declassified]
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 139, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Nov–Dec 1973. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the first page indicates the message was received in the White House at 5:14 p.m.↩
  2. See Document 238.↩