Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976

153. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 7, 1975, 1:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Vice President Rockefeller
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Members (see attached list)²

[Omitted here is discussion of Portugal and SALT.]

Anderson: For two years we have disagreed with the strategic NIE.³

Kissinger: The most useful thing you can tell the President is what is wrong with the NIE and how it can be remedied. How to remedy the process and the situation which exists.

Anderson: We also want to talk about Baker’s concern on [less than 1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: Where is the hang-up?

Baker: DOD is pushing it around bureaucratically.

Kissinger: Why don’t we force them?

Baker: It’s not so simple. [1½ lines not declassified]

[Discussion about grain]

Baker: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]

We now have a corner on the grain market, if we control it. We have the Soviets right where we want them, if we use it.

Foster: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Baker: It’s not that easy, though we are developing a plan.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14, August 7—Rockefeller, Kissinger, PFIAB. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except for those included by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the orginal. The luncheon meeting was held at the Department of State.
2. Not found attached.
3. On August 6, Foster and Teller discussed Document 149, with Stoertz and DeBruler. According to the record of the meeting, Foster and Teller “expressed disagreement with key judgments in NIE 11–3/8–74 and made suggestions concerning the preparation and content of the NIE.” In particular, they disagreed with the estimate’s net assessment that the Soviet Union was “extremely unlikely” to conclude during the next ten years that it could launch a disarming first strike against the United States. Foster also recommended that an organization should be established “to prepare analyses of the most critical intelligence issues to compete with analyses currently performed.” (CIA, NIC Files, Job 85B00134R, Box 1, Competitive Analysis, Part 1, Background on the A Team—B Experiment)