147. Memorandum From the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger1
Washington, July 30, 1974.
SUBJECT
- Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Ground Forces
Background
Attached is the Executive Summary of the Project 186 net assessment of
U.S. and Soviet ground forces. Project 186 began life as NSSM 186.2 The original idea was
to get an idea of the relative efficiency of the U.S. and USSR in producing, maintaining and
operating ground forces. A first step would be to produce a complete,
full, rich comparison of the two forces, including the qualitative
factors often overlooked in most studies. The attached study is only a
partial success in taking this first step. It is worth your reading,
particularly the first twelve pages. It has generally been well
received, except in the intelligence community.3 But it is not nearly the advance we hoped it would
be.
There are several reasons why the study was not more successful. We
foresaw many of the data problems and intelligence gaps, but we had
little appreciation of how bad the problem was. Nor did anybody else. At
the first steering committee meeting, we requested the JCS representative, a Rear Admiral, to
provide data on the organization, manning, equipment, etc. of the U.S.
ground forces, 1960 thru 1980. He promised the data in two weeks. It
took over two months to produce, and was not nearly as complete as we
expected. He was as surprised as we were. The JCS and services made a reasonable attempt to produce the
data, and failed.
Similarly, on the Soviet side, we found that many things we thought we
knew were the product of legend or speculation. For example, the
community has very little idea how many men are in the Soviet ground
forces. The ± 15% confidence interval applied only to divisional forces
in GSFG. Even there the basis of the
estimate is suspect
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outside
the community. Another example is medium tanks. The community presently
puts the Soviet inventory at about 43,000. They acknowledge that the
Soviets have produced over 70,000 medium tanks in the last 20–25 years,
but cannot reconcile the two figures. [3 lines not
declassified.]
With regard to less quantitative aspects of Soviet forces the picture is
even worse. DIA could not supply an estimate of how much the readiness
of Soviet ground forces divisions is degraded by the semi-annual influx
of new recruits that make up 25% of the division. Most of the new
recruits have essentially no training. When pressed on this subject,
they asserted that it would be unwise to assume any degradation in
readiness. Similarly when asked about the effectiveness of the Soviet
pre [word illegible] training (140 hours spread out over two years), DIA
replied that this was not known, but that prudence dictated the
assumption that it was roughly the same as the U.S. eight week basic
training course.
Thus in the course of the study we confirmed two problem areas:
—Serious intelligence gaps, particularly with respect to the qualitative
aspects of Soviet forces.
—A strong tendency for the community to fill the gaps with worst-case
estimates.
It is worth noting that both the JCS and
the Army liked the study. Indeed the Army would have considered
withdrawing its concurrence had we watered down the conclusions further
as requested by DIA and CIA.
Observations Drawn from the Study
1. Tooth to Tail. The study makes it clear that we
don’t understand the question of appropriate support ratios. In Central
Europe we have about twice as many men behind each weapon as the
Soviets. We can’t say whether that’s good, bad, or indifferent. On the
other hand, the Soviet mix may cause them problems in a war of any
length. The annual transfer of troops from the USSR to East Germany causes quite a disruption of rail
service in Eastern Europe. Reinforcement and resupply under wartime
conditions cannot seem to them a trivial problem. In any event, the U.S.
support tail probably gives our forces balance that the Soviets do not
have.
2. Readiness. This is second only to “tooth/tail”
in potential for arousing parochial passions. Here it appears that we
really do derive some advantage from our readiness and training
activity. By contrast Soviet forces must have semi annual cycles in
their readiness levels. However, we do not know how to take credit for
this yet in our comparisons.
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3. Mobilization. There must be some way out of the
dilemma that our reserves cannot be made ready before the war is over,
but their reserves are effective in a week or two. Why do we have any
reserves at all, and why do they have active forces? The question is
only partly facetious.
4. Divisional Structure. Except for their seven
airborne divisions the Soviets seem to have nothing but heavy divisions
best for ground combat in Europe. Our mix contains a number and variety
of light divisions, clearly intended for use other than on the Central
Front. Is this the mix we want? Is it consistent with our notion that
only the active forces will be available for combat in a war with the
USSR?
5. New Soviet Systems. Some of the new Soviet
equipment looks complex and sophisticated compared to their older stuff.
The BMP and ZSU 23–4 are examples. Indeed it is alleged that all new
Soviet ground force weapon systems show a discontinuity with past
practices of simplicity of design, etc. It may be that these new designs
are responding to some technical imperatives of their own. I intend to
explore the hypothesis that this represents a trend to more expensive
and capable equipment, and what the consequences might be for Soviet
resource cost and maintenance requirements.
Further Work
Clearly we cannot leave this subject in this state. I have several
efforts going which may help clarify some of the issues raised here. The
Army will undertake studies comparing U.S. and Soviet ground force
training and maintenance. A potentially useful study of Soviet combat
support is being done at General Research Corporation. We are concluding
studies of anti-tank warfare and air defense over the battlefield, which
will be briefed to you when done. I have Rand working on comparative
U.S. and Soviet design philosophies for armored vehicles.
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Attachment
Executive Summary of a Net Assessment Prepared in
the Office of the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the
Secretary of Defense4
Washington,
May 22,
1974.
PROJECT 186
NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND
FORCES
PHASE I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[Omitted here is the table of contents.]
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
This paper describes and compares the ground forces of the US and the Soviet Union. It forms the
first phase of the National Net Assessment directed by NSSM–186 and NSDM–239.5 This phase was essentially
descriptive. Its purpose is to provide the reader with an
understanding of how US and Soviet
ground forces compare, and to diagnose potential problems and
opportunities for the US.
Asymmetries between US and Soviet
Ground Forces are identified, but no conclusions have been drawn as
to whether the Soviets are doing things right and the US wrong, or vice versa. Follow-on work
will address specific issues that have been identified in this
report.
Because Phase I covers only ground forces, conclusions which require
consideration of other parts of the military establishment must be
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deferred. For example,
evaluation of readiness/force size trade-offs requires assessment of
strategic mobility forces. An evaluation of the overall military
balance is beyond the scope of this study, requiring assessment of
the forces of Allies and potential enemies of the US and Soviet Union.
B. Definition of Ground Forces
Ground forces in this paper include ground combat forces with all the
command and support structure behind them. For the US, the entire Army less strategic
defense forces are included, together with the US Marines less fixed wing aviation and
its share of support. For the Soviet Union ground forces includes
the Soviet Army with its share of command and general support, plus
naval infantry and helicopter forces.
This definition is needed to make a meaningful comparison, since
Soviet general purpose ground forces (e.g., divisions) are more
involved than US forces in
performing general support mission such as individual training and
reserve component support.
C. Uncertainties
The depth of our knowledge of Soviet ground forces is variable. We
know certain things in fine detail: We have in our possession modern
Russian tanks and personnel carriers, and we have good photography
of many Russian military installations. Much of the Russian military
establishment, however, is much less visible to us.
We have no direct information about Russian military manpower totals.
Our estimates of manpower start [less than 1 line
not declassified] with the smallest units, and are built up
for larger units from estimates based for the most part on US practices. A large part of the
Soviet total is estimated to be in units whose existence we know of
but whose size we do not, and to this we add estimates for units
that we do not see at all but which the US intelligence community feels must be present. DIA
has made estimates of Soviet command and general support manpower,
but they have a very low level of confidence in these estimates. A
great deal of work is required to explain the uncertainties in
manpower estimating and to distinguish between what is known and
what is guessed at. Much additional collection and analysis will be
required before we are confident in our estimates of Soviet military
manpower.
The uncertainty increases when we talk about costs. The Soviets
publish only one cost statistic—the single line entry for defense in
the annual state budget. We do not know what this figure includes
(it clearly excludes some military research and development financed
from the “science” appropriation; many believe it excludes much
more). Not only is there uncertainty regarding the inclusiveness of
the
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announced figure, but
because it clearly serves a political function, its basic
reliability is questionable. [2 lines not
declassified]
[1 paragraph (16 lines) not declassified]
II. KEY CONCLUSIONS
A. Size
Since 1964 the number of Soviet divisions has increased by about 15%
(from 147 to 169), and US active
divisions6 have decreased by 15% (from 21⅔ to
18⅓). Manning and equipping of US
reserve forces have increased during this time. The Soviet increase
and US decrease roughly follow
China’s movement from alliance to hostility toward the USSR, and a reduction in its
hostility to the US. Most of the
Soviet buildup has been opposite China, while the US reductions have been spread among
the Pacific, Europe and North America. At the present time Soviet
ground forces manpower is about 2.1 million, compared to 940,000 for
the US.
B. Readiness
US active forces are maintained in a
higher state of readiness than most of the Soviet forces. Our
tactical units have better trained men entering them, are generally
manned much closer to their wartime authorization, operate their
equipment more, and shoot their weapons more than their Soviet
counterparts. The price of our readiness edge and the contribution
to readiness of these US practices
have not yet been evaluated in detail, but they involve over 200,000
men and several billion dollars per year above what would be
required to maintain the active force by Soviet standards. Even
Soviet forces in Germany, which are considered to be among their
most combat ready ground forces, spend time every six months on
training of new recruits, and the Soviets spend less on the
readiness of these forces than they would have to spend to maintain
them at US standards.
C. Quality of Soviet Manpower Estimates
Estimates of Soviet manpower are very rough. DIA and CIA believe the uncertainty about the
number of Soviet troops now in Eastern Europe is about ± 15%.
However, the basis for this confidence is unclear outside the
intelligence community. [3½ lines not
declassified]
D. Support
Comparing forces in West and East Germany, the US has twice as many men as the Soviets
behind each weapon. The implications of this
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are not clear. This asymmetry has been cited
as indicative of a US edge in
sustaining capability (e.g., because of more ammunition suppliers
and mechanics), a US edge in
fighting (e.g., more target acquisition people supporting artillery
fire), or alternatively as indicative of excessive overhead. All
three explanations probably have some degree of validity.
E. Manpower Procurement
The US has a volunteer force, while
the Soviet Union has nearly universal conscription. This probably
limits the number of people in the US military to roughly the present or possibly a
reduced level. It keeps pressure on the US to use men more efficiently, to recruit women into
the force, and to use civilians. The pressures on the Soviet Union
are less clear. The estimated ruble costs of their conscript force
are quite small, but the real costs to the Soviet economy in terms
of opportunities foregone are unclear. While the military uses large
quantities of scarce manpower, it also turns out some skilled
workers and may thus serve an educational function performed in the
civilian sector in the US. One clear
result of this asymmetry (volunteer vice conscription) is that the
US has more reenlistments and
lower turnover in its force. As a result US ground forces have a much larger number of
experienced enlisted men: over 50% of the US enlisted force has more than two years of service,
while only 10% of the Soviets do. A second result is that the
Soviets have about 800,000 men with military experience entering the
reserves each year, whereas the US
does not.
F. Mix of Divisions
Almost all Soviet divisions are tank and motorized rifle, oriented
toward a war on the Eurasian land mass. Only half of US active divisions and one-third of
US reserve divisions are armored
and mechanized. The rest are amphibious (Marine), airmobile,
airborne, and infantry, which provide us worldwide capability to
fight lightly armored (largely infantry) forces and/or to fight in
terrain which is not conducive to armored warfare.
G. Mix of Weapons
The US places a higher fraction of
its major caliber antitank weapons and indirect fire weapons in the
hands of infantry. Thus the US will
have a higher ratio of antitank guided missile launchers to tanks,
and has more mortars per cannon, than the Soviets.
H. Weapon Characteristics
Generally US weapons are more
complicated, more expensive, more capable and incorporate more human
engineering factors than Soviet weapons. For example, all our tanks
have range-finders, com
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puters, automatic transmissions, and plenty of working space; the
Soviet tanks have none of these. US
anti-tank guided missiles are much more accurate and easier to use
than Soviet missiles. Several recent Soviet weapons (e.g., BMP,
ZSU–23–4) do not fit this generalization, and may represent a trend
reversal.
I. Costs
Considerable work has been done to analyze Soviet defense costs and
compare them to those of the US. The
current state of costing methodology and data limitations preclude
our obtaining an accurate estimate of the cost of Soviet defense,
its “value” in dollars, the relative “burden” of defense, or
relative efficiency. CIA has
estimated a dollar valuation of Soviet defense expenditures which,
while probably overstating the value of Soviet activities relative
to those of the US, are useful
indicators of spending trends. They show that the valuation of the
Soviet ground forces program in constant dollars has increased by
one third since 1964. The cost of the US program in constant dollars has decreased by one
quarter in the same time.
J. Asymmetries
Completion of a net assessment requires comparisons in detail of the
way the US and Soviet Union operate.
Where there are asymmetries in the two nations’ way of doing
business several possible explanations can exist:
—We’re right and they’re wrong. We should continue business as usual
or find ways to increase our advantage accruing from the
asymmetry.
—They’re right and we’re wrong. We should change our system to look
more like the Soviet.
—We’re both right, and have gone off in different directions because
of different resource constraints, geography or national strategic
objectives.
—We’re both wrong.
Deciding what the proper implications of the asymmetries are requires
a study of the total force. Work to date has focused exclusively on
the US and Soviet ground forces.
Final judgments require a comparison of overall capabilities,
including forces of Allied nations and forces other than ground
forces. There is no way to settle, for example, whether our ground
forces are appropriate without considering the contribution of
US mobility and tactical air
forces and the forces of our Allies.
A number of the study conclusions taken together suggest that a major
asymmetry exists between how the U.S. and the USSR expect a war in Central Europe
to be fought. The Soviets appear to expect a short war, (on the
order of weeks). The U.S. and our Allies appear to ex
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pect a somewhat longer war, perhaps
several months or longer. Successful conclusion of the war, in the
Soviet view, is to be achieved by overrunning most of Western Europe
and destroying all NATO military
forces there. The U.S. hopes to “win” the war by preventing a Soviet
breakthrough, and by stabilizing the conflict along static lines of
defense as close to present boundaries as possible.
This apparent asymmetry in view as to the nature of the war, if true,
has strong impact on force structure planning, support, weapons mix,
and tactical doctrine. As Project 186 continues it will be important
to refine the concept of this asymmetry, and clarify its
implications.
While no final conclusions have been drawn, major asymmetries have
been cataloged and resultant advantages to each side have been
listed on Table 1.7
