Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972

82. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird ¹

CM–4642–69

Washington, October 15, 1969.

• SUBJECT
  • Additional Actions for US Military Readiness Tests—Worldwide

1. (TS) As a follow-on to actions currently underway to comply with the desires of higher authorities to test our military readiness, attached at Tabs² are proposed actions which will continue the operation through 30 October 1969.

2. (TS) The proposed actions incorporate recommendations received from the CINCs and remain in the parameters directed (discernible to the Soviets but not threatening).

3. (TS) With your concurrence we are prepared to start implementing actions phased over the next 15 days. These actions will be initiated so as to reflect an increase in intensity of signals received by the Soviets.

4. (TS) These proposed actions will be subject to continued review for budgetary implications, cumulative impact and relation to detected reactions.

5. (TS) Detailed timing and coordination of the several actions delineated in this paper are being developed and will be forwarded.³

Earle G. Wheeler

Attachment

CINCSAC

1. On 27 October, implement SEAGA in the Show of Force option for the [1 line not declassified] and does not require Canadian overflight.

2. To prevent the loss of critical items of combat crew training, authorize to perform selective flying training during the period 17 through 23 October. Flights to be held to the minimum commensurate with critical requirements. Resume stand down on 24 October.

3. Place maximum feasible number of additional aircraft in the highest state of maintenance readiness to include loading of weapons.

CINCPAC

1. [3 lines not declassified]

2. Retain Mace on Alert until 30 October 1969.

3. Increase tactical air [less than 1 line not declassified].

4. Increase Readiness of Tac Air/Air Defense Aircraft and Missiles.

5. Increase Surveillance of Soviet Shipping enroute to NVN and in CINCAL area.

6. Increase US Local Security and Anti-sabotage Measures in ROK and Japan.

7. Increase PACOM Intelligence Watch. 8. Selective Augmentation of Primary Command Centers and Selective Activation of Alternate Command Centers.

9. Conduct Exercise Focus Lens 22 October–1 November as Now Planned.

10. Authorize Flying Training to Meet Critical Requirements 17–23 October.

USCINCEUR

1. Occupy border observation posts.

2. Selectively increase border surveillance.

3. Increase readiness tests within caserns and bases.

4. Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) along West German border.

5. Increase surveillance of Soviet Military Liaison Mission.

6. Increase intelligence gathering along West German border.

7. Stand-down communications radiating for test or training only.

8. USCINCEUR will be authorized to perform selective flying training during the period 17 through 23 October 1969. Flights will be held to the minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

CINCLANT

1. Within budgetary restrictions:

a. Sail Newport News from Brest, France, on 17 October as now scheduled. Proceed to rendezvous with Yorktown hunter killer group.

b. Cancel Yorktown hunter killer group port visits; conduct emergency sortie on 17 October to renedzvous with Newport News. Stand-down all flight operations; maintain maximum deck alert.

c. Direct USS Forrestal and USS F. D. Roosevelt to set EMCON and make high speed 400–500 mile transit towards southeast; transmit several messages; then reset EMCON. Time at your discretion. Stand-down flight operations on 24 October. Maintain maximum deck alert.

2. Execute emergency back load and sortie as soon as possible of CARIB Amphibious Squadron.

3. Stand-down all VP aircraft flight operations at Argentia, Iceland, and Azores.

4. Authorization to perform selective flight training during period 17–23 October. Flights will be held to minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

CINCONAD

1. Continue increased alert (100% on one hour or less) majority of forces until further directed.

2. Deploy ADC College Tap interceptors to Richards Gebaur AFB, Mo, and Stewart AFB, New York for four days.

3. Increase the Air Defense Interceptor deployment to the two Western Alaska bases.

4. CINC is authorized to perform selective flight training during the period 17–23 October, but hold to minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

USCINCSO

1. USCINCSO will place in effect security measures at military installations and facilities within the Canal Zone, and will enforce minimal communications to CONUS and to the Latin American MilGroups.

CINCAL

1. Increase the air defense interceptor deployment to the two Western Alaskan bases.

2. After deployment, maintain maximum ground alert of air defense forces at all bases.

3. Increased alert posture should be supported by appropriate Communications Security.

4. CINC is authorized to perform selective flight training during the period 17–23 October, but hold to minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

CINCSTRIKE

1. Authorization to perform selective flight training during period 17–23 October. Flights will be held to minimum commensurate with critical requirements.

2. Return selected units to home stations. (Brigade of 82d Abn at Eglin AFB, Special Forces units engaged in training in West Virginia and Puerto Rico.)

3. MIDEASTFOR will accomplish following within budgeting restrictions.

a. USS Valcour with COMIDEASTFOR abroad will make rapid un-scheduled departure from Port Bahrain and steam in Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.

b. Cancel COMIDEASTFOR scheduled visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan due to quote operational requirements unquote.

c. Have USS Rich depart Djibouti early due to quote operational requirements unquote, and steam in Gulf of Aden.

d. Have USS Furse visit Mombasa briefly for refueling on 16 Oct and then depart immediately due to quote operational requirements unquote. Upon departure Mombasa, have USS Furse join the USS Rich in Gulf of Aden.

e. Superimpose on all operations a degree of in port security, readiness, and EMCON not normal in routine visits.

f. Remain in port for minimum time during refueling visits.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69). Top Secret; Noforn.
2. The attachment below combines eight separate tabs.

3. Laird forwarded Wheeler’s package of proposed additional military actions to Kissinger. According to his covering memorandum, Laird concurred with Wheeler’s proposal. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 222, Agency Files, Department of Defense, Vol. IV) In an October 17 memorandum, Haig advised Kissinger to inform Nixon, during that day’s scheduled meeting with the President, of the additional “worldwide alert measures designed to signal increased U.S. readiness. These measures will increase in intensity up to October 30 and will be monitored carefully for readout.” (Ibid., Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President 8/13/69–12/30/69) Wheeler received a memorandum later that day from a member of his staff informing him “that the White House has approved the execution of all of the additional actions for U.S. Military Readiness Tests—Worldwide.” (Ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, Box 111, 381, World-Wide Increased Readiness Posture (Oct. 69))

   During an October 18 telephone conversation with Laird, “K[issinger] said the President asked him to thank L[aird] for the plan. K said it’s a little early to tell, but maybe there will be a little payoff.” Kissinger handicapped the gambit’s likelihood of success during separate October 20 telephone conversations with New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and Fritz Kraemer, Kissinger’s intellectual mentor. At 11:10 a.m., Kissinger told Rockefeller, “the thing they discussed the other day—it’s gotten down to producing little twitches. K said there’s now a 30 percent chance—it would be sheer gold if we could get away with it.” At 12:30 p.m., he cryptically told Kraemer that “something we are doing” had a 10 percent chance of succeeding. “It has no business succeeding, but it may.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)