74. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant, National Security
Council Staff (Haig)
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, October 9,
1969.
- SUBJECT
- Items to Discuss with the President, October 10
1. Inform the President that you have instructed Defense to proceed with
the alert measures he approved yesterday.2 (At Tab A is a list of pros and cons of each of the
measures listed in the memo. Those which are being implemented and for
which detailed plans are being prepared with a submission date of
October 10, are checked.)
[Omitted here are points 2 through 5, which deal with unrelated
matters.]
[Page 262]
Tab A
Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense3
Initial Evaluation of Possible Military Actions
- 1.
- Implementation of radio and/or other communications silence in
selected areas or commands, e.g., in SAC and Polaris forces.4
- a.
- Pros:
- —low cost.
- —easily detected.
- —unusual U.S.
action.
- —high initial impact; possibly alarming in
significance.
- —could be puzzling for long period.
- —low public exposure.
- —feasible for early execution.
- b.
- Cons:
- —very restricting to normal operational and
administrative requirements.
- —will gradually lose significance.
- —may be shown up as a sham as Soviet
reconnaissance/surveillance fails to turn up
complementing activity, such as alerting or
movement of forces.
- 2.
- Stand-down of flying combat aircraft in selected areas or
commands, e.g., for 48 hours in SAC and EUCOM.
- a.
- Pros:
- —rather easily detected in perhaps one
day.
- —would be considered both unusual and
significant if event includes sizeable
forces.
- —feasible of early execution.
- —negative cost.
- b.
- Cons:
- —moderately visible to public.
- —difficult to extend beyond several days
without disrupting training proficiency and
administrative schedule.
- —lack of supporting actions, such as recall of
personnel on leave and dispersal of forces, might
expose overall action as sham.
- 3.
- Increased surveillance of Soviet ships en route to North
Vietnam.
- a.
- Pros.
- —low cost.
- —easily detected by ship and promptly
reported.
- —significant departure from current
operations.
- —no direct public exposure.
- —feasible of early execution.
- —implies significant U.S. interest in Soviet actions.
- —can be continued for long period.
- b.
- Cons:
- —diverts destroyer, helicopter and patrol
aircraft from other important tasks.
- —could provoke Soviet charges of interference
with shipping on high seas, with attendant public
exposure.
- —increases chance of collision at sea.
- —could encourage counterharassment of U.S. shipping.
- 4.
- Increased reconnaissance sorties around the periphery of the
Soviet Union.
- a.
- Pros:
- —easily detected, perhaps over period of one
week.
- —no public exposure in U.S. unless Soviets take hostile
action.
- —can be integrated into over-all U.S. surveillance
program.
- —can be continued over long period.
- —would be considered very significant, though
not necessarily unusual.
- b.
- Cons:
- —will divert limited resources from other high
priority tasks.
- —increased risk of shoot-down by
Soviets.
- —risk of Soviet-sponsored initiatives by other
Red countries against U.S. surveillance craft.
- 5.
- Increased ground alert rate of SAC bombers and tankers.
- a.
- Pros:
- —rather easily detected over several
days.
- —particularly significant when coupled with
nuclear weapon loading.
- —low public exposure.
- —feasible of early execution.
- —low cost.
- b.
- Cons:
- —difficult to maintain for weeks without
strain on air crews.
- 6.
- Dispersal of SAC aircraft with
nuclear weapons to only military dispersal bases.
- a.
- Pros:
- —easily detected.
- —highly significant to Soviets.
- —low or negative costs after several
days.
- —can be executed quickly.
- —can be sustained over long period.
- b.
- Cons:
- —could be publicly alarming, depending on
situation and interpretation.
- 7.
- Alerting or sending to sea of SSBNs currently in port or alongside tender.
- a.
- Pros:
- —easily detected by Soviet shore spotters, and
promptly reported.
- —recognized by Soviets as departure from
scheduled operations.
- —feasible of early execution for submarines
not undergoing extensive repairs.
- —absence from port can be maintained for long
duration.
- —Soviets cannot determine destination or
mission.
- b.
- Cons:
- —stimulates speculation by dependents and
results in positive public exposure in U.S.
- —delays or interrupts repair and upkeep
periods.
- —degrades long-term readiness.
