Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972

191. Memorandum for the President’s Files by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, August 10, 1971.

• PARTICIPANTS
  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard
  • Admiral Moorer—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • General Westmoreland—Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
  • Admiral Zumwalt—Chief of Naval Operations
  • General Ryan—Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
  • General Chapman—Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
  • General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The President introduced the meeting by emphasizing that this year’s budgetary problems are more complex and difficult than those of the preceding year. The President noted that it was ironic that a conservative President could do less in the defense area that what one would expect. He observed that Senator Proxmire² and other responsible leaders on the Hill are going over each Service budget with a fine-tooth comb and unquestionably cuts would be imposed through Congressional action this coming year. The President stated that the point he was trying to make is that despite the need for increased defense spending the environment in the Congress does not lend itself to a hopeful outlook.

In addition to the foregoing, the President continued, all concerned are aware that the military as a profession has been under a diabolical attack from every source. It is now fashionable to say that we’ve got too much in the way of defense and that the people that we have serving in our Armed Forces are of low caliber. The President noted that his Administration has been trying to reverse this trend in attitude. Nevertheless, Congress could be expected to reflect the public attitude. Congressmen no longer lead as they did 25 years ago but rather take their cue from what they consider to be the popular consensus. The President noted that when the question is asked of the American people in the right way their response is always strong and patriotic. For example, they would answer “no” if they were asked if they wanted the United States to slip into the second most powerful position. Unfortunately, however, the question is not posed in this black and white fashion.

Thus, the President continued, as with the previous two years, this year will be especially difficult in getting the Congress to support even the rock bottom minimum which the Executive will request. Nevertheless, the President emphasized, it is his job and the job of the Chiefs to lay out what is required and then to fight to see that these requirements are met. It is obvious that these great tides frequently change and sometime in the future we will turn the corner when the American people will be willing to give far more for defense.

For all these reasons it is essential that the Executive Branch present its requirements in the most effective way. The President stated that his chief concern about our military posture was not its current state but rather the state that it would reach as a result of the decisions being made now. The President noted that the Joint Chiefs must harbor some considerable frustrations. Nevertheless, he wanted them to be aware that he was determined that the United States would remain first in military posture. He emphasized that his view is of the future, not of the past. At the same time he cautioned that pragmatism would indicate that the battle will be tougher this year than ever before.

The President then turned the presentation over to Admiral Moorer but Secretary Laird intervened, commenting that the defense posture and defense budget (the budget for FY 1972) will fare reasonably well this year. It was probable that all but 1.5% of the Administration’s request would be cleared by the Congress. The Secretary stated that he had had outstanding support this past year from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and that this coming year’s budget when priced out in requirements terms from a military viewpoint totalled some $94 billion after it was scrubbed by the Chairman versus the $117 billion JSOP requirement. Based on these reviews, the Secretary had put out guidance at a level of $79.6 billion which would be used as a baseline for discussions that day by the various chiefs. Thus we were talking about three fundamental planning figures. Secretary Laird’s guidance at $79.6 billion, the strategic guidance baseline issued earlier by Defense which totalled $83 billion and the JSOP itself prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which anticipated requirements at a level of $117 billion.³

Admiral Moorer began his presentation by indicating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff greatly appreciated the support of the Commander in Chief. He also expressed the appreciation of the group that the President would take the time to hear their individual presentations. He noted that the professional military were well aware of the problems borne by the President. Nevertheless, they believed that it was essential that the President hear their considered military views since the strategic balance is the basis for the nation’s security.

The Chairman commenced his briefing by showing a series of charts⁴ covering the following subjects:

• —A chart showing the increasing threat from Soviet ICBM’s starting at a period when the Soviets had some 90 silos at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. He went then to a chart that showed the growth of Soviet submarines and next a chart showing the status of Soviet bomber aircraft. Finally in discussing strategic systems the Chairman showed a chart which indicated that the Soviets could have as many as 2,120 strategic weapons versus 2,710 for the United States by the year 1976. The Chairman noted that the U.S. MIRV provided the edge with the Minuteman III and Poseidon. This would continue to assure us a strategic edge providing the Soviets do not MIRV. The Chairman then pointed out the differences between U.S. strategic forces and Soviet forces in terms of megatonnage, with the Soviets outstripping us by 11,700 megatons versus 3800 for U.S. strategic forces.
• —A chart of strategic defense systems which showed a comparison of the full range of U.S. and Soviet strategic defensive systems. The Chairman made the point that all of the charts confirmed that we have now entered a period of strategic parity which was decidedly different than the period of former superiority. He noted that this year’s budget provided less manpower, less ships and less aircraft than the U.S. has had since World War II. He noted that during the prior Administration the U.S. had purchased military end items from the viewpoint of attrition but not with the view towards modernization of our basic forces. This was further complicated in the Vietnam war period when we drewdown for war in the Pacific from our readiness in the Atlantic and NATO. The Chairman stated that the military had tried to reverse this trend by increasing the modernization of weapons but that these steps at today’s inflated costs are most expensive.

The Chairman then commented that the Soviets have continued to build up all of their conventional forces and all of their services and then turned to a map of the world to graphically display the kinds of improvements the Soviets have undertaken. He noted the following:

• —Submarines located between the U.S. and Hawaii.
• —Submarines in the Florida straits.
• —Attack submarines which threatened our water routes to Europe and elsewhere.
• —Increased naval presence in the Cuban area.
• —The threat posed by political events in Chile.
• —Turning next to the Mediterranean he stressed that Malta was now in jeopardy and stated that the Congressional attitude on Greece was making our foothold there all the more difficult. He noted the increased Soviet buildup in Egypt and the fact that the Soviets were not overflying the Sinai Peninsula with Foxbat aircraft. He emphasized that the Soviets have provided to the Egyptians the latest in modern air defense equipment.
• —The increased Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and the recent signature of a treaty with India.⁵
• —The impact that reversion of Okinawa would have on our strategic posture in the Pacific and the need to relocate our tactical nuclear stocks.
• —The question mark of Taiwan, the Philippines and the all important issue of the future orientation of Japan. He emphasized that Japan will most likely take its cue from its assessment of our own military resolve and capability.

For all the preceding reasons, the Chairman emphasized, the JCS have become increasingly concerned by the shift in balance in military power.

Turning to the budget, he stated that the 79.6 budget has been examined in detail by the JCS. They have looked strenuously for areas that could be further reduced but the Congressionally imposed pay raise and the need to strive for an All-Volunteer force all contributed to the feeling that 79.6 was just enough for strategic force sufficiency but additional improvements are needed for command and control and accuracy. The budget provided for modernization but was weak in materiel support and relied too heavily on reserves.

The Chairman reported that the JCS have looked at a level of 81.7 billion which would provide increased air, more mobility and improved Army and Marine readiness. The Joint Staff also looked at the possibility of an 82.5 billion dollar budget level. This would provide greater improvement and demonstrate greater resolve on the part of the United States. Thus, 79.6 billion will provide the U.S. with only marginal capability. Above all, only one war could be fought—either NATO or Asia. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is also a Pacific power and a conflict in NATO would mean a conflict in Asia as well. The Soviets, for example, have over 94 submarines in the Pacific. Again, for these reasons the JCS feel that the 79.6 level is marginal with considerable risks which would deprive the President of the options he might require in future diplomatic problem solving. For all these reasons, the Chairman concluded, we should look carefully and list in realistic terms our commitments. If we cannot afford the level of spending outlined, then there is nothing left but to reduce our commitments.

The Chairman then turned the briefing over to General Westmoreland who handed a series of charts⁶ to the President. General Westmoreland stated that the driving requirement of defense today is for a strong defense in Western Europe. He noted that NSDM 95⁷ provided for a conventional initial defense. SACEUR considered that 17 Army divisions would be required for this purpose by M+90 in the central region. General Westmoreland then showed U.S. reenforcement capabilities under the budget level promulgated by Secretary Laird. This meant there would be some shortfall because of dollar and manpower constraints on our ability to meet NATO commitments by M+90.

General Westmoreland then turned to a chronological display of how Army forces had been reduced over the period 1948 through 1973. This chart reflected the fact that in practice the United States had been unable to employ or call up reserve forces in time of crisis. It also showed a precipitous decline in Army strength since 1968 with some 220,000 projected for deactivation this year alone and a total of 670,000 deactivated since 1968.

General Westmoreland noted that at either division level, that is a total of 13 divisions or 11 divisions, the Army would be at its lowest base since prior to the Korean War. He pointed out that this year’s budget would only permit the Army to retain 11 combat divisions, with a crossover occurring in 1972. This reduction would result in a shortfall of four divisions in NATO alone and the assumption of significant risks for our overall ability to defend Europe. He stressed that this fact would be evident to the enemy and also to our allies on whose support we must rely. With the retention of 13 Army divisions it would be possible to meet the NATO commitment by M+90. This would require a greater dependence on reserves but the shortfall would be far more manageable than with 11 divisions.

General Westmoreland then displayed a chart, showing that with a base structure of 13 Army divisions it would only be necessary to call up 290,000 reserves by M+90 in the event of war in Europe. But with 11 divisions it would be necessary to call up 350,000 reserves. He noted that past experience indicated the difficulty of obtaining a decision to mobilize in times of crisis. He also observed that during the Korean conflict it took 11 months to get a National Guard division prepared for combat. The budget projected for 1973 therefore demanded a greater requirement on reserves. Even if the Army were able to retain 13 divisions it would only have some 69% of its required force structure in the event of a conflict in Europe. General Westmoreland emphasized that the Army needed visibility and forces in being, for this is the essence of deterrence.

With an 11 division Army, General Westmoreland continued, four and one-third divisions would be in NATO, three and two-thirds would be in the Continental United States for deployment and only one division forward in the Pacific area, with one-third division reserve in Hawaii. In the final analysis, this would leave only one and two-thirds divisions in the United States to meet contingencies worldwide. It would leave the President with absolutely no flexibility for contingencies and would deprive the United States of its credibility for defense of the Asian area.

General Westmoreland emphasized that the Army needed 13 active divisions and wanted an additional $500 million to maintain this strength. He noted that such a structure would provide the basis for realistic deterrence with the ability to respond initially without mobilization. Dr. Kissinger asked why two divisions would cost $500 million.

General Westmoreland stated that the sum was needed for personnel and the operational and maintenance account. The President asked if the figure would assure the military pay raise and the steps necessary to achieve an All-Volunteer force. Secretary Laird replied affirmatively, noting that the budget assumed that the Congressionally approved pay raise would become law. The President then asked if the pay raise could be delayed. Secretary Laird replied that it had already been delayed from July until next October with some irritation to the Congress.

Admiral Moorer then turned the briefing over to General Ryan. General Ryan emphasized that the Air Force budget had been rock bottom in 1972 and was now projected at a lower figure in 1973. Using FY 1964 as a base, General Ryan noted the decline in Air Force manpower and emphasized that fewer people cost more money. Forty percent of the Air Force budget in FY 1973 would be allocated to pay and allowances. He stated that the Air Force would have 32% fewer squadrons in 1973 than in 1964. He reported that the Air Force had fewer people, fewer forces and increased costs and at the same time its equipment was aging and the FY 1973 budget permitted the procurement of only 41 new aircraft.

General Ryan stated that he would avoid comment on strategic forces since that had been well covered by the Chairman but would instead concentrate on air defense. He noted that U.S. radars had drastically declined and that two-thirds of the U.S. intercepter aircraft would have to be met by reserve forces. He reported that Air Force readiness was declining with a reduction in numbers of crews. He noted the unsatisfied need for an aircraft shelter program in Europe.

In summary, General Ryan stated that the Air Force needed an additional $1 billion to be applied to increased sorties and therefore increased readiness, increased modernization and accelerated development of Minuteman III and the MIRV. With the improvement cited, the Air Force’s posture would be greatly enhanced.

Admiral Moorer then turned the briefing over to Admiral Zumwalt. Admiral Zumwalt proceeded through a series of some 34 charts.⁸ The CNO made the following points:

• —He would attempt to answer the question as to why naval forces are needed, how plans are made to provide for these forces and how these forces meet the needs.
• —The Nixon Doctrine demands a reorientation of U.S. military force structure. The briefing that followed would project the CNO’s view.
• —New constraints further underline the U.S. need to reorient its defenses.
• —The question is how the military can provide the kind of power the President needs to make his diplomacy effective.

The President interrupted and stated that he had noted that Gerard Smith had discussed the possibility of a U.S. zero ABM proposal. Dr. Kissinger confirmed this and Secretary Laird stated that DOD was opposed. Secretary Laird stated that Defense was not happy with even the two-sided proposal but at least it would provide the basis for an ultimate expansion to 12. With zero ABM the whole strategic concept would have to be modified.⁹

Dr. Kissinger commented that the zero ABM proposal would only lead to discussion of a comprehensive agreement while the May 20 statement¹⁰ was an effort to get a limitation on ABM plus a temporary bridge for offensive limitations. Dr. Kissinger emphasized that he agreed with the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs if a quick agreement is to be realized. Secretary Laird stated that he agreed with this thinking except for the cutoff date in NSDMs 117 and 120,¹¹ which would give the Soviets unnecessary numerical advantage. Dr. Kissinger assured Secretary Laird that the issue would be reviewed.

Secretary Laird stated that the United States Government cannot move off a position once it has been agreed to. The President stated that zero ABM plus a strategic freeze would only serve to put the U.S. in an inferior position. He instructed Dr. Kissinger to move Mr. Smith from that course of action.

Admiral Zumwalt then continued his briefing:

• —We are observing increasing growth of neutralism of the Finnish type. The Soviet naval threat is increasing in Asia, the Caribbean, and the Indian Ocean.
• —All the foregoing suggests that the U.S. should shift its defensive emphasis to that of a maritime power.
• —The Middle East and Greece are no longer an assured base for land, air and ground forces and thus they are no longer relevant.

The President again interrupted and asked whether or not the Poseidon was working well since the Poseidon and Minuteman III with the MIRV are our most important strategic assets. The President asked Dr. Kissinger why the Soviets were not interested in a MIRV ban. Dr. Kissinger replied that it was because the Soviets are behind us in MIRV development. They want to catch up. Secretary Laird noted that he estimated that the Soviets will have MIRV’s in CY 1972 or 1973. The President observed that most of our Congressmen wanted a MIRV ban at the very time when it is most crucial for our defense.

Mr. Packard stated that the MIRV is essential unless we get a specific agreement stopping total numbers of offensive systems. The Minuteman III with three MIRV’s each is equal to one Minuteman I in accuracy and lethality. It is essential to our current strategic balance. It provides additional targetting flexibility and must not be given up.

The Vice President asked if there were an offensive limitation couldn’t the Soviets merely move forward with the MIRV in the final analysis? Admiral Zumwalt replied that a crucial question was the number of MIRV’s that are provided to each warhead—10 or 20. The Vice President stated that he thought that throw weight would be a key issue. Secretary Laird stated that this is the precise reason for his concern. He stated that the U.S. advantage is technology and that with appropriate research and development we can maintain our present lead. The President agreed that for this reason the U.S. must push research and development which is allowed within the provisions of the May 20 agreement.

General Ryan stated that we must continue to push for increased accuracy and that this is the very argument that opens us to accusations that we are going to a first strike. The President agreed that it was essential that the U.S. push research and development leading towards increased accuracy.

Dr. Kissinger stated that the China studies¹² confirmed that Minuteman is of no value against targets on the Mainland due to the need to overfly Soviet territory. Therefore, the emphasis against that target must be with aircraft and Poseidons. The study also confirmed that the U.S. will be able to pre-empt for perhaps the next 10 to 15 years. The President observed that this was also why bombers remain relevant. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Poseidon would not be good against Soviet hard targets but would be most effective against soft Chinese targets.

Admiral Zumwalt continued his briefing:

• —He emphasized the continuing change in the conventional balance and noted that the Soviets were outbuilding the U.S. in missile platforms and merchant ships. The President asked whether the CNO was drawing his comparisons from just U.S. power or whether he was including allies as well. The CNO answered that he had included allied vessels also.
• —The Soviets are moving towards a three-to-one superiority in submarines, to include superiority in nuclear vessels, while at the same time improving noise levels to approach our technology.
• —The Soviets have a greater naval presence in the Mediterranean and will increase the margin in 1973.
• —The Soviets have built bases near Libya, and Malta is now in doubt. The President noted that it was tragic that we lost the Malta election by only one vote.¹³
• —U.S. naval ship days at sea are decreasing.
• —Ten years from now the Soviets will have complete dominance in the Indian Ocean.
• —The U.S. decline in naval power has been persistent and each projection of the Soviet buildup has underestimated their capabilities.
• —At the same time the U.S. has declined 43% in combat vessels and 15% in personnel, and only in the shore establishments have we retained a large overhead.
• —Admiral Zumwalt asked the President to view the budget of $79.6 billion from the perspective of “Jimmy the Greek.”¹⁴ In sum, our naval capability in NATO started to decline in 1970, became marginal in 1971, was worse in 1972, by 1973 the Navy cannot carry out its mission in the Pacific, Mediterranean or in NATO and there would be no guarantee of victory in a war at sea.
• —The CNO presented his view of the relative priorities for force emphasis:

  (1) Strategic forces.

  (2) Control of Seas.

  (3) Land forces.

• —Talk of projection of land forces abroad using air mobility lacks factual basis since 94% of supplies must come over the water.
• —In the event of the loss of our allies we can only survive through sea power.
• —The following additional naval needs should be met:

  (1) $102 million for new ship procurement.

  (2) $106 million for new aircraft carrier procurement.

  (3) A new nuclear carrier.

  (4) A new nuclear frigate.

  (5) Retain 107 ships scheduled for phase-out.

  (6) Grant authority for additional base closures.

  (7) Great authority for home-porting of naval vessels abroad.

The CNO concluded by emphasizing his own view of a war outcome, which suggested a less than 30% chance of victory at sea in a conflict with the Soviets.

Admiral Moorer then turned the briefing over to General Chapman, who made the following points:

• —The Marines are in excellent shape with three divisions and three support wings and a peacetime strength of 206,000.
• —All Marines are out of Vietnam with new modern equipment, both air and ground. The President asked if the Marines learned something in Vietnam. General Westmoreland answered that much was learned, especially in helicopter-borne operations and electronic warfare. The President observed that much of what was learned was for a specialized war. General Westmoreland replied that many of the lessons learned would be applicable in war with the Soviets. General Chapman added that all services had emerged with a reservoir of combat experience. Now it would be necessary to learn how to use the new equipment.
• —The Marines would have two-thirds of a division in Okinawa, one division on the East Coast and one division on the West Coast.
• —Additional needs would be met by reserves on M+60. Since July, however, reserve recruiting was only achieving 55% of its goal.
• —The Marines are in excellent shape, ready to fight.
• —In FY 1973 the new budget will require a reduction of 20,000 Marines and the cutting of 27 companies or one company per battalion on the ground and one squadron per air wing. To restore these cuts $178 million would be needed.
• —The Marines are ready even with one company out of each battalion.

The President stated that he wished to have Secretary Connally and Presidential Assistant Shultz receive the briefing as soon as possible because he wanted all of our Government spokesmen to speak from the same frame of reference. The President then observed that military credibility is the essence of deterrence but more importantly is based on the forces that can be seen in the grey areas of India, Japan, the Middle East and Latin America. An effective foreign policy stems directly from a credible defense posture. Our relative strength vis-à-vis the Soviets and Chinese is actually less of a problem than the image we project to the grey areas and especially Japan. It is not a simple matter of merely withdrawing our forces because of no military need but the psychological impact of our withdrawal.

With respect to the Navy, the President continued, the picture is very disturbing. The real problem is modernization of the Soviet fleet both in numbers of vessels and missiles. Mr. Packard commented that for whatever the reason, the U.S. has not been as good as it should have been. There are now steps underway to provide for more modernization. Modernization of the fleet is far more important than the retention of outmoded ships.

The Vice President stated that he had been in the Pacific on three occasions and had noted that U.S. credibility is derived largely from what the small nations report about our presence. At present they suspect we are losing our military power. When this is reported to potential enemies it cannot but hurt. Thus they have concluded that the Nixon Doctrine is merely a formula for bug-out. Admiral Moorer added that Prime Minister Sato¹⁵ had told him the same thing.

Secretary Laird commented that the U.S. is not bugging out but is going to maintain its presence. The Vice President asked, “But at what levels?” He then reiterated the view that in any event our actions have caused the Asians to doubt this.

The President then asked Secretary Laird if the Congress would vote new taxes. Secretary Laird replied emphatically that it would not. Admiral Moorer observed that as in the past a crisis was needed to reverse the trend. Admiral Zumwalt interjected that it is the trend that will bring on the crisis. The Vice President retorted that he did not agree with this analysis since the erosion of American determination will continue and the weaker we are the less inclined we will be to react in time of crisis.

Secretary Laird stated that the Chief of Naval Operations’ view is a good one. It is hard for us to retain our land-based air. Taiwan and Okinawa may not be available but a naval presence can be maintained. Our current strength is already down to one and one-third Army divisions spread between Korea and Hawaii. Thus our current strength is down to nothing. Navy and Air Force strength will continue to decline.

The President noted that the Indian Ocean remains a problem and in the Middle East at the time of the Jordanian crisis the Soviets were bluffed with little U.S. strength. Dr. Kissinger stated that he was a great believer in the importance of sea power but at the same time it should be noted that allies cannot be convinced with sea power alone. Evidence of this was the Korean conflict in the 1950s. Sea power is ambivalent and there can be no substitute for a visible ground presence in Southeast Asia.

Secretary Laird replied that the decision had already been made on ground power. Dr. Kissinger replied that that kind of a decision would have to come to the National Security Council. The President then commented that another factor would be air power. Secretary Laird commented that it then was obvious that we would have to have a 13 division force.

Admiral Moorer then observed that the Trust Territories were also an important problem area.

Secretary Laird then complained that much of the Defense budget was for national reconnaissance and CIA buried in the Defense budget. Unfortunately, the Air Force had to pay these bills. The real question now was how low the U.S. could go and remain credible. Morale was also a severe problem and retention of good men was most difficult during a period of declining expenditures.

The meeting then adjourned.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 62, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room and lasted from 10:05 to 11:54 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) There is a tape recording of this conversation. (Ibid., Presidential Tape Recordings, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 68–7)
2. Senator William Proxmire (D–Wisconsin).
3. See footnote 6, Document 184 and 187. Laird discussed this meeting and the Chiefs’ objectives with Kissinger during two telephone conversations, one on August 4 and another on August 9. Laird said that inter-service tensions had developed over the projected Defense budget. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
4. Not found.
5. On August 9, the Soviet Union and India announced the signing of a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation.
6. Not found.
7. NSDM 95, “U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO,” November 25, 1970, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
8. Not found.
9. The zero ABM option in SALT proposed elimination of all such systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The two-sided option proposed allowing each side to retain limited ABM capabilities, including systems to defend NCA.
10. On May 20, Nixon and Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin issued a joint communiqué about SALT, stating that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to concentrate on working out one agreement limiting ABMs and another limiting offensive strategic weapons. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 160.
11. For the texts of NSDM 117, “Instructions for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki,” July 2, and NSDM 120, which gave further instructions for the U.S. SALT Delegation on July 20, see ibid., Documents 171 and 180.
12. Reference is to the NSSM 69 study; see footnote 7, Document 181.
13. General elections held in Malta June 12–14 resulted in a victory for the Labour Party, which by obtaining a one-seat majority in the new Maltese House of Representatives ended 9 years of rule by the Nationalist Party. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1971–1972, p. 24709)
14. Jimmy “The Greek” Snyder was a Las Vegas oddsmaker, sports expert, and television personality.
15. Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan.