166. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)1
Washington, January 13,
1971.
MEMORANDUM FOR
- Dr. Henry
Kissinger
- Mr. John N. Irwin
II
- Mr. Richard
Helms
- Dr. Gerard Smith
- Lt. Gen. John W.
Vogt
- SUBJECT
- Attached Paper on Safeguard
I would appreciate your handling the attached papers on a close-hold
basis for now. They deal with the Administration posture on Safeguard
for FY 72.
The reasons for including the Washington, D.C. site in our FY 72 proposed programs are three:
- (a)
- It is the next logical step towards the area defense the
President is committed to.
- (b)
- It is a part of the U.S.
SALT approaches and
proposal.
- (c)
- We need to find out whether Congress is willing to authorize a
Washington Defense or not. If they will, we should proceed with
it. If they won’t, we must adjust our defense program and SALT approaches
accordingly.
I would like to get together with the addressees on Saturday morning
(1/16/71) to discuss the issue. Thereafter we can determine any further
modification and distribution of the paper.
[Page 669]
Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR ADDRESSEES
- SUBJECT
- Safeguard and Related Strategic Programs
In the FY 72 Defense Department Budget
we are proposing the following key programs:
- —Proceed with a hardening program to upgrade the Minuteman
silos to 1000 psi.
- —Continue the 4-site Safeguard program and add advanced
funding for the Washington, D.C. site. Maintain the option
to start area defense procurement in FY 73.
- —Initiate Advanced Development of a Hard-Site Defense
system to augment the 4-site Safeguard deployment in the
late 1970s.
- —Do concept formulation on mobile Minuteman as a further
hedge to Minuteman survivability.
In coming to these proposals we have had to address four key issues:
- 1.
-
What do we do about the future of
Minuteman? We have the options of (a) leaving
Minuteman to become vulnerable which raises crisis stability
questions, (b) phasing it out, which compromises the
President’s “diplomatic” sufficiency criterion2 (no conspicuous or apparent
disadvantage) until an alternative force could be deployed,
or (c) improving its survivability which improves the
confidence in our deterrent.
- 2.
-
Do we want a U.S. area defense system? There has
been no decrease in the threat from accidents or Nth
countries which could rationalize our eliminating the area
defense component of Safeguard. Such a defense would meet
our strategic sufficiency criterion against small attacks
and provide protection for strategic bombers and command and
control sites.
- 3.
-
Do we want an NCA defense? An NCA defense would give added
warning and decision time and could give effective
protection against small or accidental attacks. Such a
defense would be consistent with the latest U.S.
SALT position.
- 4.
-
What is the relationship between the
issues above and our latest SALT proposal? There is a clear
difference between the rationale for our [Page 670] planned strategic forces in
the absence of an arms control agreement and the rationale
for the forces permitted in our latest SALT proposal. The U.S. is committed to an area
defense and survivable forces through the Strategic
Sufficiency Criteria. Yet Option E3 gives up area
defense of the U.S. and
precludes any option (except upgrading the hardness of
existing silos) for improving Minuteman survival against
Soviet threats which are feasible within the limitations of
Option E. In addition, even though we have proposed an
ABM defense of
Washington coupled with offensive constraints in SALT, Congress failed to
approve the Washington, D.C. site in the FY 71 budget.
The program we are proposing for FY 72
is based upon the following DOD
assessment of the issues above and of the future direction for
U.S. strategic forces:
- —We need to maintain a survivable Minuteman force so long
as we can effectively do so;
- —We are committed to an area defense of the U.S.;
- —We desire a defense of the NCA either as part of an area defense, as an
addition to a Minuteman defense, or alone as a possible part
of a SALT agreement;
and
- —We desire to reach an equitable and verifiable agreement
on strategic arms limitations. Our current SALT position is subject to
modification because of changes in the strategic situation
since tabling of the U.S.
proposal. Clearly a successful agreement could modify the
three directions above.
The attached paper on Safeguard planning and related strategic
programs focuses in more detail upon these issues and the proposed
programs.4 We would welcome your views on the major issues
affecting these programs.
