100. National Security Decision Memorandum 741

TO

  • The Members of the National Security Council
  • The Attorney General
  • The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
  • The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

  • Detailed Statement of the Provisions of U.S. SALT Position

Attached is the statement as approved by the President, of the detailed provisions of the U.S. SALT position as outlined in NSDM 69 and NSDM 73.2

The material in the Detailed Statement is intended for the guidance of the United States Delegation in explaining the details of our position to the Soviet Delegation. Before presenting its contents, the Delegation should undertake the usual clearance procedures.

Henry A. Kissinger
[Page 327]

Attachment3

DETAILED STATEMENT OF NSDM 69 SALT POSITION (OPTION E)

(all provisions apply equally to each side, except as otherwise specifically provided)

I. ICBMs, SBBMs, and Heavy Bombers

A.
Limitations
a.
The aggregate total of ICBM launchers, sea-based ballistic missile (SBBM) launchers, and heavy bombers would be limited to 1900 as of an agreed date. Against this limit would be counted all operational ICBM launchers, SBBM launchers, and heavy bombers (as defined in paragraphs I.A.j., k., l.). Missile launchers for research, development, testing, training, and space missions are covered by a separate limit under section V.
b.
Within this aggregate total, the number of ICBM and SBBM launchers combined could not exceed a subtotal of 1710.
c.

Within the aggregate total and the missile subtotal, the number of launchers associated with modern, large ballistic missiles could not exceed 250. A “modern, large ballistic missile” is one whose volume exceeds 70 m3 and which is of a type which first became operational in 1964 or later. The force permitted each side by this limit could be obtained by retention of existing launchers already associated with modern, large missiles, by retrofitting such missiles into existing launchers not hitherto associated with such missiles, by basing such missiles on sea-borne platforms, or by constructing new fixed, land-based launchers for them. [See also paragraph I.A.e., I.A.h., I.B.a.]4

(Obtaining a separate limitation on modern, large missiles and assuring that such a limitation is adequately verifiable are absolutely essential. Preservation of particular possible means of building a U.S. force of modern, large missiles must not interfere with obtaining an effective and verifiable limit on the Soviet force of such missiles. This priority must be borne in mind in discussing with the Soviets the U.S. proposals with respect to offensive forces and in evaluating any possible modifications of the U.S. position.)

d.
We would initially propose a ban on deployment, production, and testing of land-mobile ICBM systems and their components and of ICBM systems utilizing water-borne vehicles on inland waterways. (This provision would not, however, prohibit vessels with SBBM launchers from transiting inland waterways when proceeding into and out of ports or in connection with normal construction, repair, and overhaul.)
e.

Any land-based ICBM silo whose construction is initiated after an agreed date, or which is relocated, or modified in externally observable ways, would be counted toward the limit of paragraph I.A.c. above.

(In the event the Soviets are unwilling to accept both the ban on land-mobile ICBMs and the controls on new ICBM launcher construction, we would be prepared to consider a fallback on one measure or the other, but not both.)

f.
Within the constraints set forth above, ICBM launchers, SBBM launchers, and heavy bombers could be substituted for each other on a one-for-one basis within the aggregate total and missile launcher subtotal, under agreed procedures.
g.
Existing SBBM launchers could be replaced by other SBBM launchers on a one-for-one basis, under agreed procedures.
h.
Subject to the limits on numbers of launchers for modern, large ballistic missiles, one-for-one replacement of deployed missiles by missiles of the same or a different type would be permitted. Retrofit of launchers previously associated with modern, large ballistic missiles would only be permitted if the launcher continued to be counted toward the limit of paragraph I.A.c. regardless of the dimensions of the new missile.
i.
There would be no limitation on the substitution under agreed procedures of new heavy bomber types for old heavy bomber types on a one-for-one basis, nor would there be other qualitative limitations on such bombers or their armaments.
j.
ICBMs are defined as land-based ballistic missiles which have a capability of ranges in excess of 5000 kilometers. ICBM launchers, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted against the ICBM launcher limit. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment missile systems (FOBS) would also be counted as ICBM launchers.
k.
“Heavy bombers” would be understood to comprise at present U.S. B–52, and the Soviet Myasishchev Bisons and Tupolev–95 Bears. Aircraft of these types would be counted as “heavy bombers” regardless of service subordination, i.e., Bears assigned to Soviet Navy count. Heavy bombers used as training, tanker, or reconnaissance aircraft would be counted in the aggregate. (The U.S. would not propose counting [Page 329]heavy bombers in storage. However, if the Soviets raise the issue, we would be prepared to consider counting them in return for an appropriate Soviet concession.) Inclusion or exclusion of future types of aircraft as heavy bombers would be decided through consultation on a case-by-case basis.
l.
“Sea-based ballistic missiles” are defined as ballistic missiles with launchers on submarines or surface ships regardless of the nature of the propulsion plant of the vessel, including those on vessels undergoing overhaul or conversion. (If pressed for a definition in terms of range, we would suggest 100 km. initially. In any event, tactical systems such as SUBROC would be excluded while the SS–N–4 and 5 would be counted.)
B.
Corollary Limitations
a.
New MR/IRBM silos not distinguishable by national means from silos for ICBMs of any type would be counted against the limit on launchers for modern, large ballistic missiles.
b.
There would be a ban on land-mobile systems of any range which are not distinguishable by national means from land-mobile ICBMs. (In the event land-mobile ICBMs are not banned, land-mobile systems indistinguishable from land-mobile ICBMs would count as ICBMs for purposes of the limits in I.A.a. and I.A.b., and, if their missiles exceeded 70 m3 in volume, as modern, large missiles for purposes of the limit of I.A.c.) The United States would, however, stipulate that a land-mobile missile with a volume of less than 9 m3 and associated with a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) of less than 14 meters in overall length (when equipped with missile container or pod) is presumptively not of intercontinental range. We would also be prepared to accept convincing evidence that identified types of land-mobile missiles, whose dimensions exceed these, lacked ICBM range.
c.
There would be agreed procedures for:
(1)
Exchanging declarations, within a specified time after signing of the agreement, regarding proposed programs for reaching the agreed aggregate total. These declarations would contain the numbers and types of ICBM launchers, SBBM launchers, and heavy bombers, which would constitute the initial aggregate total.
(2)
Advance notification of intended permitted missile launcher and heavy bomber substitution or replacement, and of intended deployment of new heavy bomber types, in order to facilitate verification of changes in the aggregate mix of missile launchers and heavy bombers.
(3)
Destruction or dismantling of missile launchers or heavy bombers which are to become excess in the process of reaching agreed levels and/or changing the aggregate mix, in order to facilitate verification of such destruction or dismantling.
(4)
Advance notification of deployment of any permitted mobile missile systems. Such notification would include photographs (e.g., parade-type photographs) and statements of the dimensions of both the new missiles and their transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). (If the Soviets balk at providing photos or dimensional information, we should not insist on it.)
d.
Use of covered facilities for fitting out and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification. This prohibition would not bar normal overhaul, conversion, or other work on submarines or surface ships under cover, in accordance with current practices.
e.
The conversion of transport aircraft for use as heavy bombers would be prohibited.
C.

Verification

Verification would be provided by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the corollary limitations and cooperative measures agreed upon.

II. MR/IRBMs

Fixed land-based MR/IRBM launchers would not be limited except for the previously listed provision on new MR/IRBM silos [paragraph I.B.a.]. Mobile land-based MR/IRBMs with a maximum range capability of less than 5000 kilometers which are not externally distinguishable from land-mobile ICBM systems would be counted as ICBMs if mobile ICBMs are permitted, and banned if mobile ICBMs are prohibited [paragraph I.B.b.].

III. Cruise Missiles

Testing of cruise missiles of intercontinental range, and deployment of launchers for such missiles, would be prohibited. Submarine-or surface ship-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) would not be otherwise limited.

IV. ABMs

Either of two alternative provisions, of equal status as United States positions, could be agreed for limitations on deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

A.
NCA” Level
1.
Limitations
a.
Deployment of ABM systems would be limited to systems appropriate for defense of the National Command Authority on each side (Moscow and Washington). One hundred fixed ABM launchers and one hundred deployed ABM interceptors, together with associated radars, would be permitted each side. (The phrase “deployed ABM interceptor” [Page 331]refers to any ABM interceptor located on or in the vicinity of an ABM launcher). Any other ABM launchers or associated radars existing or under construction at the time the agreement came into effect would be dismantled (except for those facilities permitted under paragraphs IV.A.1.b. and d. and IV.A.2.a.) Such equipment could be used in permitted R&D or operational sites.
b.
The Soviet Union could retain or replace its present 64 ABM launchers deployed in the vicinity of Moscow, and could add up to 36 additional launchers within 100 kilometers of the center of Moscow, to serve a total of no more than 100 deployed interceptors. The U.S. would be allowed to deploy 100 launchers and 100 interceptors within 100 kilometers of the center of Washington, D.C.
c.
It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an “ABM,” but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM interceptor. The understanding would recognize as ABM interceptors the Soviet Galosh (ABM–1) and the U.S. Spartan and Sprint, but would not include anti-aircraft systems, such as the Soviet systems SA–1 through SA–6 and the U.S. Nike–Hercules and Hawk. [See paragraph IV.A.1.e.]
d.
Radars would be limited as follows:
(1)
The Soviet Union could retain the Dog House radar at Naro Fominsk, the phased array radar under construction at Chekhov, and the four active Try Add radar complexes around Moscow; and could have two additional Try Add radar complexes within 100 kilometers of the center of Moscow. (If the Soviets raise the issue, we would agree to allow the Soviets to build an additional face on the Chekhov radar, providing coverage toward China.) (In the event we eventually agreed to allow the Soviets any new or replacement radars analogous to the Chekhov or Dog House radars, they would have to be located within 200 km. of the center of Moscow.) The U.S. could deploy a roughly equivalent ABM radar system in a defense centered on the Washington, D.C. area, comprising up to 6 PAR-type faces (at no more than two sites) within 200 kilometers of the center of Washington and 4 MSR-type faces (at no more than two sites) within 100 kilometers of the center of Washington.
(2)
Soviet Hen House-type radars suitable for acquisition and tracking of ballistic missiles would be limited to those currently operational or under construction. We would inform the Soviets that we regard these radars as tolerable partly in view of their present vulnerability, and that we would consider increased SAM defense of such radars as inconsistent with an agreement. The U.S. would have the right to build an agreed number of additional radars to provide capability equivalent to that provided by the Soviet Hen Houses. PAR-type radar components and technology could be used in the U.S. equivalent system.
(3)
Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. It would be prohibited for either side to construct additional radars of the Dog House, Hen House, Try Add, MSR, or PAR types, or other radars specifically designed for ABM use, except as provided in paragraphs IV.A.1.a. and d. and in IV.A.2.a., or as agreed under the provisions of this paragraph. Possible eventual replacement of permitted ABM radars would be subject to consultation. Also, there would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitations. It would be agreed that non-ABM associated radars would be distinguished by established criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan).
e.
Upgrading of SAM systems (or other types of missile systems, whatever their original design mission) to convert them into ABMs, or to give them a dual anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile capability, or the development of new SAM systems or other missile systems (apart from permitted ABM systems) with such capabilities, would be prohibited. [See paragraph IV.A.2.d.] There would be no limitations on SAM systems in their air defense role as such.
f.
It would be prohibited to equip a deployed ABM launcher so as to give it the capability to handle more than a single ABM interceptor at one time or to give it the capability for rapid reload, through automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar reload mechanisms. Furthermore, there would be a prohibition on facilities, including storage facilities at the ABM sites, for reload interceptors. It would be understood, however, that this provision would not require any change in the present configuration of the Galosh system as now deployed or in the Safeguard system as now being deployed.
2.
Corollary Limitations
a.
ABM research and development would be permitted. Deployment of, as well as testing of, mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems or their components would, however, be prohibited. The testing of reload and multiple interceptor equipment whose deployment is banned by paragraph IV.A.1.f. would be banned. Launchers of ABM interceptors for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training from fixed launchers would be limited to (1) preannounced flight tests; (2) on not more than 15 launchers (in addition to those permitted under paragraph IV.A.1.a. and b.); (3) at current test ranges and agreed additional test ranges. (Training launches from operational ABM launchers would be permitted if preannounced.) Construction of radars for ABM R&D would be permitted only at current and agreed additional locations, chosen so as to restrict to a minimum the operational potential of such R&D radars.
b.
Flight-testing of SAM systems or other types of missile systems (apart from permitted ABM systems) in an ABM mode would be prohibited [see paragraph IV.A.2.d.].
c.
There would be agreed procedures for advance notification of the deployment of new SAM systems.
d.
In the process of negotiation, we would make clear to the Soviets the specific indicators we would employ in deciding whether a SAM system had ABM capability. Those indicators include:
(1)
relocation of sites;
(2)
changes in radar average power levels, aperture configurations, antenna types (e.g., introduction of phased-array site radars), signal characteristics, or improvements in or additional numbers of acquisition radars;
(3)
changes in missile characteristics (range, acceleration, burn-out velocity, propellants, exo-atmospheric capability);
(4)
introduction of new SAM systems;
(5)
appearance of nuclear warheads at additional SAM sites;
(6)
testing of SAMs in an apparent ABM mode. Indicators of tests of SAMs “in an ABM mode” would include such activities as any use of SAMs to intercept an RV, any flight-testing of SAMs to altitudes significantly higher than those attainable by aircraft, or flight testing of SAMs in association with ABM radars, including R&D radars.
3.

Verification

Verification would be provided by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with corollary limitations and cooperative measures agreed upon.

B.
“Zero” Level
1.
Limitations
a.
There would be a ban on deployment of fixed and mobile ABM systems, to include launchers, interceptors, and associated radars.
b.
Existing ABM launchers at all operational sites would be dismantled or destroyed. (For R&D launchers, see paragraph IV.B.2.a.) Within an agreed period of time after the agreement came into effect, and under agreed procedures, the Soviet Union would dismantle or destroy the existing ABM launcher system around Moscow. The U.S. would cancel deployment of the Safeguard system and, under agreed procedures, dismantle or destroy any ABM launchers already deployed or under construction. Launchers would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all interceptors and launch vehicles and observable destruction of launch platforms. Launcher equipment and interceptors removed from operational sites could be used for R&D, subject to the limitations of paragraph IV.B.2.a.
c.
It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an “ABM,” but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM interceptor. The understanding would recognize [Page 334]as ABM interceptors the Soviet Galosh ABM–1 and the U.S. Spartan and Sprint, but would not include anti-aircraft systems such as the Soviet SA–1 through SA–6 and the U.S. Nike–Hercules and Hawk. [See paragraph IV.B.1.e.]
d.
Radars would be limited as follows:
(1)
Within an agreed period of time after the agreement came into effect, and under agreed procedures, the Soviet Union would dismantle the Dog House radar at Naro Fominsk, the radar under construction at Chekhov, and the Try Add radar complexes round Moscow, as well as any similar radars for any ABM system (other than R&D radars permitted under paragraph IV.B.2.a). (For Hen House-type radars, see paragraph IV.B.2.d.(2).) The U.S. would cancel deployment of the Safeguard system, and, under agreed procedures, dismantle or destroy any radar facilities (other than R&D radars permitted under para. IV.B.2.a.) for any ABM system already deployed or under construction, subject to possible retention of certain PAR-type radars under paragraph IV.B.1.d.(2). Radars would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all structures supporting or mounting radar faces. Radar equipment removed from operational sites could be used for R&D, subject to the limitations of paragraph IV.B.2.a.
(2)
Soviet Hen House-type radars suitable for acquisition and tracking of ballistic missiles would be limited to those currently operational or under construction. We would inform the Soviets that we regard these radars as tolerable partly in view of their present vulnerability, and that we would consider increased SAM defense of such radars as inconsistent with an agreement. The U.S. would have the right to build an agreed number of additional radars to provide capability equivalent to that provided by the Soviet Hen Houses. PAR-type radar components and technology could be used in the U.S. equivalent system.
(3)
Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. It would be prohibited for either side to construct additional radars of the Dog House, Hen House, Try Add, MSR, or PAR types, or other radars specifically designed for ABM use, except as provided in paragraphs IV.B.1.d.(2) and IV.B.2.a., or as agreed under the provisions of this paragraph. There would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitations. It would be agreed that non-ABM-associated radars would be distinguished by established criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan).
e.
Upgrading of SAM systems (or other types of missile systems, whatever their original design mission) to convert them into ABMs, or to give them a dual anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile capability, or the development of new SAM systems or other missile systems (apart [Page 335]from permitted ABM R&D) with such capabilities, would be prohibited. [See paragraph IV.B.2.d.] There would be no limitations on SAM systems in their air defense role as such.
2.
Corollary Limitations
a.
ABM research and development would be permitted. Deployment of, as well as testing of, mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems or their components would, however, be prohibited. Launches of ABM interceptors for any purpose from fixed launchers would be limited to (1) preannounced flight tests; (2) on not more than 15 launchers; and (3) at current test ranges and agreed additional test ranges. Construction of radars for ABM R&D would be permitted only at current and agreed additional locations, chosen so as to restrict to a minimum the operational potential of such R&D radars.
b.
Flight-testing of SAM systems or other types of missile systems (other than in permitted ABM R&D) in an ABM mode would be prohibited. [See paragraph IV.B.2.d.]
c.
There would be agreed procedures for advance notification of the deployment of new SAM systems.
d.
In the process of negotiation, we would make clear to the Soviets the specific indicators we would employ in deciding whether a SAM system had ABM capability. Those indicators include:
(1)
relocation of sites;
(2)
changes in radar average power levels, aperture configurations, antenna types (e.g., introduction of phased-array site radars) signal characteristics or improvements in or additional numbers of acquisition radars;
(3)
changes in missile characteristics (range, acceleration, burn-out velocity, propellants, exo-atmospheric capability);
(4)
introduction of new SAM systems;
(5)
appearance of nuclear warheads at additional SAM sites;
(6)
testing of SAMs in an apparent ABM mode. Indicators of tests of SAMs “in an ABM mode” would include such activities as any use of SAMs to intercept an RV, any flight-testing of SAMs to altitudes significantly higher than those attainable by aircraft or flight-testing of SAMs in association with ABM radars, including R&D radars.
3.

Verification

Verification would be provided by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with corollary limitations and cooperative measures agreed upon.

V. Research, Development, Testing, Training, and Space Launchers

Missile launchers and platforms for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training with respect to all strategic offensive missile systems, and for space missions would be permitted, but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed limit of 160 [Page 336]launchers (in excess of the 1900 limit and the 1710 subtotal). The launchers counted against this limit would include all launchers at R&D test ranges and facilities, launchers on “test-bed” submarines and surface ships, and training launchers at operational sites. (Heavy bombers used for training would, however, count as operational heavy bombers.) (For ABM R&D, see IV.A.2.a. and IV.B.2.a.)

VI. Heavy Bombers and Defenses against Them

See Section I with respect to heavy bombers. As previously indicated, there would be no limitations on SAM systems in their air defense role as such.

VII. MRVs/MIRVs

There would be no limitations on MRVs/MIRVs.

VIII. Verification, Consultation, and Duration

A.

Verification of a SALT agreement comprising the above provisions would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means and the provision of corollary limitations and cooperative measures designed to make the overall restrictions compatible with national verification capabilities.

There would be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement. The prohibition on deliberate concealment measures would not require changes in present U.S. or Soviet practices.

B.
The agreement would also provide for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing Joint Commission would be established to provide a forum in which the parties could:
1.
Receive timely notice of certain deployments of which advance notification is required in the agreement;
2.
Raise issues about compliance and verification. Selective direct observation could be offered or requested as a way to check on some ambiguous situation;
3.
Discuss possibly necessary or useful adjustments within the framework of the agreement; and
4.
Consider basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments).
C.
The agreement would:
1.
Involve an understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country.
2.
Include a clause providing for withdrawal in the event either party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence.
3.
Contain provisions for consultations in the event of suspected violations or basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments).
4.
Be made subject to formal review at fixed periods (for example, for five years). This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and for reaffirmation. This review would also permit withdrawal without having to charge the other side with violation or to invoke supreme national interest.
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 51–100. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation.
  2. Documents 94 and 97. On July 15 the Verification Panel discussed the SALT Delegation’s proposed changes to NSDM 69 to allow U.S. large missiles and new ICBM silos. The minutes are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files, (H-Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. On July 20 Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum summarizing the meeting and analyzing proposed changes to NSDM 69. He ended the memorandum by offering Nixon two options: redrafting the NSDM to allow the United States, though not the Soviet Union, to build new silos for up to 250 large missiles; or leave the NSDM unchanged but draft a detailed statement so that the United States could build up to 250 large missiles for submarines or for retrofit into existing silos. After the two options, Nixon wrote: “The tougher position.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XII, July 20–September 1970)
  3. Top Secret.
  4. All brackets are in the original.