102. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon
1
Washington, November 17,
1969.
- SUBJECT
-
NSC Meeting on CBW, November 18
The NSC meeting is intended to consider
the basis U.S. policy issues relating to
Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW).
The objective of the meeting is to establish a policy framework for
future CBW programs which will be
consistent with both national security and arms control objectives.
Because the subject of CBW is highly
complex, it will be possible during the meeting to address only the key
issues. Your decisions on these issues, however, will provide the policy
direction for the groups of sub-issues.
[Page 355]
There is consensus on a number of policy aspects of CBW. All agree that there is need for:
- —Continuing research and development, with emphasis on
defense.
- —Refinement of controls and safety measures.
- —Better intelligence on other nations’ CBW capabilities.
- —Doctrinal reliance on a “no first-use” policy for lethal
chemical and biological weapons.
- —A closely coordinated public affairs policy.
Attached and tabbed are:
- —Your talking points, which will
introduce the subject and structure the discussion. Briefings
are called for by Mr. Helms and General Wheeler. I would propose to lead the discussion
centering about the key issues. When I complete my outline of
the issues, I suggest that you call on appropriate participants
at the meeting for their views. Your talking points proceed in
this way.2
- —An “Issues for Decision” paper which
includes my recommendation on each of the issues.
You need to read only your talking points and the “Issues for Decision”
paper. Additional background material is enclosed in a separate
background book.3
Briefly summarized, the topics for discussion are:
1. Policy on Biological
Weapons
Specific Issues for Decision
- a.
- Should we retain a capability for combat use of lethal or
incapacitating biological weapons? If not, what should be the extent
of research and development on biological weapons?
- b.
- Can we or should we support the UK
Draft Convention which would prohibit development, production and
use of biological weapons?
2. Policy on Chemical Weapons
Specific Issues for Decision
- a.
- Should we retain a capability for use of lethal or incapacitating
chemical weapons or should we confine our chemical programs to
research and development?
- b.
- If we wish to retain a lethal chemical capability should we
maintain stockpiles overseas?
- c.
- If we wish to retain an incapacitating chemical capability should
the “no first-use” policy apply to them as well as to lethal
chemicals?
3. Policy on Tear Gas and our Position
Toward the Geneva Protocol
Specific Issues for Decision
- a.
- Do we wish to continue unrestricted use of tear gas in Vietnam and
to keep this option open for the future?
- b.
- Do we wish to ratify the Geneva Protocol which bans first use of
chemical and biological weapons?
- c.
- If so, are we willing to include incapacitating agents and tear
gas within the strictures of the protocol or can we interpret the
protocol to exclude them?
4. Policy on Authorization for Use of
Tear Gas and Herbicides
Specific Issues for Decision
a. Should Presidential authorization be required for the use of tear gas
and herbicides outside of Vietnam as it is for all other chemical and
biological weapons?
2. If not, to what level should the authority be delegated?
Tab
ISSUES FOR DECISION
There are four principal policy issues for decision. Each major issue
subsumes an additional number of specific questions.
Policy on Biological Warfare (BW)
There are two questions to be decided.
A. What should be the nature and
scope of U.S. policy on
biological warfare? There are four options:
- 1.
- Retain a Full Capability Including Both Lethal and
Incapacitating Biological Weapons.
- 2.
- Retain a Capability for Incapacitating Weapons
Only.
- 3.
- Research and Development Program Only, but for both Offensive and Defensive
Purposes.
- 4.
- Research and Development Program for Defensive Purposes
Only and to Protect against Technological surprise.
- —Some argue that we should retain a full BW capability because (1) a lethal BW
capability helps deter BW attack
and gives us another [Page 357]
strategic option; (2) because it would take considerable time to
reconstitute stockpiles and delivery means; and (3) because biological incapacitants—the only
effective incapacitating capability we maintain—could be useful
in military operations such as amphibious invasion.
- —Others argue that we should maintain a research and
development program only because (1) our nuclear deterrent
serves to deter strategic use of lethal BW; (2) the control and effectiveness of BW weapons are uncertain as are the
deterrent or retaliatory value of incapacitants; (3) though they
could possibly be useful in a “first-use” situation, such use
could risk escalation and would be considered by most nations to
be contrary to the international law; and (4) a research and
development program would protect against technological
surprise.
All agencies, except the Joint Chiefs, support Option 4.
Recommendation: That you approve Option 4,
(research and development for defensive purposes) to include only
enough offensive research and development to protect against
technological surprise.
B. Should the U.S. support the U.K. Draft Convention for the
Prohibition of Biological Warfare? There are three options:
- 1.
- Defer any decision.
- 2.
- Associate in principle only.
- 3.
- Do not support.
- —If our BW policy is to
concentrate on research and development for defensive purposes
(Option 4) we can support the Convention. Under any other policy
we would have to oppose it or seek major modifications. The
Convention provides for no on-site verification, but relies on
procedures for investigation of treaty violations by agencies
under UN auspices. Also, its
relation to other CBW arms
control proposals is unclear. No one argues that we should agree
to the Convention as it stands.
- —Some argue that we should associate in principle (1) to
evidence our willingness to consider limitations on biological
warfare, particularly if we maintain a research and development
program only, and (2) because we could gain political benefits
without tying our hands until questions such as scope of the
Convention and suitable verification procedures were
resolved.
- —Others contend that there is no urgency to consider the
Convention and that any association with it might weaken our
opposition to unverifiable provisions in other arms control
proposals.
Recommendation: That you approve Option 2
(Association in Principle) subject to the satisfactory resolution of
such questions as verification procedures and the relation of the
U.K. Draft Convention to other
arms control measures.
[Page 358]
II. Chemical Warfare (CW) Policy Issues
There are three basic issues.
A. Should we maintain a lethal
chemical capability and if so where and at what level should we
maintain stocks? There are two options:
- 1.
- Maintain lethal chemical stockpiles for deterrence or
retaliation:
- a.
- In the U.S.
only.
- b.
- In the U.S. and
overseas.
- 2.
- Rely on Research and Development only.
- —Some argue that we need lethal chemicals (1) to deter
chemical attack, and (2) as a retaliatory option between a
conventional response (which might be inadequate) and escalation
to nuclear response. They also argue (1) that unilateral
elimination of this capability would give up a valuable
bargaining counter in arms control discussions and, (2) that so
long as we maintain our declaratory policy of “no-first-use” the
international political costs of retaining the capability are
not excessive. They contend that stocks should be maintained
overseas (particularly in Germany) to assure the capability for
timely response and because, were they to be removed, attempts
to replace them in a crisis could be both difficult and
provocative. The JCS also
believe that existing stocks of mustard gas should be retained
until improved agents are developed because they represent a
large portion of existing casualty producing chemical
stocks.
- —Others argue that (1) our tactical nuclear capability makes
lethal chemicals unnecessary as a deterrent, and (2) that
existence of the chemical capability may encourage chemical
attack because the threshold of response appears lower to the
enemy. They believe that an offensive and defensive research and
development program would guard against technological surprise
and the improvement of defensive measures could lessen the
likelihood of chemical attack because of inevitable enemy
uncertainty about the true extent of our CW capabilities. They contend that, in any event,
we should not retain stocks overseas because (1) existing stocks
are too small for an adequate response and to increase them
would cause political problems with our allies; (2) needed
chemical support to theaters of operation can be provided from
the United States quickly; and (3) continued presence of these
stocks, particularly in Germany, could become a source of
friction. They argue further that mustard gas is far less
effective than our other chemical weapons and that its
destruction would yield political benefit. The Secretary of
Defense favors destruction of mustard gas.
Recommendation: That you approve retention of
a lethal chemical capability and retention of the stocks in Germany
(Option 1–b). That you also approve the Secretary of Defense’s
recommendation to destroy or detoxify the stocks of mustard gas, but
in a phased manner to [Page 359]
assure an adequate capability while the development of safer weapons
is in progress.
B. Should the U.S. “no first-use” policy on lethal
chemicals apply also to incapacitating chemicals? Two
options:
- 1.
- Affirm that the U.S. policy
of “no first-use” applies also to incapacitants.
- 2.
- Exclude incapacitants from a “no first-use” policy.
- —All agencies support our declaratory policy of “no first-use”
for lethal chemicals but there are differing views as to whether
it should apply to incapacitants. The incapacitant we now have
is not an operationally effective agent because of its uncertain
effects, but research is continuing with some promise of
development.
- —The proponents of including incapacitants in the policy argue
that (1) their deterrent or retaliatory value is questionable,
and their principal utility would be in a “first-use” situation
against an unprotected enemy; and (2) that most nations would
see such use contrary to the Geneva Protocol, international law
and past expressions of U.S.
policy. They argue also that first-use could lead to escalation
to lethal chemicals, and loosen international constraints on
chemical warfare.
- —The opponents argue that an effective agent, if developed,
could give military advantage in a variety of situations with
fewer casualties and might be accepted internationally as more
“humane” than other weapons.
- —The JCS position is uncertain
but they probably favor retaining a “first-use” option. The
Secretary of Defense may, and all other agencies will, support
including incapacitants in our no “first-use” policy.
Recommendation: That you approve a “no
first-use” policy for incapacitants with the understanding that this
does not preclude continued research and development toward an
effective agent.
[Omitted here are Sections III and IV, which discuss the use of tear
gas and/or herbicides in Vietnam and the Geneva Protocol. On
agreements to control the development and use of chemical and
biological weapons, see
Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2,
Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation,
1969–1972.]
