200. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger1
You may have seen this memorandum yesterday at State. Shultz and Flanigan are likely to hit you on it during or after staff meeting this morning.
Flanigan’s memo is a pretty straightforward job, but there are a couple of points which I think need to be stressed. The first is the judgment that if we wait until after Christmas, the Trade Bill will be dead. That seems to be the unanimous opinion of the trade people, but I am not convinced of the rigor of their analysis.[Page 722]
Assuming the correctness of the analysis on the effect of delay, however, there is some2 merit in Peter’s argument that we should go ahead in the House on the chance that we may be able to reach a compromise next Spring in the Senate or in conference. If we do not, however, we are faced either with vetoing the bill and thus publicly upsetting our major trading partners, or rebuffing the Soviet Union. Either of these alternatives, it seems to me, is worse than having no bill at all. The decision, therefore, seems to me to turn really on the judgment of the likelihood that some compromise would be possible next Spring—and the affirmative argument seems to rest basically on the feeling that the Jewish community would back off rather than assume the onus of a veto.
I am dubious.3
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 403, Subject Files, Trade, Vol. VI, April 8–December 1973. No classification mark-ing.↩
- Scowcroft inserted “some” by hand.↩
- Scowcroft added this last sentence by hand.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 153.↩
- See Document 185 and footnote 8 thereto.↩
- Possibly a reference to a meeting between Kissinger and Jackson that took place on November 21 at 7:05 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) No memorandum of conversation from this meeting has been found.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 58.↩