Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

94. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 9, 1972.

SUBJECT

• US-Czechoslovak Relations

On October 27 you requested Secretary Rogers (Tab B) to postpone planned negotiations with Czechoslovakia on a range of issues pending the results of a NSSM/CIEPSM 163 study (Tab C) that is to develop a time-phased negotiating scenario for normalizing our economic and other relations with Czechoslovakia as well as the other East European countries.²

Now the Secretary has come back with a new memorandum to the President (Tab D) saying that State nevertheless plans to proceed with two sets of negotiations before the NSSM/CIEPSM study is finished and policy decisions taken upon it.³ These negotiations are for (a) a consular agreement and (b) a cultural-scientific exchanges agreement. State wants to begin in “mid-November.” We understand that the negotiating drafts are ready for the Secretary to approve but are being held by State working levels pending a reaction from us.

The Secretary wants to push ahead with Czechoslovakia without waiting for a coherent plan approved by Presidential level, which might not call for priority attention to Czechoslovakia. There may be no harm in starting with the consular agreement, which will being direct benefits to American citizens and should be relatively simple to negotiate. As the Secretary points out in his memorandum the Czechoslovaksʼ interest in gold/claims negotiations, which the Secretary has agreed to hold off as the President requested, will induce them to accommodate us on the consular agreement.

It would be preferable to reiterate the Presidentʼs request for delay as far as the exchanges agreement is concerned, however. In this case, the balance of advantages is on the Czechoslovaksʼ side. Moreover if we initiate the two negotiations simultaneously, as the Secretary wishes to do, we convey the cumulative impression of embarking on a new hyperactive policy with Czechoslovakia. It is doubtful that we want to do this, at least until we have considered that country in the overall East European context, which the response to NSSM/CIEPSM 163 will hopefully provide. Finally, the gold/claims incentive will continue to operate even after the consular convention.

If you agree, you should give the Secretary a green light for the consular convention negotiations but an amber one for the exchanges agreement negotiations. A memorandum to the Secretary at Tab A gives him these signals.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files, Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for urgent action. Livingston initialed for Sonnenfeldt.
2. Regarding Tabs B and C, see Document 92 and footnotes 3 and 4 thereto.
3. Document 93.
4. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Al—Do this by phone with Eliot. HK[issinger].” A second annotation by Haig reads “done.” The draft memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers on which the telephone message was based, read in part as follows: “With reference to your memorandum of November 6 …, the President approves your opening negotiations on a consular agreement at your discretion. He prefers that you postpone negotiations on the proposed cultural and scientific agreement, where the direct advantages to the United States are less obvious, until completion of the NSSM/CIEPSM 163 study and policy decisions based upon it.” A notation on the memorandum reads: “given to Eliot by phone.”