Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

86. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/18

New York, September 26, 1969, 5:30 p.m.

SECRETARYʼS DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER, 1969

SUBJECT

• Secretaryʼs Bilateral Meeting with Foreign Minister Marko of Czechoslovakia

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
  • Mr. Swank
  • Ivan V. Matusek
• Foreign
  • Foreign Minister Marko
  • Jaroslav Zantovsky, Chargé dʼAffaires, a.i., Washington
  • Dusan Spacil, Interpreter

After a short exchange of amenities Foreign Minister Marko stated he was very glad to have this opportunity to meet the Secretary. This was his first trip to the United States. He said that by now he had already confirmed how much truth there was to a Slovak saying that it is better to see for yourself than to listen. By now he had spent close to three weeks in New York. He did not think he would be going to Washington or tour the country—the time he had left was too short to allow for that. Mr. Marko stated he was glad to hear that the Secretary, like himself, had some background in financial affairs. This indicated to him that both of them were interested in concrete developments.

The Secretary responded that he was happy to welcome Mr. Marko to the United States. Both countries have a long history of friendly mutual relations. He commented that while in Mexico City during the Olympic Games he was impressed by the performance of the Czechoslovak team which was one of the most popular there. The Secretary stated we were interested in developing mutual commercial relations and cultural exchanges with Czechoslovakia. He inquired how things stood. Mr. Marko responded that he had just visited a Czechoslovak book exhibit at Columbia University which confirmed to him that there was good progress in the cultural field.

The Secretary inquired as to the purpose of the Czechoslovak party plenum, now underway. In his reply Mr. Marko followed the standard Czechoslovak line: the plenum is judging and analyzing Czechoslovak developments during 1968. This analysis, which will be very careful, will be presented to the Party Congress. He referred to the distorted reporting of Czechoslovak developments in the Western press and denied that there was any truth to stories that Czechoslovak developments were returning to the period of the 1950ʼs (i.e. to Stalinism). The 1968 developments have been very complicated and one cannot make superficial judgments. In the field of foreign policy, it is necessary to address one-self to the question as to why Czechoslovakia did not attend the July 1968 talks in Warsaw (i.e. the meeting of the Warsaw Pact “five”). Mr. Marko stated “we believe that our nonattendance was a serious political error.”

The Secretary inquired how long the Soviet troops were going to stay in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Marko answered that, as is known, the stay of Soviet troops is regulated by “our treaty.” To the Secretaryʼs query whether he was referring to the Warsaw Pact Treaty, Mr. Marko stated he was referring to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of October 1968.² He stressed that this treaty had the approval of the Czechoslovak National Assembly. He added that the Czechoslovak government has not raised the question of the Soviet troopsʼ departure with the U.S.S.R. As a result, he cannot answer the Secretaryʼs question.

The Secretary responded that he understood the realities of the situation but noted that the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia—against the wishes of the population—makes it difficult for the US and the West to deal with Czechoslovakia. Mr. Marko, referring to the Secretaryʼs earlier remarks, stated that he shares and reciprocates the Secretaryʼs sentiments about the long history of friendship between the people of the two countries. The US has become a second fatherland for Czech and Slovak grandfathers. The two countries were allies during World War II. The Czechoslovak government considers the concept of peaceful coexistence to be one of absolute necessity. Stating that he has come here without any prejudices, he wondered whether one could settle some of the outstanding economic and financial problems. He wanted to make the same appeal as he did at the time of Ambassador Beamʼs departure from Prague.³ What he has in mind are questions, some of which have been pending for a quarter of a century. In a long, rambling exposé, Mr. Marko specifically mentioned: the MFN (which Poland, Yugoslavia and West Germany have); the Nazi-looted gold; the agreement on the compensation for nationalized property (“where we nearly had an agreement”); and the fact that rather than trading directly with the US, Czechoslovakia currently has to utilize third-country intermediaries in both her exports and imports from the US (“our profit margins accrue to somebody else”).

Referring to his earlier comment about the detrimental effect of the presence of Soviet troops, the Secretary stated that under these circumstances it would be impossible to gain either popular backing, or Congressional support for any legislation in these areas. Mr. Marko responded by once again referring to distortions appearing about Czechoslovakia in the Western press. He added that once the discussion started to center on the presence of troops, he would rather terminate it since it was not in consonance with the spirit of discussing an improvement in relations. The Secretary stated that he did not comment in this vein in any contentious spirit, but simply wanted Mr. Marko to know why the US cannot at this time move in these areas. He suggested that cultural and educational exchanges meanwhile offer many opportunities. Mr. Marko replied that he appreciated the Secretaryʼs explanation but added that he was afraid that the fact that the important economic questions remained unsettled will unfavorably affect Czechoslovak attitudes toward cultural/scientific exchanges. Mr. Marko said he hoped that eventually things would move in a more favorable direction.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1969: Lot 70 D 387, CF 396. Secret. The discussion was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Drafted on September 27 by Ivan V. Matusek (INR/RSE/EE) and approved on September 29 by R.L. Brown, Deputy Executive Secretary (S/S).
2. On October 16, 1968, the CSSR and the Soviet Union signed a treaty on the “temporary” stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia that permitted the Soviet forces that had taken part in the Warsaw Pact invasion in August to remain on Czechoslovak soil. The major provisions of the treaty are printed in Keesingʼs Contemporary Archives, 1967–1968, p. 23025A.
3. An apparent reference to Beamʼs discussion with Marko, reported in telegram 373 from Prague, February 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PS 9 US–CZECH, JORDAN, CHARLES)
4. Telegram 3274 from USUN, September 27, reported the same conversation between Rogers and Marko. The telegram ended with the comment: “Despite sensitivity of several of these topics, atmosphere of mtg was not unfriendly. Marko was clearly interested in focusing conversation on Czechoslovak economic and financial priorities…; Secretary was equally firm in underlining present political obstacles to any substantial movement forward.” (Ibid., POL 7 CZECH)