Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

441. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS 314/02595–71

Washington, March 10, 1971.

COUNTRY

Turkey

DOI

10 March 1971

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Command Council of the Armed Forces

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[7 lines not declassified]

1. An unprecedented meeting of the Command Council of the Armed Forces, chaired by Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief General Memduh Tagmac, took place at TGS headquarters in Ankara on 10 March from approximately 1000 to 1800 hours. The meeting was attended by the Commanders of the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Navy, by the Commanders of the First, Second and Third Armies, all Corps Commanders, all Air Force Area Commanders and a number of other general officers.

2. This meeting was convened at the insistence of a large number of senior officers to discuss and reach a firm decision on measures to be taken by the armed forces in the face of continuing deterioration of the political situation following the kidnapping of four American airmen on 4 March² and subsequent student-police clashes at Middle East Technical University and elsewhere.

3. Lieutenant General Hayati Savasci, Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces [1 line not declassified] stated that the meeting would reach one of two decisions. Either the proposal by a number of younger generals for a military takeover of the government apparatus would be approved, or the solution favored by General Tagmac and others for dictation by the army to President Cevdet Sunay and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel of specific and immediate control measures to be implemented with a facade of civilian rule would have to be adopted. Savasci added that there were no other remaining alternatives.

4. Savasci further said that there no longer was any question of whether the army would intervene in the political situation. The army was intervening and it was merely the form that remained to be decided. He said it was important that a clear consensus be reached during the 10 March meeting. He explained that if divisions remained, a dangerous situation could result in which the disappointed parties might decide to try to force their own decisions on the others. Whichever result is reached, Savasci said, it will be rapidly communicated down the line to all commands.

5. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: Air Force commanders, in particular, are quite heated up in favor of immediate military intervention and are expected to oppose strongly the Tagmac solution.)

6. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: See [less than 1 line not declassified] (TDCS DB–315/01243–71) for another account of this meeting.³ As of 2400 hours 10 March, Ankara was quiet and there were no visible signs of a military alert.)⁴

7. [21/2 lines not declassified]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.
2. See Document 440.
3. Not found.
4. After receiving the military ultimatum, Prime Minister Demirel and his Cabinet resigned on March 12.