44. Editorial Note
On July 9, 1970, Russell Fessenden, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Bonn, who was in Oberlin, Ohio wrote a personal letter to Ambassador Kenneth Rush in which he discussed, among other topics, strategy for dealing with the Brandt governmentʼs objections to Radio Free Europeʼs continued operation in West Germany. Fessenden wrote:
“RFE. The current plan is to send Bob Murphy, as a member of the RFE Board in New York and an old German hand, to see Brandt personally. The purpose would be to let Brandt learn directly of the Presidentʼs strong personal interest and to try to get him to leave RFE alone in order to avoid a major U.S.-German confrontation. A confrontation seems inevitable; the position at the top in the U.S. Government is indeed very hard. The President is reported to be very negative about the Bahr–Ehmke reaction. I also reported on the Duckwitz ‘démarche’ to me at your Third of July party. (I had no chance to write this up before I left Bonn, but did so in Washington. Duckwitz brought the subject up, saying that the Poles had put it on the agenda for the next meeting. He characterized RFE as a ‘nuisance’ which is ‘not in tune with the times.’ He asked whether it couldnʼt be moved out of the country. He obviously is even softer on this subject than Bahr and Ehmke, who at least do not believe RFE should be used as a bargaining counter in the Polish negotiations. In the face of this Duckwitz comment, I felt I had no alternative but to give him the full U.S. position, as set forth in our instruction. I stressed the inevitability of a major U.S.-German confrontation unless something is done. This seemed to have some impact on Duckwitz. However, he no doubt will be the most difficult on this question because of his strong personal commitment to the success of the Polish negotiations.)
“In addition to the Murphy visit to Brandt, EUR has in mind a second action designed to soften the blow. This would be a discreet approach to someone like Ehmke saying in effect that this is not a propitious time to push the RFE issue when the Administration is preoccupied with the troops issue, as well as many difficult East-West issues. (The feeling in Washington on RFE is so strong that there is a tendency to equate RFE with the US troop presence in Germany.) There may be no formal instructions on this second, informal and discreet approach.
“One other RFE issue I was asked about was Straussʼs view. You may recall that Ehmke and Bahr said that Strauss shared their views on RFE for the same reason: infringement of German sovereignty. There was some skepticism in Washington as to whether Strauss really felt this way, and we were asked to try to ascertain his real views. You might ask Jock [Jonathan Dean] to look into this. One note of caution [Page 124] here: I think we should be very careful in approaching Strauss (maybe we shouldnʼt do it at all). It would be very bad if RFE became a political football between the Opposition and the Government. There is a danger that someone like Strauss would seize on the issue as another indicator of the Governmentʼs ‘appeasement’ policy.” (Department of State, Files: Lot 74 D 430, Box 4, Personal Correspondence File)