438. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Military Assistance for Turkey
PARTICIPANTS
- His Excellency Melih Esenbel, Ambassador of Turkey
- Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, NEA
- Frank E. Cash, Jr., Country Director, Turkish Affairs
- Robert L. Pugh, Desk Officer, Turkish Affairs
Ambassador Esenbel drew on a telegram which he said had been sent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish General Staff, and the Office of the Prime Minister. He indicated that the Government of Turkey noted with satisfaction that the message President Nixon sent to the Congress transmitting the request for a supplemental appropriation to the 1971 Foreign Assistance bill2 made specific reference to the defense posture in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in particular to Turkey, in its indication that part of the funds requested were to restore the Turkish MAP program to the level projected before the emergency situation in Cambodia caused the diversion of $25.5 million.
The Ambassador then referred to the NATO Defense Ministersʼ call for increased effort to assist the defense of the southeastern flank.3 He pointed out that the Turkish armed forces in order to maintain an agreed standard within NATO, and thus insure a creditable deterrent, required a programmed level of continuing assistance. He noted that this level had been mutually calculated to be $670 million worth of equipment and other forms of assistance for a period of five years beginning in 1966. This was according to the McNaughton Plan, which foresaw a yearly allocation of $135 million worth of such military assistance. He stated that during the last four years the level of assistance had fallen short of that figure and amounted to only $427 million of military assistance in total. Ambassador Esenbel recalled that during the visits to Ankara of Secretary of Defense Laird and Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter4 this problem had been reviewed and the possibility of surplus military assistance had been considered. Ambassador Esenbel characterized the long supply and excess (LS&E), or surplus material, program as an additional point but noted that this could not be planned ahead and could never replace programmed military assistance. He stated that when one dealt in surplus assistance, it was in emergency circumstances—in that it was necessary to take whatever was offered when it was available—and that there was no comparison with programmed aid.
With the preceding as background, Esenbel said that the Turkish Government deemed it appropriate at the moment to bring to the [Page 1078] attention of the United States Government that while the reinstatement of funds to bring the FY 1971 MAP level to $100 million would improve the existing situation, the urgent needs of modernization of the Turkish armed forces would still remain an acute problem. He felt these needs were well known to the USG through continuing discussions between the US Military Mission in Turkey and the Turkish General Staff. He stated the wish of the GOT that the USG again make an effort to reach the McNaughton level of military assistance.
Mr. Sisco observed that: (1) the final disposition of the MAP supplemental was not yet clear, as there were differences to be sorted out, and he felt that it would be clear that day whether action would be taken immediately or deferred until the week of December 28; (2) the USG would continue to do the best it could; (3) the LS&E program was never conceived as a full substitute for MAP, but was suggested because the USG was concerned about the temporary cut from $100 million to $74.5 million; and (4) while it was not conceived as a permanent substitute for MAP, it did fit in to Turkish force goal needs. He counseled Esenbel to await Congressional action, following which the situation would be examined once more.
Ambassador Esenbel said that the point he was trying to make was that when Ambassador Handley went to the Foreign Minister during the past summer with word of the cut to $74.5 million, it caused a shock within the Turkish Government. Esenbel (who was in Turkey for the summer) reported that he had talked on this topic with the Prime Minister who, he said, had felt that the US could have obtained the needed funds elsewhere. Ambassador Esenbel noted that he had told the Prime Minister that the time (July 1970) was not ripe for the US Government to ask for legislation to provide the additional military assistance funds needed for Cambodia, but that he anticipated it would be done later. Ambassador Esenbel stated that when the interested officials of the GOT saw that the request when finally submitted was for one billion dollars, a problem was created. They could not understand why if one billion dollars was attainable, the Turkish MAP level could not be restored to the McNaughton level of $135 million. In response to Ambassador Esenbelʼs question about the adjournment of Congress, Mr. Sisco noted that it was making a major effort to get critical items through before Christmas, but that it would return to work December 28, if necessary.
- Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 65, DEF 19 MAP. Confidential. Drafted by Pugh on January 4, 1971. Esenbel read his comments from a prepared aide-mémoire. A copy is attached but not printed.↩
- On November 18; for text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 1074–1079.↩
- At the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels December 3–4; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 4, 1971, pp. 2–6.↩
- December 1–2.↩