Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

410. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 10, 1972, 1515Z.

593. Subject: Cyprus: End of Round Two.

1. Summary: We think round two in Greek Govtʼs confrontation with Makarios has effectively come to an end. Round three could, though it need not necessarily, involve violence.

2. For analytical purposes, Cyprus events since presentation of Greek demands to Makarios on Feb 11 can be considered to fall into phases. First began with presentation of Greek note, and was characterized by Makariosʼ adoption of posture of bland immobility in face of Greek demands, coupled with assiduous cultivation of popular support against Athens. Second round was introduced by March 2 action of Holy Synod, instigated by Athens, requesting Archbishopʼs resignation. This was followed, on March 3, by GOGʼs demand, submitted to Makarios by Greek Chargé through Clerides that Makarios immediately accept and implement Greeceʼs Feb 11 conditions.

3. As of March 10, our feeling is that round two is now essentially over. We know, and can only assume that Greeks do as well, that Makariosʼ written reply to Feb 11 demands, when it is delivered, will show him unyielding on essentials relating to sovereignty of Cyprus and prerogatives of his office. We expect that within next day or two Makarios and UNFICYP will have concluded and published a reasonably satisfactory agreement on Czech arms—not going as far as to provide for UNFICYP custody but nonetheless an improved and tighter version of 1967 arrangement for inspection. (Septel.)² Revelation through news media that GOG Rep Gen Haralambopoulos conspired with Cypriots to import arms and then deny knowledge of deal is telling blow at confidence of Turkish Govt in Greece.

4. Archbishopʼs probable tactic in dealing with Holy Synodʼs request is also now coming into focus. His approach likely be two-fold. With request itself, he will temporize acknowledging that there may, in canon law, be grounds for debate on propriety of holding a presidential as well as ecclesiastic office, but that for him to resign as “suggested” after twice being duly elected would be to throw Cyprus into chaos. Other prong of his approach seems likely to be maneuver to unseat Yennadhio, Bishop of Paphos, and win acceptance of thesis that three septuagenarian bishops are not the Church of Cyprus, which is Cypriot people and priesthood in totality.

5. Unless GOG is much less well informed or more self-deceiving than we think, we judge that it is reading events about as we are. We consider that sudden return to Athens of Greek Chargé Zaphiriou morning of March 10 is relevant.

6. What of round three? Again, it is Papadopoulosʼ move. Cards he played on Feb 11 and March 2 have not produced the desired results. We have no way of knowing whether he will seize opportunity of Archbishopʼs reply, which we are sure will be drafted with an eye to leaving Greece some graceful exits, to reduce confrontation and seek compromise, or whether he will escalate using violence. Some Cypriots fear that being a military man and frustrated by seeming failure of his first two moves, he will resort to preplanned violence using, in first instance, Grivas. In this regard, interesting article in GOG controlled Misimvrini March 9 (FBIS M092018) could be construed as telegraphing the punch. Article says Grivas getting ready to strike because he cannot tolerate Cyprus slipping further toward Communist anarchy and enslavement… Grivas supporters adequately armed and ready to move… Makarios must go…timing of the impending strike is up to Grivas.

7. On his side, Makarios is acting as if he almost welcomes a sharpening of confrontation brought on by his refusal to bend. He can even be seen in some respects to be goading Greece on. In past couple days the Makarios controlled press in Cyprus has begun intensive needling of GOG, suggesting splits within the military elements of Athens regime, discreditation of Palamas and Panayotakos, Grivasʼ alleged refusal lend himself to Greeceʼs traitorous, anti-enosis objectives, etc. Kanellopoulos, Mavros, Zigdhis, et al, are being cited as the true voices of Greek people. And in another jab, Papadopoulos is challenged to let anyone who doubts this go to the polls.

8. In sum, it seems to us that we are moving into third round—round in which likelihood of violence is substantially increased. Compromise is still possible, but odds in favor of it seem smaller. We wonder whether Embassy Athens would share this assessment.³

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP.
2. The terms of the agreement were reported in telegram 599 from Nicosia, March 11. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1450 from Athens, March 14, the Embassy reiterated the analysis made in telegram 971 from Athens, February 18 (Document 406) and warned that the Greek Government would ultimately be ready to use violence to secure its ends. The Embassy lobbied for a policy of U.S. non-involvement in the Cyprus crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP)