408. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

1231. Subj: Cyprus: Hellenism, Papadopoulos and Makarios.

1.
An important characteristic of present Cypriot crisis is that it is primarily Greeks that are involved on both sides. It would be a mistake, therefore, to deal with the issue as involving Cyprus and a foreign state. Makarios and Papadopoulos both represent different views, or perhaps more accurately are competitively seeking to speak as defenders of Hellenism in Cyprus. Both have shown that they regard relations among Greeks as special in character as clearly reflected by original GOG approach and Makariosʼ reaction to date.
2.
As Greeks they will be motivated by value standards appropriate to Hellenism, which has roots dating back to the pre-Christian era. There is much mysticism, myth and history wrapped up in this, one of the most ancient and persistent of ethnic motivations. Thus, the thought that Makarios might go to the UN to request any specific action against Greece must be viewed in this context. With Czech arms the original symbol of the confrontation, any recourse to the UN invokes memories of the bloody and costly war of the Greek people against the efforts of the Stalinist-directed Greek Communists to take [Page 1012] over Greece. Moreover, the demand for action against the Communists will also inspire a keenly sympathetic note on the part of the generally conservative clergy of the Orthodox Church. Grivas, a Cypriot, is still a hero to many in this context. Greek reaction in Cyprus and here could be that Makarios would be considered by some as less than loyal to Greek Hellenism. Some might feel he also not sufficiently Christian in his approach. In addition, there would be others, particularly among the military, who would frown upon the importation of Communist arms in a struggle against Papadopoulos—the avowed exponent of God, country and family (underlining added).2 This thinking, backed by likely tremendous psychological impact on the morale of Greeks in Cyprus of any possibility that Athens would “wash its hands” of Cypriot situation in event it is unable to realize its objectives of normalization of the Cypriot question, will cause Cypriot Greeks to listen carefully with both their hearts and their minds to the call from Athens for unity of Hellenism at this time.
3.
The most positive element I find is that Hellenismʼs leadership in Athens wishes to enlist the support of the Greek people but oriented towards making possible at long last the establishment of deep and special relations with Turkey. The negative element is that both Ankara and Athens are now military-backed regimes without a democratic basis. Will Makarios grasp the significance of the present movement? If he does not, it will be another excerpt in the long and dreary history of how the spirit of division among the Greek people has caused them to pay dearly in security and well being. Moreover, he could act in a way which would preserve the basic freedoms of the Cypriot people as well as the principle of election as the basis of power. But, I believe we are approaching the spirit which animated Ataturk and Venizelos to seek deep and permanent reconciliation in the thirties after the monumental disaster of the twenties. This offers exciting prospects indeed for the peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean taken within the context of our vital security interests in the cohesiveness of this flank.
Tasca
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and USUN. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP.
  2. No underlining in the original.