403. Intelligence Information Cable1

TDCS DB 315/01303–72

COUNTRY

Cyprus/Greece

DOI

12–13 February 1972

SUBJECT

  • Appraisal of Present Situation and Likely Developments

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[1 line not declassified]

Summary. President Makarios now intends to delay for some time his reply to the note of the Greek Government (GOG), delivered to him by former Ambassador Constantinos Panayiotakos. The President feels that the GOG has worked itself into an extremely difficult and delicate [Page 994] position. Makarios does not intend to allow the GOG to extricate itself from this position until he feels confident that he has successfully reversed the situation to his favor. Makarios feels that the GOG has acted foolishly in making its intentions a matter of international record, for by doing so the GOG has assured victory for Makarios in this round. End Summary.

1.
President Makarios believes that the GOG has made a series of blunders in its handling of its efforts to effect changes within Cyprus. He feels also that the GOC has been reacting effectively and has already won the battle on the international level. Thus, Makarios does not intend to hurry his reply to the note of the GOG which called on him to change his government, to turn in to the National Guard the arms which he purchased from Czechoslovakia, and to recognize the right of the GOG to assume the leadership in future negotiations concerning the Cyprus problem. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: The President feels that international support is with him. His case is simple; as the duly elected President of a sovereign state he feels he has every right to conduct state business and to take appropriate measures to insure a continuation of peace and tranquility in his country.) Makarios recalls that when the return to Cyprus of General Georgios Grivas was first reported in September 1971, he had called on Athens to bring the General under control and, if he was present in Cyprus, to effect his removal. At that time, the GOG replied that the presence of Grivas in Cyprus was an internal-Cyprus problem, pointing out that General Grivas had been retired from GOG military service and was no longer under GOG control. The President made public this reply of the GOG, noting his acceptance of the GOG position, and his appreciation of the GOGʼs acceptance of Grivasʼ return as being an internal-Cyprus matter. Makarios followed this exchange with a public request to Grivas that he appear publically and state his reason for returning to Cyprus. Makarios offered to take Grivas into his government, and noted that if Grivas wanted more, Makarios was prepared to stand against Grivas in open election. Grivas did not reply. The importation of Czech arms had a serious effect on the plans of the Grivas plotters, and forced the issue. The reaction of the GOG brought the whole affair to international attention. The note, forwarded to Makarios via Panayiotakos, greatly angered Makarios but he remained cool. The content of the GOG note was leaked to the Cypriot press, and was reported as an ultimatum. The reply of the GOG to the press account was delivered by Panayiotakos on 12 February to representatives of the press. Panayiotakos stated that the note which he brought from Athens was simply a communication from the “national center,” and should not be construed as an ultimatum. Panayiotakos continued, however, that the communiqué urged the formation of a National Front Government, stating also that Grivas has a right to be interested in internal Cyprus [Page 995] affairs and that therefore his followers must be represented in the government. It is on this press conference of Panayiotakos that Makarios now centers his program. If, as Panayiotakos stated publically, the GOG note was not an ultimatum, Makarios is free to answer the note in his good time. If, as the GOG stated in late 1971, the presence of Grivas in Cyprus is an internal matter, how is it now that the GOG feels it can interfere. Since Grivas has not seen fit to reply to Makariosʼ public offers and challenges, as the elected representative and Ethnarch of his people, Makarios will continue to discharge his responsibilities, confident that his position in the current situation demands the support of the international audience. He has stated that he will not give the Czech arms to the National Guard until Grivas is returned to Athens. He does not intend to abrogate to the GOG his right and duty to determine the future of the country of Cyprus. He is perfectly willing to work with the GOG on a common approach to an eventual settlement and, where differences of opinion occur, to attempt to work them out on individual basis and on individual merits.
2.
Although Makarios feels relatively confident that he has won this round of the battle, he does not think the fight is over. He has instructed his advisors that he expects the next move will be a direct attempt on his life. Head of the Cyprus Information (Intelligence) Service (CIS) Georgios Tombazos, has instructed his officers guarding the President and other key Cypriot officials, to be particularly careful in the coming days. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: Although recent CIS reports indicate that Makariosʼ support within the country has grown since the receipt of the GOGʼs note, these reports also indicate that Grivasʼ followers are continuing preparations for a coup.)
3.
[1½ lines not declassified]
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate for Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.