Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

392. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS DB–315/01126–72

Washington, February 9, 1972.

COUNTRY

Cyprus/Greece

DOI

January–Early February, 1972

SUBJECT

• Makariosʼ Views on the Current Internal Cyprus Situation

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[1 line not declassified]

Summary: President Makarios feels that he has won the first round in what he considers to be the preliminary activity preparatory to a coup attempt against his government by the followers of retired Lieutenant General Georgios Grivas. Makarios bases his feeling on recent conversations which he has had with former Greek Ambassador, Constantinos Panayiotakos, with the Commanding General of the Cypriot National Guard, Lieutenant General Haralambos Haralambapoulos,² and on the reporting of the Cyprus Information (Intelligence) Service (CIS). Given this, Makarios has outlined a program which he hopes will lead to a reduction of inter-island tension, while leaving no room for doubt by the Grivasʼ forces that he intends to deal them a death blow if given the opportunity. End summary.

1. President Makarios is confident that he has out-maneuvered the forces of Lieutenant General Grivas, which the President believes are preparing a coup dʼetat. The President believes that the victory is only one round in what may become a bloody struggle, and that the victory was won essentially on the political front. He feels, nonetheless, that he has set back the planning and timing of the Grivas forces. The Presidentʼs confident attitude is based on a number of considerations, but primary among them is the impression which he has gained through conversation with former Greek Ambassador, Constantinos Panayiotakos, and with National Guard Commander Haralambos Haralambopoulos. The President is not totally convinced of the sincerity of the Greek Government (GOG) but feels that there now exists a better atmosphere for the establishment of a basic understanding and cooperation between the GOG and the Cypriot Government (GOC). The President has been most concerned over the lack of cooperation between these governments and discussed the subject with Panayiotakos on 4 February. Panayiotakos stated that prior to his return to Athens to assume his position as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he wished to assure Makarios that the GOG was anxious for better relations with the President. To this end, Panayiotakos stated that incidents involving Greek officers at the time of the unloading of the Czech arms could have been avoided had the President seen fit to inform Haralambopoulos of the arrival of the arms and had requested assistance for transportation and storage. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: The Cypriot daily Eleftheria reported on 3 February that an unidentified Greek major had been arrested in the vicinity of the Mitsero Mines magazine area, where the arms were first stored. The article stated that the officer had refused to disclose his identity and was later released following representations by Haralambopoulos.) President Makarios replied that it had been impossible to inform Haralambopoulos, as he did not wish to include the Greek side in a matter as delicate as importation of arms. Makarios also recalled for Panayiotakosʼ edification, a September 1971 conversation which he had had with Haralambopoulos concerning Makariosʼ desire to import Eastern European arms. Based on this conversation, Makarios stated, he had felt that the GOG did not wish to be involved. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: TDCS DB–315/01092–72³ [less than 1 line not declassified] reported the September 1971 conversation between Makarios and Haralambopoulos.) Makarios assured Panayiotakos that the arms were under his control and were intended for use only by the Cypriot security forces. During a second conversation with Panayiotakos, on 6 February 1972, Makarios received assurances that GOG would not allow Grivas to move against the President. In later conversation with Haralambopoulos, Makarios was told that the Greek forces in Cyprus (ELDYK) are in a position to cut short any move by Grivas against Makarios. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: The assurances of Panayiotakos and Haralambopoulos have not given the President cause to rest any easier. The statements, to the contrary, lead him to believe that perhaps as he had suspected, the GOG has Grivas under its direct control, perhaps in an ELDYK camp. The important aspect of the exchanges is the fact that Makarios feels he may have Athens worried. The representations of Panayiotakos and Haralambopoulos, and the recently announced ten-day delay in Panayiotakos departure date from Cyprus reflect Athensʼ concern.) ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: Panayiotakos was scheduled to depart Cyprus for Athens on 9 February 1972.) Makarios thus feels that his decision to import arms from Czechoslovakia served notice to the followers of internal Cyprus affairs, that he is not going to be muscled into accepting a settlement to the Cypriot problem and, based on CIS reporting, he understands that the importation of Czech arms has both demoralized and confused the coup plotters.

2. Given the position in which he now finds himself, Makarios has decided that the time is right to move for a relaxation of tension in the Greek-Cypriot community. To this end, Makarios has outlined a short-termed program which, he hopes, will have the desired effect in calming inter-island tensions, while not leading those who plot against him to believe that he has grown less resolute in his resolve to meet force with force. The program is intended also to clarify the GOCʼs position on the question of a settlement to the Cyprus problem, presenting Makarios as a leader of all the people of Cyprus. The program will take the following lines:

A. President Makarios will make a public statement dealing with internal conditions. He will outline the position of the government on the reconvening of intercommunal talks and cover the activities of the followers of General Grivas.

B. Government spokesmen will portray the internal situation as improving, while seizing on the reconvening of the intercommunal talks to focus public attention from recent events.

C. The GOC will attempt to enter into official exchanges with the GOG on GOC/GOG relations, with the hope of reaching agreement on a common approach to the solution to the Cyprus problem.

D. Measures will continue to be taken by Cyprus security forces against the activities of all illegal organizations. The police force will be strengthened by the addition of one thousand new recruits.

E. President of the House of Representatives and leader of the United Party, Glafkos Clerides, will undertake to unite the Cypriot rightwing under his leadership. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: TDCS DB–315/00596–72⁴ [less than 1 line not declassified] reported that Clerides has refused the urging of representatives of rightwing groups to organize them under his leadership. Apparently Makarios now sees it in his interest to have Clerides attempt this union. An earlier, similar attempt was reportedly made by Makarios and Clerides.)

3. [1½ lines not declassified]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1292, Saunders Subject Files, Greece 1/1/72–4/30/72. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.
2. These discussions were reported in Intelligence Information Cables TDCS DB 315/01167–72, February 10, and TDCS DB 315/01053–72, February 7. (Both Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables)
3. Dated February 8, it provided background on the Cypriot purchase of Czech weapons. (Ibid.)
4. Not found.