Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

388. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, January 21, 1972, 1535Z.

145. For Assistant Secretary Sisco from Popper. Subject: Cyprus: Need for Progress on Deconfrontation.

1. I think your proposal for a new pitch on deconfrontation² comes at a propitious time and that it will be helpful to broach it to parties in near future.

2. I would, however, justify the proposal on grounds somewhat different from those you have cited. Increased tension in Cyprus today is due less to intercommunal conflict and differences than to clandestine activity within Greek Cypriot community itself. Recent Green Line shooting has again demonstrated what Aug 1970 Trilomo incident indicated—that each community, acting under mainland patronʼs guidance, can confine and control incidents when they occur, if it wishes to do so. UNFICYP is an important adjunct of the process. As I see it, your proposal is particularly useful now because it would come at a time when all parties are casting about for some suggestions or steps which would serve them as alternatives to flatly negative confrontation when new intercommunal talks get underway. Apparently with this objective, both sides are talking in terms of deconfrontation, normalization, “freeze,” or modus vivendi as subjects for early discussion.

3. Thus, Denktash has hinted at the possibility of replacing fighters by police on Green Line (Nicosia 132).³ Makarios is looking toward demilitarization which would end with disbandment of on-island military forces (Nicosia 2228 and 137).⁴ And within the last few days General Haralambopoulos, Greek National Guard commander, mused to UNFICYP Acting Chief of Staff Thornton that he wondered how UNFICYP would view a unilateral voluntary pull-back by National Guard forces to their camps throughout the island, adding that he might be willing to consider this. (Predictably, indication that Haralambopoulos has raised matter with Cyprus Government. We wonder whether he has discussed it with GOG during his recent shuttle trips to Athens.)

4. It is important to recognize that each party approaches deconfrontation on a basis strongly tilted against the other side. Makarios links it to withdrawal of mainland contingents, thus increasing freedom of Greek Cypriot majority to deal with Turk Cypriot minority on its own. Denktash thinks of it in connection with financial advantages to Turk Cypriots. It is possible that mainland Greek officers are toying with it in terms of future moves by enosis-double enosis groups. In short, when both sides are presented with a balanced and comprehensive formula, the odds are that they will boggle at it rather than agree. Nevertheless, as indicated above, I think the time is right to make a real try.

5. I believe the formula contained in your telegram is equitably balanced. I would suggest that formula be made more specific with respect to how far back Turk Cypriot fighters move. In enclaves this should be a meaningful distance, though in an area like Artemis Road, Larnaca, it would have to be less. UNFICYP would monitor and supervise rather than guarantee execution, and it would have to be understood that if either side took advantage of situation to change territorial status quo, the other would be automatically freed from all deconfrontation restrictions and guarantor powers (and/or UN Security Council) would afford full support to restore status quo ante.

6. I fully agree that a proposal of this character would be more effective if it were made by the UN and supported by others. But rather than raise it in New York and Nicosia simultaneously, I suggest that it might be better if the proposal were worked out in New York with Guyer alone and if then Guyer brought it with him as he went round the Nicosia-Athens-Ankara circuit. Depending on initial reactions, Osorio could then unveil best possible official proposal at early state in resumed talks.⁵

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Noforn. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, USUN, London, and USNATO.
2. In telegram 9607 to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, and USUN, January 20, Sisco suggested a deconfrontation proposal based on the following points: 1. All Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen withdrawn to barracks and where necessary replaced with policemen; 2. All Turk Cypriot fighters at points of confrontation replaced by Turk Cypriot policemen; 3. Prohibition of automatic weapons in areas of close confrontation; 4. No change in territorial status quo; and 5. Above four points guaranteed by UNFICYP. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)
3. Ibid.
4. Telegram 2228 from Nicosia, December 22, 1971, is ibid. Telegram 137 from Nicosia, January 21, was not found.
5. In telegram 338 from Athens, January 19, and 484 from Ankara, January 20, the Embassies in Greece and Turkey endorsed the proposals contained in Siscoʼs telegram. (Both ibid.)