382. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State1

Secto 80/3245. Memorandum of Conversation: Under Secretary Palamas (Greece). Part II of III: Cyprus. October 6, 1971; 5:00 PM. 35 A Waldorf.2

1.
Participants: Greece—Under Secretary Palamas, Ambassador Pesmazotlu; US—The Secretary, Mr. Sisco, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Boyatt (reporting officer).
2.
Summary: Palamas and Olcay have developed compromise procedure for sustaining negotiating process on Cyprus problem which involves: (A) continuation of local talks; (B) addition of Greek and Turk technical experts as participants; (C) utilization of SYG good offices as framework for continuation of talks and addition of mainland participants. USG supports this positive approach by parties concerned in dealing with problem. End summary.
3.
Palamas opened discussion of Cyprus problem by summarizing his talks with GOT FonMin Olcay which characterized as conducted in spirit of compromise.3 Although GOG and GOT differ on substance of Cyprus problem they agree on need for procedural device to preserve negotiations and avoid outbreaks of violence leading to crisis. Specifically two governments in agreement on three points:
(A)
Inter-communal talks constituted best negotiating procedure and should continue.
(B)
Inter-communal talks should be re-enforced by participation of GOG and GOT technical experts who would join as observers.
(C)
GOG and GOT agreed that most viable framework within which local talks should be continued and expanded to include Greek and Turk experts was SYGʼs good offices mandate.
4.
On procedural details Palamas stated that Archbishop Makarios would be inclined to reject anything proposed by Greece or Turkey. Therefore, to avoid this negative reaction U Thant should take initiative and propose continuation of talks and addition of GOG and GOT [Page 936] experts. Fact is both Ankara and Athens want compromise and can contribute to progress by inducing both communities to compromise.
5.
Palamas reported that in his earlier talks with U Thant latter proposed that he issue report containing his ideas on substance of Cyprus problem. Greece would not object formally because U Thantʼs concepts would undoubtedly support GOC position. However, Palamas said he personally believed substantive comments by U Thant at this stage and in this form will be definitely unhelpful because they would undoubtedly generate GOT rejection of UN views and possibly UN procedural role as well. Palamas expressed hope US would be able to help with U Thant in this regard.
6.
Secretary responded by expressing pleasure that allies had made positive progress on difficult problem. US had been thinking along similar lines and procedure outlined by Palamas seemed to us to be very good idea indeed. Palamas interjected thought that not only would this procedure keep talks going it would also keep the Cyprus problem out of SC and therefore keep the Soviets out of it.
7.
Pursuing question of UN role further Palamas added his personal thought that any UN substantive views could be folded into procedure by addition to local talks of UN technical expert. December resignation of Osorio-Tafall and need for UN SYG to appoint new special representative might provide opportunity for such a move. Sisco noted that this last idea gave additional balance since it went a long way toward meeting desire of Archbishop Makarios to have active UN role.
8.
Secretary closed by stating USG would support in every way creative effort by parties directly concerned to deal with Cyprus problem.
Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GREECE. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated priority to Ankara, Athens, London, Nicosia, and USNATO.
  2. Separate memoranda of conversation, dealing with the Chinese representation question and the progress of democratization in Greece, reported in telegrams Secto 88 and 92, both October 8, are ibid.
  3. The talks took place in New York where both men were attending the UN General Assembly session.