371. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)1

Cyprus Policy Assessment

The Problem

While intercommunal peace has been maintained on Cyprus since the 1967 crisis, there has been little progress toward establishing a new constitutional order in which Greek and Turk can live together. Intercommunal negotiations have limped on since June 1968, without significant consequence, with both Athens and Ankara experiencing growing frustration with the continuing stalemate. In response to this frustration, a Greco-Turkish dialogue has been initiated for the purpose of expanding the search for resolution of the Cyprus Problem which has twice brought the two countries into confrontation.

The Dialogue: Hopeful, But Not Without Dangers

We encourage close Greco-Turkish association on the Cyprus problem and believe that a Greco-Turkish dialogue can serve a useful supportive role for the purpose of breathing new life into the talks. The GOG and the GOT may be able to reach compromises which the communal negotiators for domestic political reasons can not reach themselves. Also, compromises already reached by the “parent” countries could have increased chances of acceptance on the island.

Looking ahead, however, we see potential dangers in the Greco-Turkish dialogue; dangers which we intend to carefully monitor and be prepared to raise with the parties if necessary: (1) Greece and Turkey, if frustrated in their attempts to resolve the constitutional impasse, may seek subsequently to bring about a dynamic solution such as partition; (2) Makarios and the GOC may suspect that the Greco-Turkish dialogue poses a threat and overreact; and (3) Turkey may overestimate Greeceʼs ability to secure Greek Cypriot acceptance of the results of the dialogue and become disillusioned with future prospects of working with Greece for peaceful resolution of the problem.

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U.S. Posture

After considering the inherent opportunities and dangers involved, we have decided our interests will be best served through a policy which continues our positive support for the intercommunal talks, while stressing with Athens and Ankara the need to use their dialogue in support of the intercommunal negotiations as a means of breathing new life into the Cypriot talks. As we monitor the Greco-Turkish dialogue, we should be able to identify emergence of any of the dangers cited above, and will be prepared as appropriate to make known our strong belief to both Athens and Ankara that a viable solution must be based on Cypriot acquiescence; and pointing out as may become necessary that an attempt to impose a solution would not only be dangerous to carry out, but could generate the very crisis we all are striving to avoid.

The attached telegram2 outlines the exchange of views we have shared with the field and our joint conclusions reflected in the above analysis. In addition you may want to read Part I of our as yet uncleared revised policy statement.3

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Davis and Long on June 8; concurred in by Churchill, Pugh, and Davies.
  2. Telegram 100122, printed as Document 369.
  3. Attached but not printed is the country policy statement on Cyprus.