Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

359. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus

Background

The principal U.S. concerns in Cyprus have been: (1) that tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities not erupt and draw Greece and Turkey into war; (2) that the well organized Communist party not achieve predominance. As long as Makarios is there, the latter seems under control. But in 1964 and 1967 when Turkey was on the brink of invading Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority (20%), it was to a large extent the intervention of the U.S. President or his emissary which helped to resolve the crisis. The main purpose of this meeting is to establish a personal relationship—which Makarios has sought—as a basis for such future action if unhappily it should become necessary.

Director Helms also points out that Cyprus plays an increasingly important role as we search for friendly territory from which to support our Mid-East intelligence, communications and other efforts such as the U–2 flights monitoring the UAR standstill.²

Makarios follows a non-aligned foreign policy but inclines toward the West. He speaks English well.

Issues Makarios May Raise

1. He may ask that the U.S. press Turkey to force more flexibility into the Turkish Cypriot line in the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. [These talks began after the 1967 crisis to try to rewrite the constitution and devise a governmental structure so as to provide more workable guarantees for the rights of the Turkish minority. We have tried to stay out of the middle.]³

2. Although Makarios acquiesced in our U–2 flights, the Cypriot press this week picked up the story that they are flying from the British sovereign base areas there. Makarios may cite it as a source of embarrassment.

Talking Points

1. I appreciate the opportunity to establish personal ties. These have been important in times of past crisis. I also value the views of a non-aligned leader who understands the Western view of the world.

2. Your Beatitude appreciates our concern over Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and our hope that Cyprus will maintain its independent and non-aligned stance. The main objective of the U.S. vis-à-vis the USSR is to achieve a balance which will permit the nations of the area to make peace and to enjoy freedom from external domination.

3. I appreciate your governmentʼs facilitating reception of the hijacking hostages and cooperation in “helping us with our peace initiative” [a delicate way to refer to our U–2 flights]. We will continue our efforts to get peace talks started. We negotiated a basis for talks last summer, but that has been undercut.

4. The negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on Cyprus are for President Makarios and his countrymen to work out. The U.S. cannot help but have a concern for their successful outcome—both because of our desire to see violence avoided among our friends and because of the importance of a stable Cyprus to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. I am counting on Your Beatitudeʼs wisdom to achieve a positive result.

5. I appreciate removal of Cypriot ships from trade with North Vietnam. Trade with Cuba remains a continuing concern of the United States and I hope that it may be possible for Cyprus to reduce its involvement in that commerce. These restrictions are both important to U.S. policy. [The U.S. has pressed persistently for the removal of ships flying the Cypriot flag from the North Vietnam trade (successfully) and from their growing involvement in the Cuban trade (65% of non-Communist shipping).]

Secretary Irwinʼs memo is attached.⁴ Its main points are reflected above.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2. A copy of Helmsʼs September 23 letter is ibid.
3. All brackets in the original.
4. Attached but not printed. The President met with Makarios on October 25. See Document 360.