Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

340. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 24, 1969, 1530Z.

439. Subject: Cyprus: Settlement Effort (or lack thereof). Reference: (A) Athens 1185; (B) Ankara 1906.²

1. As Mississippi prison farm warden used to say to inmates, “what we got here is a problem of communication.” Embassy Ankara (ref B) is correct that sofar there is little substantive change in GOC position (same is true of Turk Cypriots). Embassy Athens is correct that GOG “is standing behind roadblock it thinks Makarios has erected” (on local autonomy). Point of exercise we are proposing is: to get GOT to help persuade Turk Cypriots to make compromises which can be traded off for GOC compromises, and to get GOG to help persuade Makarios to make compromises which will elicit Turk response (in words of ref A we want GOG to help us in getting Makarios to take down “roadblock”).

2. Maintenance of niceties of U.S. non-involvement in Ankara and Athens while we fairly heavily involved here in informal way with Greek and Turk Cypriots and GOG and GOT Embassies seems to us of questionable utility. Influence of Athens on Greek Cypriots and of Ankara on Turk Cypriots is undeniable. If GOT is going to continue to support Kuchuk and TCPA majority in their original position on local autonomy and GOG is going to support Makarios and Council of Ministers majority in their original position on local autonomy, then we have no ball game. What we are suggesting is help for moderates (led fortunately by two negotiators—Clerides and Denktash—on both sides) from respective motherlands by at least informally requesting GOT and GOG to support in general terms kind of compromise we have suggested.

3. Timing for quasi-initiative (which does not involve formal démarches) we recommend is fortuitous. GOT Chargé Yavuzalp left yesterday (March 23) for Ankara and policy review with Chaglayangil in preparation for latterʼs anticipated meeting with Pipinelis in Washington in connection NATO anniversary. Before leaving he called to ascertain our views on possible compromises on local autonomy question. On Greek side, special committee of Council of Ministers now preparing paper on local autonomy which Clerides will take to Athens during his upcoming trip (now leaked to press). Would seem both Yavuzalp consultation with GOT FonOff and Clerides consultation with Pipinelis offer unique opportunities for GOT and GOG to give boost to compromise on local autonomy. Both Athens and Ankara claim they sincerely want get Cyprus problem off their backs. Only way to do so is to get local constituents to compromise. To be noted our thoughts on fundamentals of compromise (Nicosia 429)³ are midway between partiesʼ current positions and are quite general as well as informal so USG not liable be accused of trying propound a specific compromise or of unfairly pressuring one party at expense other.⁴

Crawford

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO.
2. In telegram 1185 from Athens, March 22, the Embassy commented that it did not believe the Greek Government was forcing its views on Makarios but was supporting what it understood to be the position of the Government of Cyprus. In telegram 1906 from Ankara, March 21, the Embassy reported on discussions regarding the administrative grouping of Turkish Cypriot villages. (Both ibid.)
3. Dated March 21, it reported on a Cyprus airways strike. (Ibid., LAB 6–1 CYP)
4. In telegram 45225 to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, March 24, the Department instructed the Embassies “to weigh in with all parties” emphasizing U.S. concern with the lack of progress in negotiations and suggesting possible elements of an accord “without intimating we are presenting a preferred solution.” (Ibid., POL 27 CYP) In telegram 47944 to Ankara, March 28, the Department reported that its approach had created the impression that a U.S. plan existed and necessitated apologies from Sisco to the Turkish Ambassador over the misunderstanding. (Ibid.) Komer defended his approach in telegram 2082 from Ankara, March 28. (Ibid.)