Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

328. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot)¹

Washington, December 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Vice Presidentʼs Talks with King Constantine and Prime Minister Papadopoulos

During his trip to Turkey, Iran and Greece, the Vice President cabled accounts of all his official talks with the exceptions of his conversation with King Constantine and his second meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos. The main points of these two conversations are summarized below for your information, but should be closely held because of their sensitivity.

On October 15, 1971, the Vice President met with King Constantine at the latterʼs request. During the course of the conversation the King made the following major points:

• —He described his strong support for U.S. military aid to Greece. He denied having ever told anyone otherwise and said he could not imagine any action more unpatriotic.
• —His own position had deteriorated since he had last seen the Vice President at the EISENHOWER funeral.² Despite the fact that he was always open to contacts, he had not been approached directly by any member of the Greek Government for some two years. He thought that they believed he was conspiring against them but this was not true. To alleviate their concern he was willing to accept any Colonel they might appoint as his personal aide who could report on his activities or to even have a detail of several young Greek policemen guard him and provide the same function.
• —The King suggested that a balance was badly needed in the visible relations the U.S. has with the regime in Athens and himself. Ambassador Tasca, for instance, could have visited him some two years earlier. One frequently sees pictures of admirals, generals and Cabinet ministers visiting Athens.
• —He hoped to persuade the present Greek regime to return to normal political life and to persuade the people to further patience. But change was necessary and the time for force might well come. In that case, he would not seek material aid but would require a U.S. moral commitment to support him. The Vice President indicated in the strongest possible way that the U.S. would not support the overturn of the present GOG by force under any circumstances nor was any sort of moral commitment at all likely.
• —If asked he would very seriously consider returning to Greece. He felt the need very strongly for Greece to have a king as a unifying power and that it was essential that the monarchy survive. He thought the most likely arrangement for his return would be a scenario in which he would be given a cordial reception. Papadopoulos would then resign and the King immediately would reappoint him and give him full backing. If Papadopoulos had any doubts he could have a letter of reappointment in his pocket when he resigned. After reappointment, Papadopoulos would infuse the government with new blood, with people whom both could trust and all could go forward to build for the future. The King asked the Vice President to mention his ideas on returning to Greece to the Prime Minister and to also say that he had no intention of bringing back the officers that had left the armed forces since his departure and that he contemplated no punishment for those who had taken part in the seizure of power.

During the afternoon of October 17, 1971, the Vice President met for three hours by mutual agreement with Prime Minister Papadopoulos to continue their conversation of the previous day. The following are the highlights of this conversation:

• —The Prime Minister indicated that he was searching for some gesture that might throw the critics of his regime off balance and give the press a new focus. For example, he had considered bringing some very prominent person into his government but so far had been unable to find someone who could project the proper image and not, at the same time, impede the attainment of the objectives of his government.
• —In reaction to the Vice Presidentʼs suggestion that the return of King Constantine might suit the Prime Ministerʼs purposes, the Prime Minister described this as impossible now and indicated that he is clearly disenchanted with the King. The Vice President laid out in detail and without attribution the ideas the King had expressed to him on how he might return. The Prime Minister did not see this as a feasible scenario. At the same time, the Prime Minister stressed that he was the protector of the monarchy and believed that it could be an important stabilizing influence for Greece in the long run.
• —The Prime Minister indicated that the gradual process of implementing the constitution would continue. As of the end of last year, he had thought that it would take until the end of 1974 to prepare for elections, but now, because of the international situation, he could not say how long would be required.
• —The Prime Minister said that in his opinion the pressure for return to parliamentary democracy in Greece would decrease in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere abroad over time. The Vice President expressed his doubt that this would be true in the strongest possible terms. On the contrary, he felt more, not less, opposition could be expected from the U.S. Congress.
• —The Prime Minister made clear his determination to complete the “revolution” and the mission of his government as they saw it at all cost. If the U.S. Congress were to cut off aid, he would seek help elsewhere and if it were not forthcoming he would take whatever other solutions were necessary. The Government of Greece would not act adversely to Greek national interests, as they saw them, for any reason whatsoever. He understood the importance of NATO and its value to Greece, but he could not accept the responsibility to solve NATO problems at the expense of Greek national interests. If his allies chose to abandon him, he would rather struggle alone than to do what he knew was wrong for his country.
• —The Prime Minister asked the Vice President to be absolutely sure of two points. First, he was completely aware that Greece cannot survive “if she finds herself a passenger on a ship manned by insane men whose captain is also mad, and which is therefore destined for the bottom of the sea.” Secondly, he was totally aware of his responsibility not only to his country but to the world as a whole. He had always tried to have his advancement of national interest conform to broader interests.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US. Secret; Nodis.
2. No record of this meeting was found.