3. Editorial Note

On March 28, 1969, Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger approved NSSM 35. “The President,” the NSSM reads, “has directed a review of U.S. Trade Policy toward Communist countries…. This study should examine policy towards COCOM, U.S. differential controls, trade with Eastern Europe, Asian communist and Cuban trade embargoes, and extraterritorial effects of trade controls.” For the full text of the NSSM, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–72, Document 288. For the resulting study, see ibid., Document 292.

After the study was completed, Kissinger forwarded a summary to President Richard Nixon in May in order to brief the President for an upcoming NSC meeting. Kissinger wrote: “All agencies agree that our present East-West trade policy hurts the Communist economies marginally, if at all; is a source of irritation between us and our allies and between us and our business community; and that increased trade could be of some help in improving East-West political relations.

“But there are three sharply different approaches to liberalizing our present policy:

  • “1. To seek political concessions before we take any forward steps, including requests for Congressional authority to liberalize (Defense view);
  • “2. To request Congressional authority prior to negotiations but then liberalize in the expectation that it will lead to improvement in the political climate (State view);
  • “3. To seek authority but then liberalize in return for purely economic concessions (Commerce view)….

“State advocates an immediate major legislative initiative to liberalize the Export Control Act, seek authority for the President to extend MFN treatment to the Communist community and remove the [Page 5] proscriptions on Export-Import Bank lending. They see this approach as most clearly reflecting your desire to move into an ‘era of negotiations’ and to enhance your bargaining power with the USSR….

“Commerce is firmly opposed to any major legislative initiative at this time, fearing Congressional rebuffs and hence a setback to the improvement in trade relations which they foresee under existing law.

“The other agencies are in between State and Commerce…but generally leaning more toward Commerceʼs caution.

“I recommend that the Administration take no major legislative initiatives at this time but go along with Congressional liberalizing initiatives. My judgment is based largely on foreign policy considerations, however, and domestic political ramifications must be a major element in your decision.” For the full text of the memorandum, see ibid., Document 298.

On May 28 Kissinger signed NSDM 15, “East-West Trade,” which conveyed the following Presidential decisions concerning Eastern Europe:

  • “1. Present legislation provides an adequate basis for U.S. trade policy toward the USSR and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe at this time, in view of the status of our overall relations with them. There is thus no current need for the Administration to make any proposals, or support proposals of others, to change the Export Control Act or provide authority for the President to extend most-favored-nation treatment to these countries. Neither is there a need to try to facilitate sales by amendment of the regulations governing shipment to them of agricultural commodities….
  • “3. We should be prepared to move generously to liberalize our trade policy toward the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries whenever there is sufficient improvement in our overall relations with them.
  • “4. The United States should continue to liberalize its export control list, within the framework of present legislation. As soon as possible, we should align our controls to the list agreed internationally by COCOM except where the United States can maintain effective unilateral control because the items are not available from non-U.S. sources. The United States should not place pressure on other countries not to pursue trade policies toward Eastern Europe more liberal than our own.” For the full text of NSDM 15, see ibid., Document 299.