283. Editorial Note
On June 17, 1970, the National Security Council met in the Cabinet Room of the White House with President Richard Nixon to discuss U.S. policy toward the Mediterranean, with particular reference to Italy and Greece. According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 3:11 to 4:44 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Ambassador Henry Tasca, who was in Washington for consultations, attended. The meeting began with a briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, who stressed U.S. interest in the southern flank of Europe, the security of Israel, and the security of oil shipments for Europe from the Middle East. Helms then noted that the Soviet Union in the 1950s provided arms to radical Arab states and in the 1960s established [Page 720] a naval presence in the Mediterranean. Helms stated that the Soviets were planning to stay in the Mediterranean. After noting the Soviet provision of air defense to Egypt and the continued strength of the Communist Party in Italy, Helms turned to Greece and Turkey:
“In Greece and Turkey—Turkey is firmly committed to its NATO ties and is almost certain to remain in NATO. But while they will exert more vigorous influence in the Alliance, they will probably continue to expand their relations with Moscow, particularly in the economic field. Moscow has played both sides in the Cyprus situation.”
The President then called upon his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, who stated that while the NSC had made an extensive examination of the whole area, the discussion at the meeting on the operational side would concentrate on Italy and Greece. Kissinger noted that the United States faced a number of questions including the following: “To what extent that we continue to seek containment of Soviet power, can we afford not to have firm relations with Greece and not to look at it from a security point of view?”
After a discussion of Spain, North Africa, and Malta, Secretary of State William Rogers raised the issue of NATO and Greece:
“Brosio is very worried about the future of NATO. He wanted to head the Scandinavians off to avoid a Greek walkout. It was a tough meeting. The Dane was concerned about the U.S. giving military aid to Greece. We urged the Greeks not to walk out. The Dane finally decided on a milder speech than he earlier planned. The Greek thanked me and agreed to ask his government to move as much as it can. The Norwegians and Danes wanted us to get the Greeks to do something visible before we go ahead with military supply.
“President: The decision has to be in two different parts:NATO-related arms, and arms related to internal defense.
“Rogers: The decision is as to timing. Itʼs possible that Norway and the Danes may leave. If we could get the Greeks to do something, weʼd be O.K. They have already said they will stop the military courts and return to civilian rule. If they could announce this, that would be all thatʼs needed for us.
“Amb. Tasca: They will do it.
“President: The idea is not to blackjack them but to work out a deal privately.
“Tasca: We want to avoid a situation where those who are against us charge that we havenʼt done anything.
“President: [To Sec. Rogers]: Do the Europeans understand the dangers in the situation?
“Rogers: Yes, they understand. Any weakening will be a source of great concern.”
[Page 721]The President then led the discussion toward the issue of U.S. military posture, especially if the United States received a request for support from Lebanon or Jordan. The President then returned to Greece as follows:
“President: What about the King of Greece? Whatʼs his situation?
“VP: Itʼs hard to judge, but …
“Tasca: Heʼs had many faults in the past. There is great opposition to him among the yo Unger and middle officers.
“President: What do they want?
“Tasca: They want a Republic. The Army is more of this mind than the others because of their background. They think the King might put in older exiled officers. If the King was prepared to make a statement that he wants the Greeks to have arms, that could help reconcile the various groups.
“President: I know him reasonably well. He has strong qualities. His father was a decent man. He has good points but was pulled and hauled by the radicals. Heʼs idealistic but he was exploited. Could he be persuaded to do that? The symbol of the King is good in Greece. In his self-interest, he doesnʼt have the political sophistication to know that those outside really donʼt support him. If he could get a statement on arms, action on arms, and go ahead with a promise to have a constitutional government by the end of the year….
“Tasca: They never had made a promise before to do this by the end of the year.
“Rogers: The NATO people donʼt believe theyʼll do it.
“VP: What is the Soviet attitude?
“Tasca: They are knocking on two doors: Theyʼre trying to discredit this government, and at the same time theyʼre trying to queer its relations with the U.S. to get us out of Greece.
“VP: Who stimulates the public relations figures in the U.S.? The Greek-American Committee is amazed.
“Tasca: The International Red Cross tell us—they have free access—that they donʼt believe the torture stories. This may have been in the first 18 months—on Communists who were in the ʼ40s civil war—but not anymore now.
“Rogers: We have to realize that regardless of the facts, the young people in Europe believe them. We canʼt afford to lose them all. The Europeans say they havenʼt done anything.
“Tasca: They do have serious problems. They donʼt understand their image problems abroad.
“VP: I donʼt believe there are groupings of ‘young people,’ ‘poor people.’ These constituencies donʼt exist. They are diverse.
[Page 722]“President: One thing is relevant: The USIA people say that the only major U.S. paper they see in Europe is the Herald-Tribune. Thatʼs basically the New York Times and Post. The TV in Europe is state-controlled and leftist-oriented. What is involved is a barrage of propaganda unfavorable to the U.S.—and also a negative picture of the Greeks. The idea is that the U.S. shouldnʼt give arms and then the Greeks would change. Theyʼd change alright, but the wrong way. In 1947 I visited Greece as a young Congressman. I talked to guerrillas—who were probably properly coached—and I came back convinced that the Greek-Turkish Aid program should go forward. I got a barrage of cards and letters saying, ‘Don’t give arms, give food to Greece.ʼ The left was against giving arms. The major difference is that in the 1950ʼs it was unfashionable to support Communists but it is no longer so. People now say they donʼt care about the security of Europe; they want the Greeks to be pure. I donʼt know what would happen at the lower levels in Europe. I know what Iʼd do—we need the Greeks because of 10 divisions, and the Mid-east. We donʼt like the government but weʼd like its successor less. We canʼt do this, of course. Papandreou is a cold-eyed tough guy of the left. We have to do it right. Constantine should come back for his interest and Greeceʼs interest and tell them we believe they should move and say they will move.
“VP: Has the media and opinion effect really been examined? The media here are not representative. Couldnʼt this be true in other countries, too?
“President: The American leader class—the intellectuals, the media, etc.—they have a viewpoint that makes them no longer fit for leadership. The strength of America is in the ‘hard-hats’—the stevedores, the working people, some in the colleges. But American opinion in a hard decision could be with you. Itʼs not so in Europe. Luns, whoʼs a tough man, said that on TV.
“Rogers: One thing of the difference between the young and the old: The young donʼt remember the war and they have no sense of history.
“President: Tasca, you go back and try to get it done. If we follow the Danes, the Norwegians and other Socialists, the French and Italians, we do nothing. They are weak; weʼve got to lead. Weʼve got to support the Greeks. It must be made palatable. The others all know if we werenʼt there, theyʼd be terrified. We look all the more important because the Europeans canʼt sell security to their own people.
“Rogers: All they really ask us to do is do it wisely—not the Danes and Norwegians—but they help us by taking our problems into consideration.
“Tasca: We care about it but we want to talk and bring the Greeks along. The Greeks are very friendly.”
[Page 723]The discussion then turned to the role of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–028, NSC Meeting—The Mediterranean 6/17/70) The full account of this NSC meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.