Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

257. Draft Memorandum for the President¹

Washington, October 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Military Supply Policy Toward Greece—The Issues

The NSC Review Group has discussed the issues and options laid out in the Interdepartmental Group paper at Tab C.² The following reflects the Groupʼs view of the problem and discussion of the issues:

I. Background

A. The “suspension” of military aid: What has it meant?

After a group of colonels took over the Greek government in April 1967, the Johnson Administration suspended shipment of major items under our military aid program. Equipment valued at $52.6 million now remains suspended. However, the flow of other items and spare parts has continued at substantial levels:

1. From April 1967 through June 1969, the US delivered about $100 million in equipment under grant assistance.

2. Grant assistance has been supplemented by $75 million in U.S. excess stocks programmed for delivery at no cost to the Greeks and $35 million in sales, including $20 million on credit terms. These represent a significant increase over the pre-coup levels.

3. Overall, the value of U.S. military shipments programmed for Greece—while it dipped in the year after the coup—now stands at pre-coup levels, although a gradual shift from grant aid continues and the withholding of some major items of equipment (RF–5 aircraft, M–48 tanks, M–113 personnel carriers) has slowed modernization of Greeceʼs armored units.

B. The political parallel to “suspension.” All the while that the US was withholding major items of equipment, the Johnson Administration took the position with the Greek government and with the US Congress that full resumption of military shipments would be possible only as it was clear that Greece was returning to constitutional representative government. This policy was an attempt to bridge the gap between two conflicting interests—strategic interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and preserving Greece as a NATO ally and, on the other side, pressures on the Administration from a number of places including Congress to oppose military dictatorship.

C. The sum of US pressure. Thus, while the Johnson Administration did suspend some military aid shipments and have its Ambassador repeatedly urge return to constitutional government, the sum of actual US pressure was more symbolic than real. The US could have cut off the entire flow of military equipment and created an atmosphere in which American private investment and tourism declined sharply. Instead, it expressed dissatisfaction through repeated ambassadorial admonitions and partial suspension of military shipments without exerting enough pressure to risk jeopardizing the US-Greek alliance.

D. The present situation.

1. In Greece. The Greek government has promulgated a constitution, is slowly putting its provisions into effect but has not yet set a date for elections and the return to parliamentary government. The government seems firmly entrenched. Opposition is passive and not united. The government has so far shown little sign of being able to broaden its popular base and win active support.

2. Outside Greece expatriate opponents of the military government—most recently ex-Prime Minister Karamanlis—continue to press for return to constitutional government, either by urging opposition action in Greece or by urging US and western European action to isolate Greece. They continue to seek signs of US support.

3. US-Greek relations. The Greek government has in essence asked the Nixon Administration to stop pressing it to return to constitutional government. It says it will do so as soon as possible, but it argues that pressure from outside will not help and will only irritate US-Greek relations.

E. The issues, therefore, are:

1. What are US interests in Greece? (Section II)

2. Do these interests require us to maintain a full-scale military assistance program? (Section III)

3. How does the nature of government in Greece affect US interests? (Section IV)

4. What are our options? (Section V)

II. What Are US interests in Greece?

A. US economic benefits from Greece are relatively small. US direct investment by private firms is only $155 million. We maintain a small surplus in our trade with Greece, but obtain no resources through trade that we could not obtain elsewhere.

B. Specific US political benefits from Greece are negligible aside from firm Greek support for a strong NATO and aside from a general interest in any government that is not a source of international disorder and is willing to do business according to general international practice. The present Greek government has little influence over other governments or in international forums. Opposition to military government in some quarters has turned our normal relationship with a NATO partner into a political issue.

C. In contrast to US economic or political interests some of our strategic benefits from continued close association with Greece are significant:

1. Greeceʼs military forces (160,000 men) are capable of a conventional defense against attack by Bulgaria (159,000 men) without significant US assistance or the use of nuclear weapons. Besides defending Greece itself, these forces could help divert Warsaw Pact forces or substitute for US forces in a US-Soviet conflict. [21/2 lines not declassified]

2. Greece could provide base and staging rights to the US for the Middle East. The US bases in Greece are both suitable and probably available for the staging of humanitarian, peace-keeping or military intervention missions into the Middle East.

With the increasing restriction on US use of its bases in Libya or Turkey, we have no other bases near the Middle East with comparable ease-of-access.

3. Greece also provides the US and NATO with a number of military facilities including communication links for the 6th Fleet and Turkey, [11/2 lines not declassified] and logistics bases for support of the 6th Fleet. However, unlike staging rights to the Middle East, there are theoretical alternatives to these facilities, although they are subject to the unsteadiness of Italian policies and the willingness of Congress to appropriate either for new [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities or for satellite communications systems.

4. Voice of America depends heavily on relay stations in Greece for its Arabic and Eastern European broadcasts.

D. Conclusions:

1. Apart from general interest in the ability of a NATO partner to defend itself, the main US interest in Greece lies in maintaining unrestricted access to bases for US staging into the Mid-East and—unless unique—to communications [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities there.

2. Insofar as the military regime in Greece arouses hostility in some NATO capitals—as well as in the US Congress—and could over time become a source of international disorder, the US must recognize that the US freedom of maneuver is somewhat limited by the existence of authoritarian government.

E. These conclusions raise two issues which are examined in greater detail in the two following sections:

1. Do US strategic interests require a full-scale US military assistance program? (Section III)

2. How does the nature of the government in Greece affect US interests? (Section IV)

III. Do these interests require us to maintain a full-scale military assistance program?

A. Pro.

1. US access to Greece will depend on a close political relationship and a continued sense of common objectives.

2. Because of Greek inability to produce or purchase all of the sophisticated equipment it needs, the Greek forces cannot be modernized without continued assistance from the US on major items of equipment, such as F–5s, M–48 tanks, etc.

3. A continuing military aid program, therefore, is one concrete way of demonstrating that a close political relationship exists. This is especially true as long as the Greek government is controlled by army officers.

4. A continuing military aid program is also necessary to assure Greeceʼs ability to defend itself as well as to carry out its NATO responsibilities. A program of present dimensions affects that capability by … [Defense to fill in specifics.]³

B. Con.

1. A conventional attack on Greece by its Communist neighbors with or without Soviet support is extremely unlikely in the near future.

2. The most likely threat to Greek stability is internal disruption. The present Greek forces could fight a civil war, even one supported by its communist neighbors, without further help from the US.

3. Even if there were a conventional attack, the Greek forces could be maintained for a time at a level satisfactory to meet it without significant force modernization or the delivery of major items of new and sophisticated equipment. As long as spare parts continue to flow along with some new equipment on a sales or excess basis, the degree of degradation of Greek capability would not present too great a risk.

4. On the political level, it can be argued that even continued partial suspension of military shipments probably does not jeopardize US access to Greek bases. The US presence in Greece is a sign of the governmentʼs international “legitimacy” and contribution to NATO—international recognition that is valuable to the isolated Greek government.

C. Conclusion: Something close to the present level of military shipments probably is necessary to preserve US access to Greek facilities, but the most immediate issue is not so much the level as the political relationship it signifies. On purely military grounds, there is some flexibility in the level of US deliveries under grant military assistance, though continued delivery of spares is essential and some new equipment is important in preventing too serious degradation of Greek capability. A somewhat reduced program could maintain the conventional capability of Greek forces and US influence with the Greek government. However, at some very low level of US shipments, the Greek government might conclude that their benefits from the US could not justify the continued extension of liberal staging and base rights to the US.

IV. How does the nature of the government in Greece affect US interests?

A. Political stability in Greece is important to pursuit of US interests. If the present government does not over time gain active popular support, pressure for a change will increase. Failure of the present government to provide for orderly change will increase the likelihood of a sudden change which would probably increase instability.

B. As long as Greece remains divided between the military government and its opponents, the US is caught in the middle. Any move the US makes involves taking sides—whether intended or not—and therefore affects US ability either now or later to maintain the close political relationship necessary to pursue US interests. Although we have no desire to involve ourselves and might prefer to make clear that we ship arms solely in the NATO context, the following are facts we have to cope with:

1. Most Greeks have always believed that there is an “American factor” in Greek politics. Almost nothing we can say or do will change this view.

2. The junta considers some sign of US support important. The opposition feels that significant US pressure could remove the regime.

3. Whatever we do will be read in Greece as the US taking sides regardless of our intent.

4. What we do will therefore adversely affect our relations either with this government or with its successor.

C. The Administrationʼs attitude toward the Greek government can have some effect on the success of its general legislation in Congress and on the legislative authority for carrying on a military aid program in Greece. While the majority of the Congress has not been involved, resuming full military aid to Greece could, for example, disaffect some of the liberal Democratic Committee members who are traditional supporters of foreign aid and thereby affect the prospects for the Foreign Assistance Act. Some influential senators who oppose military aid in general have threatened to kill the appropriation for Greece altogether.

D. Continuing opposition to the junta in European capitals generates pressure to isolate Greece from the European Community. While not in itself crucial in the near future, this is a trend opposite to what the US would judge to be in its general interest.

E. Conclusion: Ideally, the US would like to maintain a normal NATO military aid relationship with whatever government is in control in Athens without prejudice to its interests. However, the situation in Greece is such that whatever the US does puts it in a position of taking sides and thereby prejudices either our present or future position in Greece as well as the cooperation of influential members of our own Congress in continuing general overseas programs. Finally, continuation of the present situation for long has within it the seeds of instability.

V. What are our options?

A. The first choice is between continuing present policy—symbolic suspension of major items, continued flow of lesser items and spares—and removing the suspension. The pros and cons of continuing present policy are:

1. Pro:

• —This policy has enabled us to maintain the desired access to Greek facilities.
• —It may have contributed to the juntaʼs efforts to appear to be moving toward representative government.
• —Even if it has not, it has enabled the US to straddle the fence between continuing basic supplies to a NATO partner while maintaining a semblance of disapproval for domestic political purposes.
• —More important, it has enabled the US to maintain a bridge to a succeeding representative government. The civilian politicians who will presumably one day govern Greece again, are constantly looking for signs that the US has thrown in its lot with the military government. This policy permits us to maintain a posture that our military aid is exclusively for NATO purposes and does not constitute political endorsement.

2. Con:

• —The junta is becoming more and more annoyed with the present policy. While it may not soon deny US access, it has already begun seeking additional sources of arms, and this will over time erode the cooperative relationship desirable to maintain that access.
• —It has made clear that it will follow its own timetable regardless of the US position and that US policy is achieving nothing more than to irritate US-Greek relations.
• —Storage costs for suspended items for FY 1970 are estimated at $950,000.

3. Conclusion: The present policy of symbolic suspension will not hurry the return of representative government to Greece. It may not immediately jeopardize US access to bases and facilities but it increases the chances over time that the government in Athens will begin to harass or restrict that access. To continue the present policy is to take that risk for the sake of maintaining a semblance of disapproval of the military regime, primarily to maintain a bridge to a future representative government.

B. If the decision were to end the symbolic suspension of major items, a second choice would then remain between two methods of resuming shipment of all equipment programmed.

1. Option 1: A quid-pro-quo policy, looking toward lifting the present embargo as the regime takes specific steps toward constitutional, representative government. [A scenario showing how this policy would work out in practice is at Tab A.]⁴

a. Pro:

• —This policy would tell the junta exactly where the US stands, thus putting an end to the no-answer situation of the past nine months. It would thereby release some of the tension created by present policy.
• —At the same time, it would permit the US to continue straddling the fence between working with the regime and yet not appearing fully to endorse it. It would maintain the possibility of building a bridge to the next Greek government.
• —If the Greek government, in response, moved steadily back toward representative government, this would gradually restore Greeceʼs firm relationship with NATO and Western Europe.

b. Con:

• —The Greek government might well interpret this as unacceptable pressure. It might prefer to do without the suspended items rather than jeopardizing its tenure for items that could be bought elsewhere.
• —If the regime agreed, it would play up the fact of resumption and play down any conditions the US might impose on resumption. The US would be tagged with resumption without necessarily gaining any move in Athens impressive enough to justify resumption in the eyes of the Greek opposition.
• —Moreover, the governmentʼs timetable might take so long to work out that we might feel the risk to our security interests too great for us to go on holding out for definitive progress.

c. Conclusion: This policy would be very difficult to make succeed. It stands a good chance of earning us the worst of two worlds—continued irritation of the military government, failure to move it and perhaps even publicity on US willingness to resume aid. At the same time, it offers US cooperation with the present regime as long as it progresses along the course which it professes to have mapped for itself, and it maintains enough distance between the US and the junta to keep alive the potential for a reasonable relationship with a successor government.

2. Option 2: Resumption of full military deliveries while avoiding public endorsement of the present Greek government. [A scenario showing how this policy would work out in practice is at Tab B.]⁵

a. Pro:

• —It would assure US access to Greece, thereby securing our highest priority interests in Greece as long as the present government remains in power.
• —It might prolong the regimeʼs tenure while giving it the kind of security which could encourage it to relax its repressive tactics and begin working seriously toward an orderly transition to representative government.

b. Con:

• —It would cast our lot decisively with the present government and jeopardize our interests when Greece returns to representative government.
• —We would have no further leverage except to reimpose suspension, which would almost certainly cause a sharp reaction from the military government.
• —There would be some Congressional opposition in the U.S.

c. Conclusion: This is the best way of securing our interests in the near term but it leaves us with very little reinsurance against the inevitable day when civilian government returns to Greece.

VI. Conclusions.

A. The situation, US interests, US capability:

1. The present situation in Greece is adequate in the short term for preserving US interests, although it carries with it increasing risk over time that US access to Greece will be restricted.

2. But the present situation has in it the seeds of instability and difficulty for us in pursuing our interests unless a gradual transition is arranged to a more broadly based government.

3. We are not going to change the situation in Greece much one way or another.

4. We want to maintain a cooperative relationship with the present government. We also want to leave the door open to a cooperative relationship with future governments.

5. We do not want to take sides sharply in the present political dispute in Greece because that will jeopardize our position either with the present government or with future governments.

6. Anything we do in Greece will be read by one side or the other as taking sides.

B. The elements of an appropriate policy would, therefore, seem to be these:

1. the minimum movement from present policy necessary to maintain a cooperative relationship with the present government without dramatically taking sides with it;

2. a US posture that assumes the importance of Greek transition back to representative government, thereby holding the door open to cooperation with the next government;

3. acceptance of a pace in transition that does not return Greece too quickly to the instability of 1967.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. Davis sent the draft memorandum on October 10 to those who attended the Review Group meeting of October 2; see Document 256. Davis asked for comments and concurrence and a recommendation on whether the issue warranted a full NSC discussion or could be handled as a memorandum to the President. It was handled as a memorandum to the President; see Document 261.
2. See footnote 4, Document 256.
3. Brackets in the original.
4. Brackets in the original. The scenario in attached Tab A contained an illustrative list of possible steps. The first stage would include passage of a press law easing current restrictions on the press and admission of technicians into the government. The next stage would be abolition of the courts martial and establishment of a Constitutional Court. The third and final stage, allowing the United States to release such items as tanks and fighter aircraft, would include validating the suspended articles of the constitution and thus restoring civil liberties, holding municipal elections, and reactivating political parties although with some circumscription of their freedom of action.
5. Brackets in the original. The scenario in attached Tab B would have Ambassador Tasca announce to the Greek authorities that the MAP was being resumed in full, but explaining the U.S. desire to see a return to parliamentary democracy. Tasca would also explain that restoration was being made in good faith in the expectation that Greece would take substantive steps to reestablish democracy as soon as possible. U.S. public comment would stress the overriding U.S. strategic interests in Greece, but make clear that the United States would push for reforms. Subsequently, U.S. official public comments would express satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the evolutionary process in Greece. These statements would be carried by the Voice of America. The “cool but correct” posture would continue until general progress was made in the restoration of political life in Greece and, until then, U.S. officials would avoid statements that gave the appearance of embracing the regime. Tasca would develop a relationship with the regime permitting him to “exercise influence for democratic reform without involving himself unduly in Greek internal affairs.”