Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

236. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, April 20, 1972, 0700Z.

1901. Subj: Yugoslav Queries Concerning US Reaction in Event Soviet Invasion.

1. In course of Ambassadorʼs April 13 conversation with Dolanc, latter claimed US had condemned invasion of Czechoslovakia but had done nothing about it.² He then asked what US attitude would be if country outside Warsaw Pact were invaded by USSR. Ambassador replied that response would depend on a variety of factors (e.g. identity of country attacked, circumstances of invasion, willingness of people of invaded country to resist, attitude of US public and Congress) and that concrete answer to such a broad question could not be given. Dolanc expressed his understanding and moved to another topic.

2. Same topic has been raised by high GOY spokesmen several times before in recent months, during conversations with important visitors from West. In course of conversation with Ambassador Forthomme of Belgium during latterʼs January visit, Foreign Sec Tepavac reportedly volunteered observation that prospects for help from West in event of Soviet invasion are slim. Early in February FSFA Deputy Sec Petric took same line with Senator McGee, as did Bogdan Osolnik, Federal Assembly foreign affairs spokesman.

3. Interesting to conjecture concerning reasons for such expressions of concern at this point in time. Relations with USSR have improved considerably since last summer. GOY spokesmen have told Emb that military pressure from Soviets in the Balkans is generally at low point (e.g., no hints being made to Yugoslavia about overflights or base rights); economic as well as inter-Party relations have developed steadily since Brezhnev visit. However, very fact that economic and other ties with Soviets are growing probably stimulates this kind of conjecture on part of GOY; it is both reflection of their concern and an implied explanation for Western ears.

4. Recent events inside Yugoslavia and outside have also probably played a role. Croatian party crisis this winter afforded dramatic evidence of strength of centrifugal forces here and heightened concern over possible Soviet mischief-making. Dismemberment of Pakistan has impressed some Yugoslavs with helplessness of country beset with internal strife which is invaded by stronger power bent on dismemberment. Finally, while actively promoting CSCE as well as discussion of troop withdrawals from Europe, Yugoslavs are queasy about sort of new power balance which will emerge. Aware of desire of USG to achieve further improvement in its relationships with USSR, they fear we will agree to arrangements which ignore their interests and leave them more vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Talk of new “isolationism” in US and Congressional call for unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe add to uneasiness. Thus they raise these questions with Western spokesmen, against a background of general concern, as part of probing effort during period of internal and external shifts.

Toon

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 734, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. III 1 Sept 71. Secret; Exdis.
2. For documentation relating to the U.S. response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80–95.