Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

234. Memorandum for the Presidentʼs Files¹

Washington, October 30, 1971, 10:05–11:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between President Nixon and President Tito

PARTICIPANTS

• President Nixon
• Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State
• President Tito
• Miss Lijana Tambaca, Interpreter

In opening the conversation, the President commented that President Tito had had a busy time, including an appearance at the National Press Club. President Tito said that he had been asked many questions at the Press Club and that in his responses he had told the press what he thought, which might not have satisfied everyone. The President said that President Tito had handled the questions very well indeed, and that answers which satisfied everybody were not good because they said nothing.

Asked by President Tito if he was satisfied with the joint communiqué,² the President responded that he was, commenting that it might be much more difficult to work out a joint communiqué when he went to Peking and Moscow. The President then asked President Tito if his associates were satisfied with the talks they had had on economic and other bilateral matters. President Tito replied that they were, but that there was one problem, that of the import surcharge. He felt this problem was especially important because the third UNCTAD session was to convene soon³ and also because there was a meeting of 77 nations in Lima.⁴ He felt that it would be very useful from the standpoint of U.S. prestige if something were done in this matter. The President said that we were working on this problem to take care of less developed countries and that appropriate actions would be taken fairly soon. The actual problem was only with the UK, France, the FRG, Italy and Japan, and there was no problem as regards other countries. We had this matter very much in mind, and when Secretary Connally returned from his trip to Japan⁵ something would be worked out.

President Tito observed that he was very satisfied with the discussion he had with Secretary Stans and a number of American businessmen.⁶ The rather extensive and detailed discussion had been about the possibility of increasing U.S.-Yugoslav trade and economic cooperation. In this connection, he wanted to point out that Yugoslavia had amended its legislation concerning foreign investments so as to encourage such investments. Referring to OPIC, the President noted that we were also working on the necessary legislation. As President Tito knew, it was difficult to work out trade arrangements with socialist states because they had no private corporations. Yugoslavia, however, was different. In fact, during the meeting with Ceausescu,⁷ the latter had asked why the U.S. could not accord the same treatment to Romania as it had given Yugoslavia, and he, the President, had told Ceausescu that this was because Yugoslavia had a different system. Thus, if President Tito could influence other socialist states to make arrangements similar to those in Yugoslavia, trade with those states would go up. President Tito observed that he would soon visit Romania,⁸ with the President noting that while Ceausescu was a very intelligent and tough person, he did not fully understand the intricacies of international investment. The U.S. would like to help Ceausescu but the Romanian system created difficulties in this regard.

The President then said he wanted to tell President Tito very frankly about our attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Vietnam problem. In this connection, he stressed that his remarks would be of a strictly private nature and that he would be grateful if the record of this conversation, a copy of which would be provided to the Yugoslav side, was issued only to the two Presidents and not distributed further.

The President continued by noting that President Tito had participated in more international meetings than any living statesman. Indeed, he had also participated in more international meetings than any dead statesman, if only because the number of nations had increased. The President said he knew that the polite thing to do was to gloss over the differences that might exist between interlocutors, but he wished to tell President Tito straight from the shoulder about his views on the world and the dangers as he saw them.

First, the President said, he believed that President Tito knew that, while the U.S. had many faults, it was not a threat to the independence of smaller countries. It was certainly not a threat to Yugoslavia, which could have trade and other relations with the U.S. but should not fear any interference on the part of the United States. The U.S. was not saintly, but from the standpoint of its own self-interest—and any country must act on the basis of its self-interest—it believed that its interests would be served by the existence of strong independent nations like Yugoslavia. We realized, however, that Ceausescu, with his big neighbor to the North, and Yugoslavia, which was in the same sphere but somewhat further removed, had a special problem. While he did not know Brezhnev or Kosygin personally, there was no question in his mind that, because of its self-interest, the USSR would continue its efforts to bring its neighbors under increased influence. The independence of Yugoslavia and Romania, regardless of these two countriesʼ internal systems, was consistent with U.S. interests but was not consistent with Soviet interests.

President Tito interjected that there were great differences between Romania and Yugoslavia, with the President commenting that President Tito would still admit that he had been a thorn in the USSRʼs side, not because he wanted it but because his independent policy was disliked by the Soviets. The problem of the countries in that area was to have good relations with the United States but without going so far as to provoke the Soviets into using their might to stop movement toward independence. In this connection, the President observed that one of the major questions to be discussed in Moscow would be the U.S. attitude towards the Eastern bloc. Our position would not be that of liberation; as Hungary had shown, liberation meant suicide.⁹ However, the President stressed, his position would be to avoid any kind of understanding with Moscow that would give the Soviets encouragement to fish in troubled waters in Yugoslavia or elsewhere. He felt that he did not have to say more than that. President Tito said he fully understood what the President had in mind and noted that he had not yet told the President about Brezhnevʼs comments concerning blocs. He said that Brezhnev had told him that if such security could be assured in Europe as would stabilize the situation, then the Soviets would agree to the elimination of both blocs and to have different arrangements among European states, for example, on a bilateral basis. President Tito commented that these remarks had surprised him because previously the Soviets had been very tough on this issue. The President said that while this might be what Brezhnev said, he personally strongly believed that from the standpoint of their self-interest the Soviets could not tolerate any division or independence inside their bloc. For example, the differences between the USSR and China were not because of the long borders or different nationalities, but because the Soviets were unable to tolerate another strong power in the communist bloc. The President said that he was not criticizing and that he understood this.

President Tito said it was true that the Yugoslav independent position inevitably had repercussions in the neighboring countries and that it was, as the President had said, a thorn in the Soviet side. However, little by little the Soviets were coming to adjust themselves to change, although the President was right that they would never allow those states to leave their orbit. The President recalled that he had told Ceausescu frankly that he could not go so far as President Tito had gone because if he did he would be stamped by the Soviets. But what the Romanians could do was to make some internal adjustments that would facilitate the development of their relations with other countries. President Tito observed that the Romanians were greatly dependent on Soviet raw materials.

The President said that another question he wished to discuss with President Tito was our arms talks with the Soviets, because those talks were very important from the standpoint of what other states would do for their defense. Noting that we hoped to reach agreement with the Soviets on limiting both offensive and defensive strategic armaments, the President said that he wished to point out at the same time that if no such agreement was reached he would have to make a decision to increase our armaments. As things stood now, the Soviets were making great efforts to enlarge their arsenal of ICBMs, SS–9s and SLBMs. While we could not object to Soviet efforts to reach parity with the United States, we could not stand by if another nation was gaining superiority. Therefore, if no agreement was reached, we would have to increase our arms spending by $15 to $20 billion, and he, the President, was prepared to do it. President Tito expressed the view that it was important for the U.S. to discuss arms control with the Soviet Union because if agreement was reached in this area, that would make it easier to reach agreement on other issues as well.

The President continued that in certain parts of the world, some seemed to believe that given our winding up some commitments, our Vietnam policy, the Nixon Doctrine,¹⁰ and our moves regarding China and the USSR, he was so concerned about peace that he would make a move for peace even if that should weaken U.S. defenses. This, the President emphasized, was a gross miscalculation. The U.S. was a Pacific power, and it intended to remain such a power because it had interests in the area. If others were to limit their armaments, the U.S. would do the same, but it would not do it unilaterally.

The President recalled the remark in his toast the other night, that President Tito was a man of peace. In a very personal way, he wanted to say that although President Titoʼs and his own backgrounds were different and his role in history had not been as great as President Titoʼs, there were also some similarities. Both President Tito and himself had come up the hard way. President Tito was for peace, and he considered himself to be a man of peace too. President Tito was for independence, just as he was a strong believer in independence. He also respected different social systems; President Tito might be a communist and he a capitalist but this did not matter. However, one thing should be clear, and that was that he, President Nixon, was not a soft man. The U.S. was not interested in peace at any cost, and this would be made very clear in the forthcoming discussions with the Chinese and the Soviets. Nor would the U.S. make any arrangement with the Chinese or the Soviets at the expense of third countries. The President continued that it was his firm conviction that a weak United States would be a danger to peace, although some Senators held a different view and called for unilateral disarmament. He did not believe in such disarmament, especially if the other side was building up its armaments. In this connection, the President noted that some leaders on which President Tito had influence might criticize the United States for increasing its military strength, but that he firmly believed that this served the interests of peace. President Tito said that the nations the President was referring to did not criticize the United States for strengthening its defenses but rather for its inadequate participation in their development. Many of those nations were tired of hearing only words about such participation and wanted to see some action.

The President said that he now wished to comment briefly on Vietnam. He recalled that at the time he had come to office there had been over 500,000 American troops in Vietnam, with 300 killed every week. Now, however, we had less than 200,000 troops in Vietnam, and last week there had been only seven killed. This was not accidental. Late in 1969, after making a peace offer,¹¹ we had warned North Vietnam that if it failed to negotiate we would have to take measures to protect U.S. forces. In August of 1969, during his conversation with Ceausescu, he had also told him that he would have to do that. Following that, the talks continued for several months with nothing happening. Consequently, he had ordered the liquidation of North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia, and the result of that action had been that our casualties had dropped from 300 to 100 a week. In October 1970, the U.S. had made another peace offer.¹² Here again, the North Vietnamese had been told privately that unless they really negotiated we would have to take military action. During his visit in October of 1970, Gromyko had been informed that this was what we were going to tell the North Vietnamese. However, the other side had made no response and only increased its infiltration. As a result, the Laotian operation had had to be launched.¹³ That operation had been conducted by the South Vietnamese Army and its result had been North Vietnamʼs inability to launch its offensive this year and a decrease in U.S. casualties to the present average of less than 20. The President continued that we had offered the North Vietnamese assistance in rebuilding their country, which was badly damaged not only by war but also by recent floods. Our condition, however, was that the 400 American prisoners be returned. The North Vietnamese had again failed to answer, and now they had been told that we needed a reply by the end of November. The President said that he did not expect President Tito to comment on Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam because he knew that those opposing our position on Vietnam said that the U.S. should withdraw, turn the country over to North Vietnam, and also bring down Thieu in the process. This, however, the U.S. would never do.

President Tito interjected that this was not his position. His position was that a solution should not be sought only by military means and that a government should be formed including all elements in South Vietnam. Such a government would not be communist but a democratic one, and there were democratic elements on both sides in South Vietnam. The President noted that we had made an offer to set up a government that would be acceptable to the people of South Vietnam. The offer provided for international supervision and, while he did not wish to go into further details, was generally a very forthcoming one. The President said that he did not wish to leave any mistaken impression as to what would happen. He considered himself a man of peace, just as President Tito did. But, as President, he had to use power to protect U.S. interests. If the North Vietnamese failed to answer and did not release our prisoners we would act, this time not against Laos or Cambodia but against North Vietnam. The idea that the U.S. had no choice but to get out was totally fallacious. We did want to get out but we also intended to get our prisoners back. Consequently, if North Vietnam did not even answer our very forthcoming offer, which went beyond anything that had been said publicly, we would have to act.

President Tito expressed the views that the U.S. should discuss this with both the Soviets and the Chinese. While he had never had discussions with the North Vietnamese, he had talked with Madame Binh. However, the South Vietnamese could not make North Vietnam move if the latter did not want to. Noting that President Tito saw many leaders, the President said that those leaders might be interested in his evaluation of President Nixon just as he, President Nixon, was interested in President Titoʼs evaluation of Brezhnev and other leaders. He thought that the main point to put across was that he, President Nixon, was a man of peace who would consider strengthening of peace as the greatest contribution, but that his desire for peace should not be mistaken for weakness. President Tito was also a man of peace, but he was also a strong man for otherwise he would not be here today. The President continued that, for his part, he would use all power at his disposal to obtain the release of our prisoners. He stressed that while he would not ask President Tito for any comments, he wanted to be completely frank and let President Tito know what would happen.

President Tito said he was grateful for the Presidentʼs remarks. As a man of peace, he could not encourage any warlike action and believed that peaceful solutions should be sought. He understood U.S. difficulties, and it was a mistake to say that he believed the U.S. should get out at any cost, because that would be regarded as weakness. At the same time, every effort should be made to obtain a peaceful solution. President Tito said that he was optimistic in this regard because of the Presidentʼs forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow and also because of Soviet willingness to talk. As Galileo had said, “The earth is moving just the same.”

President Tito said that, in conclusion, he wished to stress that Yugoslav policy was not based on the ideas of one man or one group of people. Rather, it reflected the desires of all Yugoslav people, who wanted good relations with the United States, relations which had been a tradition in the history of both countries, and also as good as possible relations with other great powers. Consequently, the President Tito, could not change Yugoslav policy in any other direction. The President replied that he fully understood this. Noting that his approach was a very pragmatic one, he said that the U.S. was not interested in every nation having the same system of government as our own or in having every nation voting with us in the United Nations. It was clear that every nation had to proceed on the basis of what it regarded as its best national interest. All we wanted was equal treatment for both sides, without the U.S. being vilified while the other side went scot free.

Asked by the President when he was returning to Yugoslavia, President Tito replied that it would be around November 6. The President stated that he had made our last and best offer to North Vietnam and that he wished President Tito to know that if we received no response until the end of November we would have to act. President Tito commented that it was very useful for him to know this.

The meeting ended at 11:05 a.m.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Tito. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The memorandum is marked “unsanitized.” See footnote 1, Document 232. A tape recording of this conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 609.
2. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 1070–1072.
3. April 13–May 21, 1972, in Santiago, Chile.
4. Reference is to the second meeting of the Group of 77 Developing Nations October 25–November 7.
5. November 10–12.
6. No record of this discussion has been found.
7. See Documents 183 and 184.
8. September 22–25.
9. Reference is to the 1956 Hungarian revolution.
10. See footnote 19, Document 220.
11. Made by the President in an address on November 3, 1969. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909.
12. For text of the October 7 offer, see ibid., 1970, pp. 825–828.
13. Reference is to the Lan Som operation of February 1971, in which 16,000 South Vietnamese troops with U.S. air support tried to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail.