Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, June 21, 1971, 2259Z.

110720. Subject: POLADs/Yugoslav Developments. Reference: USNATO 2590.²

1. Following INR assessment is forwarded in response to your request and may be drawn upon, at Missionʼs discretion, in POLADs discussion:

2. While Belgradeʼs ties with the West are at an all time high and closer collaboration with Peking is in prospect, there has been a conspicuous lack of success in mutual Yugoslav-Soviet attempts (e.g., Gromykoʼs visit to Belgrade, September 1969; and the visits to Moscow of Premier Ribicic in June 1970 and Foreign Secretary Tepavac in February 1971) to effect a genuine reconciliation since the falling out over the Czechoslovak invasion. Soviet behavior and posture, particularly recurrent belaboring of the Brezhnev Doctrine, continue to confirm the Yugoslavs in their suspicions over long-term Soviet intentions toward their country. The Yugoslavs have apparently concluded that a genuine reconciliation is out of the picture for the foreseeable future. Tito himself—unlike in similar situations heretofore—appears to have oriented himself completely westward, as reflected in a number of his get-togethers with Western European leaders. Unlike the old dream he once entertained of becoming an independent associate of the East European socialist countries with an equal say in developments in this area, he now apparently wants no part of the “socialist commonwealth” because of the implications presented by the Brezhnev Doctrine. He has not met with Brezhnev and Kosygin since April 1968 while maintaining a heavy schedule of meetings with free world leaders.

3. The Soviets for their part see nothing but hostility in Yugoslaviaʼs stronger westward orientation and in Belgradeʼs reconciliation with Peking, despite the Yugoslavsʼ protestations that improved ties with the Chinese are not aimed against Moscow and would not be at the expense of “good ties” with the USSR.

4. An aspect of this hostility has been the constant pressure of various sorts exerted by the Soviets against Yugoslavia. For instance, the Soviets still refuse to give the Yugoslavs formal official assurance that they are not part of the “socialist commonwealth” and thus exempt from the provisions of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Soviet Embassy in Yugoslavia maintains an oversize information-propaganda program in Yugoslavia and has stalled on a formal information agreement by which the Yugoslav Government hoped to regulate and possibly cut down its size. While Yugoslav suspicions cannot be corroborated, Belgrade is convinced that Moscow supports the Bulgarians on the Macedonian question, which to the Yugoslavs is tantamount to support of Bulgarian claims on Yugoslav territory (e.g., Socialist Republic of Macedonia and three border enclaves in Serbia).

5. More recently Belgrade has come to believe that Moscow is promoting internal Yugoslav national discord and tensions accompanying Titoʼs moves to pave a more orderly succession. The most notable—although not independently provable—were the indications that, over the past year, Soviets were subsidizing the émigré Branimir Jelic, head of the exile Croat National Committee centered in West Berlin, which carried on subversive agitation for an independent Croatia. Jelic was a member of the Ustashi (Croat fascists), who publicly claiming Soviet support for an independent Croatia, has scored an extraordinary diversionary success last spring by duping the Croat Party leadership into an open dispute with the Yugoslav secret police. Croat leader Bakaric (and possibly others) evidently compromised himself by an innocent correspondence with Jelic, which the latter evidently divulged. It required Titoʼs intervention at the Brioni Presidium meeting in late April to settle the question to the satisfaction of both sides. (RSEN–27 of May 10: Yugoslavia—Leadership Meeting Lessens Tensions, Produces Agreement on Future Tasks may also be drawn upon.)³

6. The Soviets have also been pressuring the Yugoslavs by evidently dusting off the old Cominformist exiles—those who fled Yugoslavia after the Yugoslav Partyʼs expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948 and now for the most part reside in the USSR. In the polemics following the Czechoslovak invasion, the Yugoslavs again raised the danger of “neo-Cominformism,” that is, those pro-Soviet and generally conservative elements who favored jettisoning Titoʼs “self-managing” socialism in favor of a return to a centralist, more authoritarian government—although these elements have never been specifically identified. Last year the Soviets apparently resurrected the old Cominformist Vlado Dapcevic, a former colonel in the Yugoslav Army, who was reported operating in Western Europe, purportedly to set up an anti-Tito regime and/or party. One press report indicated that the Soviets had him coordinating subversive activities against Titoʼs regime. The latest chapter revolved around the lectures by two Cominformists in the USSR, Blazo Raspopovic and Jova Elez, which the Yugoslav Government protested in early June because of alleged “slanders” against Yugoslavia and President Tito. The protest, coupled with the ensuing polemical exchange between the Belgrade Politika and the Moscow Izvestiya, brought already cool relations to a new low.

7. Given these developments Belgradeʼs ties with Moscow are likely to remain troubled for the foreseeable future. The political and ideological differences dividing them remain well-nigh intractable, and the suspicions between them have been increasing. This state of affairs with Moscow is in notable contrast to Belgradeʼs efforts to move closer to the West and China. There is no reason to suppose that the independent-minded Yugoslavs will diverge from the course that they have now charted for themselves.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL YUGO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by S. Asterion (INR), cleared in EUR and INR, and approved by Ralph McGuire (EUR).
2. Dated June 17; it reported on the NATO Permanent Representativesʼs discussion concerning the Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation. (Ibid., NATO 3)
3. Not found.