Office of the Historian

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State1

Belgrade, March 13, 1970, 1540Z.

629. Subject: US-Yugoslav Military Relations.

1.
Yugoslav Chief of Staff Colonel General Bubanj, accompanied by Lt. Colonel General Bulovic (Ass Chief of Staff for Intelligence), and an aide came to dinner at residence March 8.
2.
Occasion was social; wives were present; invitation prompted by my desire to know Bubanj better and to probe for ways of improving currently distant relations Yugoslav military maintain with US.
3.
I found Bubanj tough-minded, shrewd, blunt. He has been twice Air Forces C/S, and since January Armed Forces C/S; looks like retired all-pro tackle; water colors as hobby; limited English. Bulovic silky, intellectual, oblique; very current on published literature US military doctrine and organization; fluent English (MilAtt Washington 1948–52).
4.
During long after dinner conversation on service connections, Bubanj put direct question to me: What would US do in case of Soviet attack on Yugoslavia?
5.
In reply I said prior question seemed to me: What would Yugoslav armed forces do? Would reaction in any way be conditioned by fact that over last decade Yugoslav armed forces had had much closer relations with Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries and had looked to them for most of their external training and advance equipment purchases?
6.
Bubanj said mission of Yugoslav armed forces was to defend against attack from any direction; they would carry it out. Yugoslavia had always wanted to diversify its arms sources, as form of deterrent and to avoid over-dependence. But high costs, stiff terms in West and availability of clearing account mechanism in East had dictated sourcing. Yugoslavia now making intensive effort to diversify. Had already contacted Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, France, Britain. But if it had to fight, Yugoslavia would use all its resources, whatever their origin.
7.
I then said that I thought direct attack on Yugoslavia least probable contingency. Intimidating or internal divisive action more likely, and presumably Yugoslav armed forces had contingency plans for that (Bubanj nodded agreement). But should situation be such that direct intervention possible, attitude of US would no doubt be as stated in NATO communiqué of November 1968.2 Added that, as Secretary Rogers had recently told Tito, US would not enter into any agreement with Soviets that would affect our friends.3
8.
Bubanj expressed appreciation. Reverted to hope I had expressed for closer and warmer relations military our two countries, but feared that, in view mistrust and past local misunderstandings, this would take time to develop. Said he would like to have further discussion whole range of issues and that he also believed senior US and Yugoslav military should work toward informal, more frequent contacts. I agreed.
9.
Comments: Bubanj took initiative both in suggesting date to accept invitation extended some time ago and in turning conversation to fundamentals. His timing followed the Secretaryʼs Addis conversation with Tito (on which he said he had been well briefed), Ribicic talks in London on alternative procurement sourcing, and new strains below Soviet-Yugoslav surface.
10.
I believe Bubanj operating under political guidance. I think he sees his military task as deterrence, and I have no doubt that he would fight if deterrence fails. In view present role of Yugoslav military in this decentralizing country and their potential role in succession period—psychology of which has now clearly set in—I gave him encouragement I could within existing policy framework. We have since heard from Yugoslav side that Bubanj was “satisfied that beginning was good,” that tone was frank, and that ice had been broken.
11.
These would also be my views. I have thought about our conversation during succeeding three day Bosnian visit, and may have recommendations to make as contact develops. Meanwhile, Bubanj says he would like to talk again. I think best leave next move to him.
Leonhart
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. I through Jul 70. Secret; Exdis.↩
  2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 6, 1968, pp. 595–597.↩
  3. Reference is to the Rogers–Tito meeting at Addis Ababa; see Document 217.↩