Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

209. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

Bucharest, December 30, 1971, 1519Z.

3934. 1. Begin summary: At New Year reception today President Ceausescu asked me to transmit his “personal appeal to President Nixon to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam.”² He also asked that his greetings be conveyed to President, and his thanks for recent affirmative actions on Ex–Im Bank and MFN.³ Action requested: I recommend brief response from President to Ceausescu, in appropriate form, to keep open channel of communication between two Presidents and to exert whatever influence is possible on Romania in relation to Indochina. End summary.

2. At annual New Year reception today, President Ceausescu took me aside immediately after his remarks to the diplomatic corps and began conversation at asking: “Why has the United States begun again the bombing of North Viet-Nam?” I replied that every action of war is tragic for humanity and for the cause of peace. I said the United States particularly desired a cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and a peaceful settlement of the conflict through negotiations; in recent weeks, however, North Vietnamese forces have attacked Saigon, crossed the DMZ, and stepped up their military operations in Cambodia and Laos. I said current limited air strikes should be seen against this background, and assured President Ceausescu that they represented no change in US policy. Ceausescu then asked me to transmit his “personal appeal to President Nixon to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam.” He said that conflicts could not be settled by resort to force. I said that it would be salutary for all parties concerned to act on this basis; unfortunately, we had not yet been able to engage the North Vietnamese in real negotiations at the Paris talks.

3. President Ceausescu asked that his personal greetings be conveyed to President Nixon. He said he wished also to express his appreciation for the Presidentʼs action in authorizing Ex–Im Bank credit facilities for Romania, and to thank him for the affirmative declaration of the administrationʼs position to Congress concerning the MFN legislation.

4. I recommend Department and White House consider desirability of transmitting suitable brief message from President to Ceausescu, responding to latterʼs communication. I believe it would be worthwhile to do this briefly in some appropriate form as maintenance of communications opened between two Presidents earlier and to make whatever helpful input we can on Southeast Asia. While Romaniaʼs general stand on Indochina problems has often been stated for the record—most recently in todayʼs Scinteia—there is probably utility in our doing what we can to weigh in with Ceausescu in occasional high level communications designed to draw Romanian position back a little toward more neutral ground. Opportunities here are not large, but it remains true that Ceausescu sees himself in somewhat independent position from which he wishes to judge international issues on basis of Romanian “principles.”

Meeker

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. Confidential; Exdis.
2. The attacks were in retaliation for North Vietnamese shelling of Saigon and increased troop infiltration.
3. The administration announced Nixonʼs decision to extend Export-Import Bank facilities to Romania on November 30, 1971. (Telegram 216475 to Bucharest, November 30; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971)