Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

206. Memorandum of Conversation¹

San Clemente, California, August 31, 1971, 11:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
• Henry A. Kissinger
• Peter W. Rodman, NSC (notetaker)

Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by welcoming Ambassador Bogdan to California. He asked the Ambassador what was going on in Romania. “You shouldnʼt keep threatening your big neighbors like you are doing,” he remarked.² The Ambassador replied that sometimes it was necessary. He called Dr. Kissingerʼs attention to the tactics a hedgehog uses against a bear: A hedgehog is really no competition for a bear, but when heʼs in a fight he raises hell first, so that all the wood hears.

The Ambassador then stated that his President had instructed him to pass on to President Nixon the Romanian Presidentʼs considerations on the situation in Eastern Europe. But first of all, the Ambassador was to convey his Presidentʼs appreciation for the measures which the United States had taken on Romaniaʼs behalf—on Most Favored Nation, EXIM–Bank, and GATT.

Dr. Kissinger then inquired if the Ambassador was going to announce his visit to San Clemente. The Ambassador replied that he had no strong feelings, but that he had thought it would have some publicity. Dr. Kissinger then suggested that they return to that question after the Ambassador finished his presentation.

In general, Ambassador Bogdan resumed, President Ceausescu felt that the trends in the world today were positive. Reason was prevailing more and more. Americaʼs normalization of relations with China, the Berlin agreement, and the possibility of a SALT agreement, were examples of this. Dr. Kissinger commented that there might be a Conference on European Security, too. Did Romania want a Conference on European Security? The Ambassador replied that it depended on how the Conference was organized; he suggested that perhaps there should be cooperation on that between the United States and Romania. Dr. Kissinger responded that he would be interested to talk with the Ambassador on some occasion about that.

At the same time, Ambassador Bogdan continued, President Ceausescu wished to invite President Nixonʼs attention to certain negative developments in Eastern Europe and in Soviet-Romanian relations. He was referring specifically to the reaction of the Soviet Union to the visit of Romaniaʼs state-party delegation to China. The Soviets made gestures and press attacks on them, directly and by proxy. The Romanian Government did not know what was discussed at the Crimean meeting, but it was safe to assume that they talked about Romania.³ The Romanians had met with them at COMECON shortly before.

Dr. Kissinger then asked a series of questions exploring whether there was a parallel with Czechoslovakiaʼs position in 1968. There were no pro-Soviet factions in Bucharest, the Ambassador indicated, and the Romanians would fight. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Hungarians were joining in the attacks on Romania; Ambassador Bogdan did not think it was of their own free will.

The Ambassador asked rhetorically why it was that Romania wished to direct the Presidentʼs attention to this situation, including the military maneuvers and press attacks. The first reason was that frankness was important to any relationship. And secondly, the Romanian President had been a little surprised to see the lack of reaction in the West to these developments. Perhaps, it was only due to lack of awareness, the Ambassador suggested. Dr. Kissinger thought that was the reason. “Do you think the Soviets will attack you?” Dr. Kissinger asked. It was difficult to say, the Ambassador replied, but he thought his countryʼs situation was basically better than 1968. Romaniaʼs position was stronger and her international situation was better; Romania had better assets in the international situation. But they wanted to avoid complacency, and this was why they wished to talk with the President. Even if the United States and Romania differed in their respective views about military blocs and other questions, President Ceausescu believed that the United States and Romania shared an interest in a more diversified world. Such a world is more stable, the Ambassador continued; it gives more freedom of action and room for maneuver for smaller and middle-sized nations. President Ceausescu knew that President Nixon had sought to encourage this, but Romania nevertheless had noted that at this juncture there was no response to these developments. Dr. Kissinger noted in reply that it would have been difficult for the United States to criticize the Soviets for not inviting Romania to the Crimea, and the military pressures (the maneuvers in Bulgaria) had been called off. But the United States was aware of the Sovietsʼ other tactics, such as flying planes right up to the border and then turning. It looked like a war of nerves.

The Ambassador pointed out the necessity of taking precautions. But there was no need for Romania to give the United States advice, the Ambassador continued, because the President had already done a number of things—such as his visit to Romania, and the economic steps—which were a help to Romania. Other gestures were possible, he noted. The United States had a variety of means at its disposal. The U.S. was negotiating with the Soviets on many issues (Berlin, SALT, CES), and the Soviets would not want to jeopardize these talks. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the United States would make sure that the Soviet Union was under no illusions about the fact that if they attacked Romania, this would ruin détente for several years. “This is important,” the Ambassador responded. There were other possibilities, too: The United States could help by getting the true facts before the press. The Soviets were accusing Romania of creating a Tirana–Belgrade–Bucharest–Peking axis, and so forth. [Dr. Kissinger interjected that Romania was formidable enough by herself, but when she was in league with the Albanians, too, that was serious! The Ambassador mentioned that the Albanians have a slogan: “We and the Chinese are 800 million strong!”]⁴ The Ambassador referred to President Nixonʼs gesture of not opposing the new trade legislation, and Dr. Kissinger indicated that that had been a deliberate decision.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Ambassador what else the United States could do concretely. The Ambassador replied that he would like, if possible, to be received by the President, perhaps in Washington. Dr. Kissinger noted that a meeting in San Clemente was not possible, but he told the Ambassador that he would recommend such a meeting to the President. He could not commit the President, but his own estimate was that the President would probably agree to it.⁵

Dr. Kissinger then informed the Ambassador that he could report back to President Ceausescu the following (and at this point the Ambassador took out pencil and paper and took careful notes): (1) The United States has a major interest in the independence and autonomous policy of Romania. (2) The United States will do nothing directly or indirectly that amounts to collusion that would enable a great power to abrogate the independence of Romania. (3) The United States will make clear in its way that unilateral pressures or military action is not consistent with a relaxation of tensions.

Dr. Kissinger then added that he would discuss with the President what visible things the United States could do. In response to Dr. Kissingerʼs question, the Ambassador characterized the Yugoslav attitude as close to the Romanian. Brezhnevʼs visit to Yugoslavia⁶ the Romanians thought of as a response to a longstanding invitation.

The conversation then turned to the question of press treatment of Ambassador Bogdanʼs meetings with Dr. Kissinger and the President. They first agreed that it was better not to announce at this point that the Ambassador had met with Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger then commented that, since the President almost never receives Ambassadors except for presentation of credentials, it was important to have some special reason to cite for a Presidential meeting with the Romanian Ambassador. Otherwise every other Ambassador in town would feel slighted, or would immediately ask to see the President. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the meeting be set up on the basis that the Ambassador was carrying a special message from President Ceausescu. The Ambassador replied that unfortunately he was not authorized to say he was carrying a personal message, but he could check back with Bucharest and correct that. Dr. Kissinger then noted that a personal message alone might not be enough to explain a Presidential meeting. He suggested, and Ambassador Bogdan agreed, that the White House could simply announce, after the meeting, that the President received a message. When we announce it, Ron Ziegler could say that the meeting was for an exchange of views, and that the President used the opportunity to show his feeling for Romania, etc. We would check with the Romanians on the precise language.

Ambassador Bogdan then turned the conversation to some other political issues. He congratulated Dr. Kissinger on his trip to Peking,⁷ noting that this would probably make it less interesting for Dr. Kissinger to hear about the Romaniansʼ visit to China. On the contrary, Dr. Kissinger replied. He noted that President Ceausescu had received a good reception there, and then asked the Ambassador a series of questions about the Romaniansʼ conversations and impressions. In reply, the Ambassador indicated that President Ceausescu had met with Mao, and had the impression he was still in command. The Romanians and Chinese had talked about the U.S. on a constructive basis. President Ceausescu had stressed the necessity of a political solution in Vietnam privately and in his public statement, and he had also pressed for this in the communiqué.

The Ambassador continued by saying that in the Romanian view the North Vietnamese had made an important step, in that in their latest proposal the POWʼs were not linked to a political settlement.⁸ Dr. Kissinger, asked by the Ambassador whether he agreed, commented that he was not sure whether a people who fought so heroically were really capable of making peace. Maybe not, the Ambassador said; the Romanians, too, had heard the North Vietnamese say that with all the sacrifices they had made, they could not give up. But their (imaginary) fears of U.S.–PRC collusion may be alleviated by a political settlement in Indochina, the Ambassador suggested. The Ambassador expressed the view, in all humility, that the United States had stressed too much the possibility of help from the USSR. Even if the Soviets wished to help, they could not. Dr. Kissinger said he was inclined to agree, and that the U.S. had not stressed this avenue since the early months of the Administration. He thought that nobody really had any influence over Hanoi. The only real issue remaining was Hanoiʼs desire for us to put their people into power. We could not do that. Our position was a fair political process that left the outcome uncertain; but this was unacceptable to the North Vietnamese.

The only way to see is to discuss it with them, the Ambassador said. He asked Dr. Kissingerʼs estimate of the situation, and Dr. Kissinger replied that he was less hopeful than he had been a few weeks previously, because Hanoi would probably now want to wait out the outcome of all the current political turmoil in Saigon. Ambassador Bogdan mentioned that the Chinese were not so sanguine about Hanoiʼs prospects but it was difficult for them too, to do much about ending the war. Dr. Kissinger thought the Chinese knew what they were doing. The Chinese were disciplined, and thought in historical terms. To them, Indochina was not the main problem. The Ambassador thought that Japan might be, but Dr. Kissinger responded that the Chinese were more worried about “your ally,” the Soviet Union. The Chinese were not building air raid shelters in China against us or Japan! Japan had hardly any airplanes. The Chinese had not built such shelters 15 years ago at the height of U.S.–PRC hostility, and from that something could be deduced.

Ambassador Bogdan returned to the economic issues, reporting that the Romanians had spoken with Wilbur Mills on the MFN question, and Mills had told them that if the Administration told him it was interested in it, he would get it done. Dr. Kissinger promised to look into that, and said he would check with Peterson.

The Ambassador then mentioned that he would also soon be seeing the Secretary of State, as usual, for a tour dʼhorizon,⁹ and to tell him what he had told Dr. Kissinger. The Romanian Government was also thinking of inviting the Secretary to visit Romania. Dr. Kissinger urged the Ambassador to explore this with the Secretary. The Under Secretary of State might be able to come earlier, but the Ambassador should certainly not exclude a visit by the Secretary. The Ambassador added that in the second half of October, Paul McCracken would be visiting Romania to see his counterpart, who is a high party and state official. He might bring a message from the President. Dr. Kissinger replied noncommittally.

After some pleasantries about the prospects and possible symbolic implications of Dr. Kissingerʼs visiting Romania for a vacation, the meeting ended.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in Kissingerʼs office.
2. Reference is to Soviet reactions to President Ceausescuʼs June visit to China that included announcement of early August military maneuvers near the Romanian border. In a July 15 memorandum to Kissinger, the Department of State outlined Soviet moves and predicted a further heightening of tensions. (Ibid.)
3. Reference is to an August 2 meeting of Communist Party leaders.
4. Brackets in the original.
5. Bogdan met with the President on September 17. See Document 207.
6. September 22–25.
7. Kissinger met with Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials in Beijing July 9–11.
8. The so-called “Seven Point Plan” of July 1971. For text, see Keesingʼs Contemporary Archives, 1971–1972, p. 25079. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, August 1970–January 1972.
9. Bogdan saw Rogers on September 3. Memoranda of conversation are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ROM–US.