Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

192. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

• US-Romanian Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Romania
  • First Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescu
  • Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
  • Mr. Sergiu Celac, Interpreter
• United States
  • The President
  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
  • Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council Staff

Macovescu opened the conversation by expressing his thanks for having had the opportunity to talk at length with Dr. Kissinger.²

He then conveyed to the President and Mrs. Nixon the good wishes of President and Mrs. Ceausescu and of Premier and Mrs. Maurer. The Romanian leaders, he said, wished the President great success in the coming year.

The President expressed his appreciation and in turn extended good wishes to the Romanian leaders and their wives. The President said that he had the warmest memories of his trip to Romania and of the Romanian people.

Macovescu then handed the President a letter from President Ceausescu ³ and said that he had also brought, as a gift, an album of photographs and moving pictures of the Presidentʼs visit to Romania.

The President expressed his gratitude and said he would respond to Ceausescuʼs letter.⁴

The President then went on to say that we were trying to cooperate at the highest level on the matters discussed between himself and President Ceausescu. Some of the matters take time, but we would do all we could within the inhibitions of our legislation. The President stressed that we did not like blocs and that we would deal with each country on an individual basis. Romania had been fair to us and we would act in the same way toward Romania. Wherever we can, we will be cooperative.

Macovescu responded that Romania acted in the same spirit and would do its best to develop its relations with the United States. He expressed his gratitude for the assistance that Dr. Kissinger had already given to him on several of the problems he had come to Washington to discuss.

Macovescu, who had been speaking in English, then changed to Romanian and spoke through the interpreter. He said in his discussions with Dr. Kissinger and also with others in Washington⁵ he had sensed the desire on our side to develop relations. Ceausescuʼs message to the President was explicit in also stressing the desire of Romania to develop relations in all fields. It was also a personal message to convey the desire of Ceausescu for the best possible personal relations with the President. Macovescu said he had asked Mr. Kissingerʼs assistance in certain specific fields and it had been promptly forthcoming. He was hopeful that in the future Romania could receive similar assistance. The Romanian Government wanted to have good relations based on concrete realities, relations which would not be disturbed by momentary circumstances.

Macovescu went on to say that the Presidentʼs visit had produced a great impression with the people and leaders of Romania and that prospects for the future of our relations were very good. Romania wished to develop such relations, as Ceausescu had told the President, with all states, including its neighbors. It was making constant efforts to develop its relations with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Macovescu went on, the course of relations with the Soviet Union was not always favorable. Lately the Romanians had noticed a certain Soviet reticence concerning Romaniaʼs external policy. This was not dramatic but in day-to-day relations the Romanians noted that a certain reserve was particularly manifest in economic matters. Macovescu said that this situation explained Romaniaʼs effort to obtain coke for its steel industry in the U.S. [The President had noted in his opening remarks that we understood the importance of coke to Romania.]⁶

The President asked whether the Soviet reserve of which Macovescu had spoken had occurred since his visit and whether Romanians saw a connection between Soviet policy and the Presidentʼs visit. Macovescu replied that he could not say that the Presidentʼs visit marked a specific stage in the Soviet attitude since there had been evidence of it for a long period of time. In the last two months, however, it had become more accentuated. The attitude, Macovescu commented, was not aggressive but rather one of reticence and reservation. The President said he had asked the question because other countries might develop reserve toward us if they thought that their relations with the Soviet Union would be adversely affected by improved relations with us. We think of Romania as a test case. The President stressed that we wanted our friendship to help, not to hurt and we had no desire to make things more difficult for our friends.

Macovescu said that the Romanians were acting in the same spirit. They had no desire to cause difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations through their relations with the U.S. He added that no representative of the Soviet Union had ever commented officially or unofficially at any level on the Presidentʼs visit. There had been rumors about the Soviet reaction but none of these had ever been substantiated. He repeated that no Soviet comment was ever received by the Romanians.

Continuing, Macovescu said that in the context of the previous point the Romanians had a general concern for security in Europe. The Romanian Government was extremely interested in European security because it had no desire to see a repetition of Czechoslovakia or the application of any doctrine like the Brezhnev Doctrine. Consequently the Romanians seize every opportunity to organize action on European security. This was not directed against anyone in Europe or outside. It was Romaniaʼs constant concern to see that European security should not be directed against any power outside Europe, especially the U.S. To be more specific, Macovescu went on, when a socialist country started talking about the first session of a European security conference the Romanians supported from the very beginning the idea of U.S. and Canadian participation, assuming they were willing to participate. After the Prague Foreign Ministersʼ Conference this position had now become a joint one of all socialist countries so that there is no point even in discussing this matter any further. The socialist countries had advanced certain specific proposals for the first session of a European security conference. Macovescu continued that there could of course be much talk about such matters as agenda, time and place, but his main point was to request that the U.S. Government give due attention to facilitating the eventual achievement of an organized system of security. Perhaps the process would be a long and tedious one but the Romaniansʼ hope and goal was to live in freedom and independence like any other nation. Romania wants the system to be the product of the participation and responsibility of all states and not a bloc to bloc arrangement. This, Macovescu said, was the second message which President Ceausescu had wanted him to convey.

The President said that we were open-minded. The real problem is what to discuss. At high levels, discussions are not useful unless there are serious problems on the table. Otherwise an illusion of security would be created when security does not really exist. It was dangerous for countries to think they have security when they do not. The President said we would examine any proposal that would lead to useful discussions.

Macovescu thanked the President and said that in behalf of President Ceausescu he wanted to reiterate once more the request for support for the Romanian economy, which is the basis of Romanian independence. The President reiterated that we wanted to help to the extent possible. He said we understood the difficulty of the Romanian position and did not want Romania to run risks like those which some of its neighbors had run. For this reason, the President said, we intended to be discreet in our relations with Romania.

The President then asked whether, since he had seen Ceausescu, relations between the Soviet Union and China had become more normal. He added that while we had to get our information on this subject from the newspapers, the Romanians could observe it more directly.

Macovescu said that since the Presidentʼs visit Premier Maurer had been in the Far East and twice met Chou En-lai on the way to and from Hanoi at the time of Hoʼs funeral.⁷ In addition Ceausescu and Maurer had seen Brezhnev more recently⁸ and there have been other contacts with Soviet officials. As regards Sino-Soviet relations, one could not really speak of normalization; but certain changes were under way. The Chinese had indicated that they were willing to meet the Soviets half way but a thorough normalization was a long way off. The Romanians had urged similar statements on the part of the Soviets. It was clear that strong suspicions remained on both sides.

The President said that we wanted good relations with both countries. We did not want the Soviets to interpret our efforts to normalize relations with China as antagonizing policy, just as we did not want them to see our policy toward Romania as hostile to them. He realized, the President said, that this was contrary to what the press said. He went on to say that blocs lined up against each other were very dangerous. We viewed this matter differently after World War II. Of course alliances were still important, but we were now in a different period. We now seek normal relations with all countries on a case by case basis, although some relationships will be more normal than others. He hoped this approach would be reciprocated.

Concluding, the President reiterated that he had the warmest memories of his visit. He said that he himself would not be able to return to Bucharest very soon, but that his children certainly would. He asked Macovescu to convey his good wishes to President Ceausescu. Macovescu said he would do so and that the Presidentʼs family would be received in Romania with the greatest pleasure and with the same warmth as the President himself. In leaving he wished the President good health which, he said, the job of President required.

(The conversation was cordial throughout. Macovescuʼs substantive points were made with the greatest care and precision. At the conclusion of the talk the President escorted the Romanian visitors into the hall.)

HS

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 704, Country Files—Europe, Macovescu (Romania). Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Red Room at the White House.
2. Kissinger and Macovescu held talks December 16–17. Memoranda of their conversation, together with a summary prepared for the Presidentʼs use, are ibid. Kissinger also held a telephone conversation with the President on the points regarding Vietnam and China that had been developed during his talks with Macovescu. (Ibid.)
3. Dated December 13; in it the Romanian President expressed his pleasure at the progress in bilateral relations, particularly in the area of economic cooperation. (Ibid.)
4. The December 29 letter was passed by hand to Ceausescu by the Ambassador following instructions contained in telegram 1934 to Bucharest, January 6. (Ibid., Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69) No copy of the letter was found.
5. The Department of State reported on Macovescuʼs conversations in telegram 210734 to Bucharest, December 19. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 ROM)
6. Brackets in the original. Documentation regarding White House efforts to procure coke for Romania is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971.
7. North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh died September 2.
8. December 3–4, during the meeting of Communist Parties at Moscow.