Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

177. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 1, 1969, 5:30–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Situation in Europe

PARTICIPANTS

• Romania:
  • Gheorghe Macovescu, First Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Corneliu Bogdan, Ambassador to the United States
• U.S.:
  • The Secretary
  • Geroge R. Kaplan, EUR/EE, Romanian Affairs

Recalling that he had met both President EISENHOWER and Secretary Rogers late in the EISENHOWER administration when he was Minister here, Mr. Macovescu expressed his personal condolences as well as those of President Ceausescu.² The Secretary replied that, as the youngest member of the EISENHOWER Cabinet, he had had a special feeling toward the late President who had been something like a father to him.

Mr. Macovescu said that his government desired above all a better atmosphere and peace in Europe and was pursuing the avenues it considered appropriate toward this end. He noted that he would be visiting Dutch Foreign Minister Luns in The Hague immediately following his Washington trip.

The Secretary said that we, too, not only want peace but are willing to go half way and more to achieve it. He said that a new administration has a certain initial advantage and can therefore take a fresh look at the important problems of achieving it. He noted, however, that Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Mr. Brezhnevʼs ideological justification had ominous overtones.

Mr. Macovescu said that the Brezhnev doctrine³ was not a justification but rather an explanation. The Romanian Government, he said, simply does not accept this doctrine and has stated its views repeatedly. The Secretary said that, while the Brezhnev doctrine may indeed be an explanation for one situation, it could as easily be construed as justification for all situations.

Mr. Macovescu said that the Romanian delegation had signed the Budapest declaration on March 17⁴ in good faith, feeling that it provided an excellent starting point in the quest for an improved atmosphere in Europe. Romania wants to play a role in working toward the abolition of blocs and the prevention of Czechoslovakia-type situations. Equally important, of course, is to build something tangible for the future. In this connection, he emphasized that the military arrangements agreed to in Budapest were not directed against anyone. The Secretary asked how this could be the case. Mr. Macovescu replied that prior to these arrangements, the Warsaw Pact had no actual working regulations. The Soviets could do whatever they wished. Now, all members know their obligations. It would now be impossible, for example, for the Soviets to decide unilaterally that maneuvers would be held anywhere in the Warsaw Pact area. Mr. Macovescu stated categorically that the subject of maneuvers had not arisen in the Budapest meeting.

The Secretary asked if there had been any discussion in Budapest concerning Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Macovescu replied that, although there had not, the Romanian Government takes every opportunity to inform the Soviets that they would be well-advised to remove their troops and renounce solutions to international problems by force.

Mr. Macovescu said that he had been instructed by President Ceausescu to emphasize that Romania did not want any special help from the United States but would on its own renounce any pressure to subscribe to any policy dictated from outside Romania. He reiterated that Romania intends to decide its own destiny by itself. The Secretary noted that it would probably be just as well in these circumstances for the United States to stay quiet. Mr. Macovescu agreed.

The Secretary said that we have already told the Soviets on a number of occasions that another Czechoslovakia would make any improvement in bilateral relations utterly impossible. Dobrynin knows this. The Secretary said that both he and the President respect the Romanian attitude and detect obvious concern over it on the part of the USSR. Mr. Macovescu said that President Ceausescu had been absolutely clear in his public statements and in his contacts with the Soviets that, while Soviet-Romanian friendship is desirable, Romania had no intention of strewing flowers in the path of the Soviets should they decide to enter Romania. He added that his countryʼs policy was more realistic than courageous.

The Secretary asked if the Soviets had given any assurances to the Romanian leadership that they would not invade their country. Mr. Macovescu replied that the question had a certain academic quality inasmuch as the Soviets had given such assurances to the Czechoslovaks.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on April 4. The meeting took place in the Secretaryʼs office. The memorandum is part 1 of 4; parts 2 through 4 are ibid.
2. Former President EISENHOWER died on March 28. Macovescu attended the March 30 state funeral as the representative of his government.
3. See footnote 3, Document 72.
4. For extracts of the relevant portions of the communiqué issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact appealing for a Conference on European Security, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1035–1037.