172. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

  • Conversations in Poland

I talked on August 2 for about a total of three and a half hours alone with Szlachcic2 and Frelek, the senior Polish Party Secretary in charge of international affairs who had accompanied Gierek to the Communist summit in the Crimea.3

The first talk was with Szlachcic who received me with enormous friendliness. He said he had just hung up talking to Gierek who was still in the Crimea and who wanted Szlachcic to convey his warmest regards to you. Gierek and the entire Polish leadership were still under the deep impression of the Presidentʼs visit but beyond that were totally convinced that the evolution in US-Soviet relations and in international affairs generally that was now underway was extremely favorable. The processes that had been set in train were, in the Polish view, wholly constructive because they promised the further democratization of Communist societies, including in a crucial way Soviet society. This could only occur under conditions of détente and the Poles [Page 411] were therefore delighted over the way the situation was developing. Szlachcic said that he was convinced that Soviet policy in this regard was firmly established and that Brezhnev was in a position to override opposition to it to the extent that it still existed. Szlachcic said that unlike some others the Poles were not concerned about US-Soviet dealings; these were essential to the whole process and the Poles could see no way in which Polish interests might be damaged by superpower agreements. On the contrary, these were required for things to keep moving forward as the Poles want.

I asked Szlachcic whether he really felt that the process of détente and democratization, as he had described it, could go forward without arousing Soviet misgivings about the implications for intra-Communist discipline and, in particular, whether the point might not come where once again the Soviets and some others, like the East Germans, felt the brakes had to be applied lest democratization proceeded too far and too fast. I said that in the past there seemed to be a dialectic pattern that operated: the more détente the greater the effort to control its effects with détente the victim.

Szlachcic said that if the process was carefully managed he thought this time the experiences of the past would not be repeated, even though there will still be some, like the East Germans and Castro who preferred tension. (He said in regard to Castro that he wanted you to know that the Poles and Soviets had agreed before Castroʼs recent visit to Moscow4 and Warsaw that they would not sign any anti-American statement with him. The Soviets ended up signing what Szlachcic regarded a rather harmless joint statement but the Poles refused to issue a statement altogether because Castro had tried to inject anti-US themes. Szlachcic said the Poles wanted to make clear to Castro that he would be isolated if he continued to push anti-Americanism and Szlachcic thought that the lesson Castro learned in Moscow and Warsaw might produce some effects in his orientation that would permit the US to conduct a more flexible policy toward Cuba over time.) Szlachcic stressed that it was important that we operate through the Communist parties in Eastern Europe; any effort to achieve change by working outside the parties would immediately arouse intense Soviet reaction. This was why the Poles appreciated the Presidentʼs decision not to see the Cardinal [Wyszynski] in Warsaw, and, as he had told you, why they were so pleased at the way we played the December 1970 events in Poland. I said we felt that Soviet decisions in 1971 had in part been influenced by the Polish December events. Szlachcic said he agreed. He said the [Page 412] Soviets move slowly and reluctantly but they are now moving, in part by conscious decision. The Poles had decided to give the Soviets full and loyal support because this was the best way to produce the fundamental changes in their system that we all wanted. To illustrate, he cited the automobile and Polish regulations on travel abroad. He said the Poles had opened their frontiers to the USSR and the GDR for the first time because they want their people to move around and stimulate the Soviets to do the same for theirs. Cars were going to help the process.

This took us onto a brief discussion of the impact of the automobile. I said I thought there were three sets of implications in the coming of larger number of cars: (1) they require an economic infrastructure that will require some change in economic priorities, (2) they will facilitate contacts among people over larger distances and across frontiers, and (3) they will reinforce the impulse toward privacy and toward individual decisions which Communist regimes have traditionally tried to smother. Szlachcic said the first two sets of implications were already clear and the Poles, at least, were taking the requisite economic decisions. He thought the Soviets would, too. The second was of course a prime motive for the Poles in promoting the automobile age. The third would be an interesting phenomenon to watch; the Poles were all in favor of greater individualism and were not afraid of it since it was a key ingredient in the process of democratization and humanization.

I asked Frelek, whom I have known for many years in his earlier capacity as head of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, how he accounted for the fact that a man of Brezhnevʼs background had apparently become the driving force behind a rather dramatic shift in the Soviet approach to relations with us and the West generally. Without answering directly, Frelek said that the thing to remember about Brezhnev was that he knew the Party and the Party knew and trusted him. (Patolichev in quite a different context had made the same point to us in Moscow.) The cadres trusted him as they did not trust Khrushchev who had constantly shaken them up with purges and reorganizations and the use of groups and devices that circumvented the apparat. Moreover, despite the high average age of the Politburo and Brezhnevʼs own seniority, Brezhnev had succeeded in catching the imagination and enlisting the loyalty of that large proportion of Central Committee members who were only in their forties and below and who were truly the first post-revolutionary generation. Both Szlachcic and Frelek tended for these reasons to discount the likelihood that Brezhnev was in serious political trouble on any foreign policy issue. Frelek said that if there were disputes about any of the trade matters we had been in Moscow to discuss it would be about technical aspects rather than political ones. But he added that in the USSR as elsewhere the political fortunes of leaders rise and fall basically with domestic issues, especially economic ones. This was also true in Poland, even though the international [Page 413] environment was crucial to Polandʼs existence; Gierekʼs strong position was in large degree due to his successful coping with economic problems, just as Gomulkaʼs downfall had been heavily influenced by economic failure. (Both Frelek and Szlachcic however stressed that Gierekʼs personal qualities and his ability to work with and influence the Soviets had a great deal to do with his political strength.)

Frelek commented that since moving in as Party Secretary with Gierek he had come to know his Soviet counterparts Katushev and Rusakov—now Brezhnevʼs personal assistants for intra-Bloc affairs—quite well. For the first time this year, he had been invited to their homes and had met their families. He had spent ten days with Katushev in Sochi. We were wrong to see these people as party hacks. They were bright, well informed and energetic. He said that the same was true of others in the Soviet higher apparat although the party does not always get the best people to work for it in career jobs. But in his own department of the Polish Central Committee he now had several of his former students and in a small way he thought it compared well with the NSC staff. He was still teaching part-time at the University and would be coming to the US again in December.

Szlachcic repeatedly reverted to his theme that American-Soviet and East-West détente was the most favorable feature of the current international situation. He said you were a hero in Poland because you were regarded as the architect of what was happening. The Poles were convinced that the reelection of the President was vital for the continuation of the process and they would do all they could to help although they were virtually certain that the President would be chosen again in any case. Szlachcic said the entire European bloc had reached the same conclusion and that it was confirmed at the Crimean summit. The Poles were working with Polish-American groups and would be sending a delegation to Chicago to “brief,” in a very matter of fact manner, the Polish-American organizations there about the Presidentʼs visit. Szlachcic said we could be sure that they would not overdo their support, recognizing that it could backfire if handled clumsily.

Szlachcic stressed Polish eagerness for good US-Polish relations within the overall process of détente. He said they were not aware of any Soviet fears in this regard, provided, of course, that it occurred within regular channels. Szlachcic said the Soviets had been instrumental in triggering the Polish initiative of inviting the President in part because they wanted the curse taken off their own reception of the President in the aftermath of the Vietnam mining operation.5 The [Page 414] Poles had kept the Soviets fully informed of their talks with the President, Szlachcic said, and the Soviets had reciprocated. (I did not probe.) It was in this context that Szlachcic said the Poles were happy to hear of your forthcoming visit to Moscow.6 (Frelek, on the other hand, said that the Soviets had been very reticent in talking to the Poles or others about SALT II.)

Szlachcic also said that the Poles had been deeply appreciative of our support of Brandtʼs eastern policy. I said we had always made clear that we supported the normalization of the FRGʼs relations with the East but we had had to be careful not to get caught up in German domestic politics. Moreover, many of us felt that the kinds of decisions involved in the FRGʼs search for reconciliation and a modus vivendi with the East were so fundamental that they should be truly national decisions of the Germans. One should not have a situation where some years from now someone in Germany would claim that the eastern settlements had been externally imposed and a new stab-in-the-back legend would be manufactured. Szlachcic said he understood this but we should not be overly modest regarding our role; the Poles knew that given our influence in Bonn the Germans must have acted with our encouragement. Szlachcic went on to say that the Crimean summit had decided that Brandtʼs re-election was a must and that everything should be done to help it along. Consequently, the Poles would move to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn in late September, although the complex citizenship issue still had to be settled by the lawyers somehow. (Bahrʼs friend Sahm, the new German Ambassador in Moscow, had told me just two days earlier that the Soviets had put a total freeze on bloc relations with the FRG until the German election, in part, because they did not want to risk the defeat of any aspect of eastern policy that might have to go through the stalemated Bundestag. This applied particularly to the German application for UN membership.) I would judge the Crimean decision is related to Schroederʼs trip to China.

Frelek in confirming the Crimean decision said that for his part he was well aware that we had had our doubts about some of Brandtʼs eastern policies. But, where Szlachcic had observed that even with a CDU government the basic lines of Brandtʼs policy would continue because of objective factors, Frelek noted that we might find ourselves confronted with far more serious problems with a CDU-conducted eastern policy than with Brandtʼs. The Poles, he said, would have distinct reservations about the kind of courtship of the Soviets which someone like Strauss would soon become engaged in were he in a position of power.

[Page 415]

Szlachcic got to talking about the European security conference and the Polish view that it was an important aspect of the détente process. I said we understood the Polish interest and respected it; our reservations had not related to that aspect but to our concern that any such venture deal with substance rather than atmosphere. I said that in my view countries like Poland were chiefly interested in the process of the conference whereas we were bound to be concerned with its results. This was why we had stressed the need for careful preparation. I then said that we of course also expected MBFR explorations to proceed in parallel with the conference preparations. I said we were doing serious homework on MBFR. Szlachcic said the Poles welcome MBFR negotiations but they were very concerned that any reductions encompass national forces—he pointed westward, implying that the Poles would not be comfortable with reduced US and Soviet forces while the East Germans and the West Germans remained at full strength. He said the Poles really did not worry so much about the reduction of US and Soviet forces. The presence of Soviet forces, including in Poland but also, for example, in Hungary, had permitted the process of reform and democratization to go forward in Eastern Europe without arousing Soviet security worries. (I commented that Kadar seemed to have achieved all of what the 1956 revolutionaries had aimed at as regards economic changes. Szlachcic said he has managed to go beyond what [Imre] Nagy had wanted but without allowing extra-Party forces to take over the process.) Szlachcic said the Poles want the US to remain strong in Europe and in the world as a whole; without such strength détente was doomed and with it the whole Polish policy concept. Consequently, the Poles oppose unilateral US reductions. I said that our effort to negotiate reciprocal reductions was importantly influenced by our need to keep our unilateral reducers from achieving their purposes. Szlachcic said he understood this and did not want our bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the Soviets undermined by unilateral cuts. But he stressed again that any agreement should include national forces. I said that because of our Congressional problem7 we would emphasize stationed forces initially but we certainly saw the weight of the arguments for also including national forces. Szlachcic reverted several times to the point that a strong US was prerequisite for peace and for democratization in Eastern Europe and the USSR. That was why the Poles want the President re-elected.

I said I could assure Szlachcic that maintenance of a strong US was also the Presidentʼs purpose, since it was equally clear to him that the [Page 416] worldʼs peace depended on it. To that end we would continue to make our domestic system work successfully, we would maintain our military strength whatever the critics might say, and we would end the Vietnam war in a way that did not shatter the internal cohesion of our society nor raise questions about our will and capacity to play an active and responsible role in international affairs. Szlachcic said he assumed I was speaking on the assumption that the President would be re-elected. I said that was the premise we had started with in our conversation. Szlachcic said that while the Poles obviously have to say things about the US that are critical—as he had told you, the ideological struggle would go on—they view us and the policies of the President and you are pursuing with the greatest admiration.

Szlachcic asked me how I felt about the prospects for a Vietnam settlement. I said that there were many factors which led to the conclusion that Hanoi, acting rationally, should now grasp the opportunity to end the war. I said that if Hanoi was stalling because it hoped a new Administration would give it better terms it should recognize that a re-elected President Nixon could be much tougher to deal with than he was now. I said I was not informed about developments in the Paris talks and that perhaps Szlachcic could judge better than I whether Hanoi had begun to draw the logical conclusions from developments since May or whether it was still operating on the basis of its irrational suspicions, fears and hopes. Szlachcic said that Hanoi tells the Poles nothing and that if he had half the influence in Hanoi that we have with Thieu he could assure me peace would be imminent. But he could also assure me that the Soviets and the Poles have told Hanoi that the time to settle was now and that indeed they had conducted their policy in such a way that Hanoi would be led to that conclusion. Szlachcic said he himself was more hopeful than ever before that the war could be ended. In any case, that was what the Poles ardently wanted and they could see that the President wanted it too. They had told Hanoi so.

Szlachcic asked me whether I had any advice for the Poles. I said that was a large question that I wouldnʼt want to answer on the spur of the moment. But I was impressed with the Polish view of the world and with the impact of Polish attitudes on others. I said I did have one specific suggestion: it related to the European conference and seemed to fall in with what Szlachcic had earlier said about opening frontiers, the role of the automobile, etc. In the West, one of the tests of what the conference would accomplish would be whether it contributed to the intensification and broadening of contacts across the dividing lines in Europe. In fact, when we had signed our Statement of Principles with the Soviets, we had been criticized by some in Western Europe for not including a principle on freedom of movement, though this was unwarranted since the whole document dealt with greater cooperation [Page 417] and contact. But the criticism showed the feelings on the matter. I thought it would give the conference a more concrete character if it could develop ways to increase contacts, facilitate movement between peoples and stimulate the flow of ideas and information. I said I would hope that it if were feasible the Poles might use their influence with their allies to have an item of this kind on the conference agenda. Szlachcic said he would consider the point.

Some other points: Frelek said the Crimean summit was fairly routine; these meetings have become regular summertime events. The Soviets never raised the Middle East but both Frelek and Szlachcic volunteered that they thought that what had happened there might make a settlement more possible or at any rate remove the problem as a US-Soviet issue. I did not comment.

I told both Szlachcic and Frelek that I thought our economic relations would proceed well once the essentially technical issues of the bonds had been resolved. I told them Peterson was speaking with the Presidentʼs full authority in stressing our desire for close economic relations.8

Frelek said that the Soviets had been very positive about the Peterson mission and that Brezhnev had been very pleased about his conversation with us at Oreanda. The Soviets apparently gave no hint of the difficulties which in fact are still in the way of a comprehensive trade settlement.

Frelek said the Poles have no information about what was going on in Romania but that Soviet-Romanian relations were fairly stable at present.

Both Szlachcic and Frelek stressed Polish concern with EEC trade policies. The point was also made in the official talks with Peterson. As Patolichev had done earlier in Moscow, they said that the US and the East Europeans had a common interest in fighting the trade practices of the Community. I said we had supported the formation of the EEC and its enlargement; clearly there were now some serious economic problems between it and us, but we hoped to be able to persuade the Community to join us in finding ways of reducing or managing them.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Kissingerʼs handwritten note on the first page reads: “Good job—HK.”
  2. Franciszek Szlachcic, Minister of the Interior and a member of the Polish Politburo.
  3. Held on August 2.
  4. Fidel Castro was in Moscow for the COMECON economic summit June 10–12. A summary statement on the activities of the meeting is in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 5, 1972, p. 23.
  5. On May 8 President Nixon announced the imposition of a blockade on North Vietnam. For text of his statement, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 583–587. On May 10 the United States bombed Hanoi.
  6. September 10–12.
  7. Reference is to efforts by Congress to save money and achieve greater Western European involvement in its own defense by unilaterally reducing the size of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. The most recent effort to impose a troop cut, in May 1971, had been defeated on the floor of the Senate.
  8. Peterson visited Poland in July, as the head of a U.S. commercial delegation.