Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

161. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 21, 1972.

Tohak 39. Ref: Hakto 11.² After some delay I was able to contact the Polish Ambassador who had spent the afternoon at Dulles Airport. When I informed him that I had a direct message from the President on the sensitive issue of Cardinal Wyszynski, he became quite concerned and agreed that this issue was indeed one of the greatest sensitivity in Poland. I explained that the President was under increasing domestic pressure to meet with the Cardinal during the Presidentʼs forthcoming trip to Poland. The President had been resisting these pressures due to his understanding of the sensitivity of this problem. I also understood that there had been some exploratory contacts made on the subject of the Cardinal through normal diplomatic channels. For this reason I had asked him to come in to meet with me personally in order to discuss a suggestion that President Nixon wished to make to his Government, recognizing of course that it was in the interest of both governments that the issue of Cardinal Wyszynski be handled with the greatest delicacy. I then stated that President Nixon wished to suggest the alternate solution of having Mrs. Nixon pay a brief, low-profile courtesy call on Cardinal Wyszynski during the forthcoming visit. The Ambassador reacted quite sharply, stating that on his own he could categorically state that this was an unacceptable course of action for his Government, reiterating that it was a matter of the greatest sensitivity. I, of course, avoided pressing and made it clear that this was merely a suggestion which the Ambassador might wish to propose to his Government, but in doing so it should be clearly portrayed as a suggestion. The Ambassador replied that in his view it would even be an unnecessary irritant to ask his Government to consider the suggestion, but that he was willing to do so if that was the U.S. Governmentʼs wish. At this point in the conversation you called and suggested to me that you wished to discuss it further with the President. After talking to you, I told the Ambassador that we were most anxious that the Presidentʼs visit proceed successfully and that until you had had an opportunity to discuss this with the President, he should not formally make the proposal to his Government. I am sure he will immediately report all that occurred, but he seemed very much relieved and stated that he was leaving here Wednesday night for Warsaw and could be used between now and then in any way we wished and also following his arrival in Poland. He remarked that he was perhaps the most understanding of our problem, and departed very amicably insisting that his Government was most anxious to have the most successful visit and was determined to receive President Nixon with the greatest warmth and hospitality.

I will await further word from you on this subject.³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, Presidentʼs Trip Files, Presidentʼs Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May 1–Jun 72, TOHAK. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2. Document 160.
3. On May 22 at 8:28 a.m. EST the White House Situation Room received Kissingerʼs reply (Hakto 16) to Haigʼs message: “Tell Polish Ambassador not to relay request for Mrs. Nixon call.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, Presidentʼs Trip Files, Presidentʼs Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May–June 1972, HAKTO)