Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

74. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

The attached document is based on the conversation between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger June 23² and the subsequent conversation between the General Secretary and the President.³ It makes a maximum effort to take into account Soviet views. At the same time, the U.S. holds the view that the working principles should not be used to support the position of either party but to get negotiations started. The U.S. has made minimum changes in previously discussed positions in order to get a negotiating process started. The following points are noted:

Paragraph 1: This paragraph is essentially from the Zavidovo paper⁴ with the addition of the objective of achieving a final peace and the formulation on negotiation discussed June 23 in San Clemente. The last sentence is in the formulation of the May 1972 draft.

Paragraph 2: The word “agreements” is changed to “settlement” in this and subsequent paragraphs in accordance with the discussion June 23 despite the fact that it was taken from Foreign Minister Gromyko’s paper at Zavidovo. The remainder is the sentence of the May 1972 draft with simple reference to “appropriate UN resolutions” added.

Paragraph 3: This remains unchanged from the draft of May 1972.

Paragraph 4: This has been simplified in the light of the Gromyko–Kissinger conversation of June 23. It contains the same elements as in the May 1972 draft.

Paragraph 5: Again, the word “agreement” is replaced with “settlement.” Since the point now refers to the over-all settlement rather than to any specific agreement, the words “lead to” are dropped.

Paragraph 6: This is the same as the May 1972 draft.

Paragraph 7: This remains as accepted in discussions June 23. It is essentially the same as in the May 1972 draft.

Paragraph 8: The language of the communiqué is introduced.

Attachment

Washington, June 24, 1973.

General Working Principles

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be comprehensive, embracing all parties concerned and all issues. This settlement means the elaboration and implementation of a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict that would achieve a final peace. This should at some stage involve appropriate forms of negotiation between the parties acceptable to all parties concerned. In the process of working out agreement on the whole complex of questions relating to the settlement, the possibility is not precluded of this settlement being implemented by stages or that some issues may be resolved on a priority basis.

2. The settlement should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 in accordance with appropriate UN resolutions.

3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement between the parties concerned.

4. Arrangements for mutual security could include demilitarized zones; establishment of an international force; stationing of such a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guarantees which could include the Soviet Union and the United States.

5. The settlement should end the state of belligerency and establish a state of peace.

6. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement must be based.

7. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.

8. The refugee problem should be settled on a just basis through agreed procedures and taking into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 6. No classification marking. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Delivered by messenger to Amb. Dobrynin at Camp David, 6/24/73 o/a 9:00 p.m.” There is no drafting information, but an earlier and slightly different draft of the attached General Working Principles was forwarded from Saunders to Rodman with a handwritten note stating that it reflected the Kissinger–Gromyko conversation on the morning of June 23 and that it had been used as a basis for discussion on the evening of June 23, from which had come the revision of June 24 sent to Camp David. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 72.
3. See Document 73.
4. See footnote 4, Document 53.