376. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1


  • General Dayan’s Main Points

You could inform Secretary Schlesinger that General Dayan made the following points in his conversation with Secretary Kissinger this morning:2

1. The Israelis have received from the US far less equipment since the war started than Egypt and Syria have received from the Soviets, other Communist countries and other Arab countries.3

—The Israelis estimate that, while Israel has received 90,000 tons by sea the Arabs have received 300,000 tons.

—Secretary Kissinger noted that our figures indicate that the US and USSR have sent just about the same amounts and those amounts by our calculations are slightly over 100,000 tons. He asked Israeli and [Page 1033]US intelligence people to get together to understand the wide discrepancy between US figures and Israeli figures.

2. One thing that is new is the extensive involvement of Communist countries other than the USSR—Cubans, North Koreans, perhaps North Vietnamese, not to mention the Pakistanis.

3. Israel is disillusioned that it cannot get from the US more than 200 tanks and 150 APCs. Whether additional equipment is available or not, Israel would like to place orders now so that the equipment will at least be in prospect.

4. If the US is counting captured Soviet equipment as a useful part of the Israeli inventory, that is a mistake.

5. Stand-off equipment is of highest priority. No one item will provide the whole solution. Some combination of items is necessary.

6. If the Israelis pull back from the Canal, Israel would prefer that neither the US nor the Soviets be present, but if the Soviets are to have forces in the area, the US must be present also.

Secretary Kissinger made the following comments on some of the equipment which General Dayan had mentioned:

1. We could give Israel 150 more tanks.

2. We just do not have the quantity of TOW missiles that Israel has asked for.

3. The only way we can provide additional APCs is to take them off the production line and away from our reserve forces.

4. On rifles we could provide 40,000 now and another 40,000 out of new production.

5. On ammunition, we will provide 140,000 rounds of 155 anti-tank ammunition. On 175 and 105 ammunition, there is some 175 in Europe which we will provide. The remainder will have to come out of production.

The Israelis are interested in some jamming equipment for use on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. The Israelis were unclear themselves on what they wanted but seemed to have an idea from General Casey that some equipment useful against the SAMs is available here.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 611, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Vol. 13, Nov. 73–Dec. 73. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.
  2. A memorandum of conversation recording this meeting is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ISR. The meeting took place at noon in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. Dayan also met with Helms on December 7 and made similar points. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 136, Country Files, Middle East, Dinitz, December 1–31, 1973)
  3. CIA Intelligence Report ER IR 73–24, December 1973, entitled “Soviet Military Resupply Activities in the Middle East,” provided policymakers with an estimate of the Soviet resupply effort since the outbreak of fighting on October 6. The paper is in the CIA Freedom of Information Electronic Reading Room.