278. Note From the Secretary of State’s Executive Assistant (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger1

HAK:

The following is a message to you from the Prime Minister through Dinitz:

1) I am sorry to hear that the US does not find it possible to object to the paragraph which calls for a return to the October 22 lines.2 This more specific demand is more serious than the similar statement in the previous resolution.

2) I appreciate the situation in which the US finds itself in the face of Soviet moves. I do not want the Secretary to think that I belittle the seriousness of the situation.

3) I have taken note of the Secretary’s words that he would “do his best to support Israel on the interpretation of the paragraph.” The Secretary knows that there is no possibility to fix the location of the previous line; it has never been verified and it has never been demarcated. Therefore, I expect serious discussions will evolve as to the location of the previous lines. I ask the Secretary to be prepared for such discussions and to be helpful to Israel in them.

4) I place great importance on the composition of the international force. It is an obvious point that it must not be composed of nations with no diplomatic relations with Israel. A number of important points will have to be worked out relating to the international force and its terms of reference, including for example authority to dismiss the force. Therefore I ask the Secretary that no finalizing of arrangements be made before Israel is given ample time by the US to review the situation. I ask that Ambassador Scali and Ambassador Tekoah discuss the details in New York, but that finalization be between Ambassador Dinitz and the Secretary so that I may have a direct influence on the final decision.

LSE3
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 136, Country Files, Middle East, Dinitz, June 4–October 31, 1973. Secret. A handwritten note on the message indicates that it was received at 3:05 p.m.
  2. Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 340 (1973) reads: “Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973.” (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, p. 213)
  3. The original bears these typed initials.