Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

266. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, October 24, 1973, 7:15 p.m.

K. Anatol, I was talking to the President.² As I understand it Malik has instructions to vote for the resolution if we go along with it, even to send over troops. We won’t go along with it.

D. If a draft resolution will be introduced which will contain the appeal towards the Soviet Union and the United States—

K. If the Egyptians introduce it.

D. —to take urgent necessary measures, including our sending over military contingents to insure the fulfillment of the resolution of the Security Council about ceasefire then he is instructed to vote for such a resolution.

K. We will vote against it.

D. I would like you to know . . . when I talked to you I was wrong.

K. I think we should both discourage such a resolution.

D. He has already received instructions. I think it only fair for me to tell you because of our discussions this afternoon.

K. Well, we will vote against it.³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts (Telcons), Anatoli[y] Dobrynin File, Box 28. No classification marking.
2. In a 7:10 p.m. conversation, which was mostly about Watergate, Nixon complained that although Kissinger had come back with a diplomatic triumph of the first order, The New York Times and The Washington Posthad paid no attention. Kissinger responded that it had been the administration’s biggest triumph in many ways. It had been a very difficult situation and the President had pulled it off. He said that although he, Kissinger, had done a lot of finessing, it had been Nixon’s decision “to push in the chips.” (Ibid., Chronological File, Box 23)
3. At 7:25 p.m., Kissinger telephoned Ambassador Scali and instructed him to veto any resolution calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to take urgent measures to enforce the cease-fire, including sending military contingents. He noted Malik had been instructed to vote for such a resolution. The Secretary also instructed Scali to veto any condemnation of Israel. (Ibid.) Kissinger informed Dinitz by telephone at 7:35 p.m. that he and Nixon agreed the United States would veto a resolution that called for sending military forces instead of observers. (Ibid.) Both printed in Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 336–338. Kissinger also sent a message to Ismail with a message from Nixon to Sadat explaining why the United States would veto any resolution asking for an outside military force (including U.S. and Soviet troops) to enforce the cease-fire. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 132, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt/Ismail, Vol. III, October 1–31, 1973)