Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

238. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Embassy in Jordan¹

En route, October 23, 1973, 0455Z.

Secto 33. Refer Amman 5642.² Subject: Ceasefire. For Ambassador Brown from Secretary.

1. Please deliver following message to King from Secretary.

2. “Your Majesty:

Ambassador Brown has just advised me of the pressures you are under for your units to continue fighting on the Syrian front.

I am at this moment in the air enroute to Washington to report personally to President Nixon on my talks in Moscow, which achieved the resolution passed last night by the Security Council. Egypt and Israel have accepted the ceasefire. I very much hope I can report to him that Jordan has done the same, with regard to its forces everywhere. The Security Council resolution is unambiguous in this regard.

It would be tragic, Your Majesty, after the fortitude you have shown during these difficult weeks in resisting a widening of the war, if Jordan should be in violation of the ceasefire for which we have all striven so hard.³

Sincerely

Henry A Kissinger

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 39, Kissinger Trip Files, HAK Trip—Moscow, Tel Aviv, London, HAKTO, SECTO, TOSEC, Misc., Oct. 20–23, 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Flash. Repeated to the Department of State. Sent also as telegram 208875 to Amman. (Ibid., Box 1175, Harold H. Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, 1973 Middle East War, 23 October 1973)
2. Document 237.
3. In telegram 5647 from Amman, October 23, 1030Z, Brown reported that he had delivered the message to Rifai that morning. Rifai had argued that Jordan would have to fight if the Syrians and Iraqis went into battle, since the Jordanians were under Syrian command. The Ambassador had pointed out that Jordan had ultimate responsibility for the actions of its forces and if they violated the cease-fire, it could not plead non-responsibility. He stressed that the Jordanians had to make sure that their role in Syria was one of pushing Assad toward acceptance of the cease-fire and not as bystanders. Rifai finally said that it looked as if the fighting was dying down on the Syrian front and he would make sure that Jordanian forces were not drawn into anything. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1175, Harold H. Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, 1973 Middle East War, 23 October 1973, File No. 18)