215. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1
Hakto 1. In thinking through what is ahead for me in Moscow, I have decided that it is essential that we stick to the resupply schedule we have agreed upon. In fact, it should be stepped up slightly, along the lines of the plan described by Schlesinger in our meeting yesterday.2 As I understand the plan it was to go to 18 C–141s and at least 5 C5A’s today. We should stay at that level.
The negotiations I am about to undertake will be tough, and I will need to have some bargaining chips to give up should the occasion warrant. We can use it to get the Soviets to stop their airlift.
Thus, I want you to be extremely careful that Defense does not now begin cutting back on our effort. If the Israelis win, what we do on resupply in the next few days will make no difference; if the Israelis cannot pull it off and bog down I will need all the bargaining leverage I can muster.3
Specifically, while I am negotiating, I want:
—The F–4s to continue at a rate of four to six a day;
—Resupply of the A–4s at the rate I gave you;
—Ammunition as requested by the Israelis;
—A little movement in helicopters.
This will give me some leverage I can use while in Moscow.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 39, Kissinger Trip Files, HAK Trip—Moscow, Tel Aviv, London, HAKTO, SECTO, TOSEC, Misc., Oct. 20–23, 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate.↩
- See Document 208.↩
- In telegram Tohak 28/WH32557, October 20, 1957Z, the White House transmitted a situation report that had just been given to Scowcroft by Dinitz. The forward thrust of Israeli forces west of the canal continued and they were engaged in the destruction of large parts of the two Egyptian armies holding the canal as well as the missile sites protecting those armies from air attack. Israeli forces had seized the initiative, causing confusion and dislocation to the enemy. A wedge had been introduced in the Egyptian front and the two armies were practically separated from each other. The report said that when the cease-fire came into force, it should find Israel holding a line that made sense from a politico-military point of view. The Syrian front had been essentially static throughout the past week, but Israeli forces had inflicted serious damage on the various contingents making up the multinational forces reinforcing the Syrian army. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 39, Kissinger Trip Files, HAK Trip—Moscow, Tel Aviv, London, TOHAK 1–60, Oct. 20–23, 1973)↩