202. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)1
D. Mr. Brezhnev asked you to convince the President of the following: This is not exactly the text of the message but I’m reading . . . “We continue to carry on very expansive consultations with the Arab leaders. For its consideration we need a little bit more time. At the same time we—the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders—want to think of what kind of formulation should be included in the text of the draft resolution of the Security Council. In our opinion this resolution should include the following main provisions:
1. A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.
2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time.
3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.
This is the main point. I will repeat it. (Repeated the above three provisions).
K. Appropriate consultations with whom?
D. Our commentary involves the following conclusions. We feel that the best thing would be to have limited number of participants in these consultations. We, the Soviet Union, are prepared, if it suits you and the immediately involved participants and Israelis, for this kind of consultation on the part of the Soviet Union and the U.S.
K. Why are you so hard on your allies?
D. On what allies. We have many allies. I would like a clarification.
K. The one ally you have as a permanent member of the Security Council.
D. For the sake of conversation, why not drop them.
K. Actually we are no more eager to have your allies there than you are. We are not much more eager to have our own allies there.
D . . . Let’s have these conclusions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The question arises about a guarantee if the resolution is to be [Page 592] adopted. I agreed together with you, if it is acceptable to both of our clients, that the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a recent forum guarantee the fulfillment of this resolution. We also are prepared to guarantee the territorial integrity, security and inviolability of the borders and the frontiers of all, including Israel, taking into consideration at the same time its right to sovereignty and independent existence. With these kinds of guarantees from the U.S. and the Soviet Union we feel that hardly anybody will have a doubt about the viability of the guarantee. So Mr. Brezhnev would like to share his thoughts along those lines with the President and he would like to receive the reaction of the White House. On my own there are two basic things: the Middle East and our relationship to cement with you.
K. I understand. You will see in the message that the President will send to you at about 10:00 or 10:30 (this he has and wants to work on it personally)—which is not an answer to this—that he makes exactly the same point without going into details. Should I still send the message of the President’s to you?
D. Yes, I will mention that it was received before this.
K. Because we won’t have an answer in two hours. Thinking out loud without having talked to the President, the most difficult point here is point number two about immediately after ceasefire that the Israelis should withdraw to a line under Res. 242 which really isn’t established yet. First let me say I realize you’re making a very constructive effort . . .
D. Yes, I’m being very constructive.
K. Why don’t we consider it later rather than debate it out now and if we have a counter-proposal we will get back to you.
D. Did you get it all down.
K. Yes, the FBI, CIA and we all have taken it down and your KGB man too.
D. Send the President’s message to me between 10 and 11, all right?
K. Yes, and on the other you will get our response before the end of tomorrow.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, Box 23. No classification marking.↩