Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973

130. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, October 8, 1973, 5:40 p.m.

D: I want to tell you that they are expecting this information. We are not going to do anything at the Council. No kind of resolution in the Security Council. Our representative in the SC has instructions not to have any polemics with the American representative. Meanwhile we continue to consult urgently with the Arab side. In this connection, we would like and hope that you will do everything not to force the SC to accept any resolutions.

K: You can count on that.²

D: Until we have finished our consultations with our allies.

K: May I make a suggestion to you. Your Arab friends are going around New York saying I am giving them an ultimatum.

D: In New York?

K: Yes. I thought we had an agreement specifically.

D: They are trying to delay the SC meeting.

K: It is not going on yet.

D: No?

K: It has been delayed. My own recommendation is we don’t care whether it takes place or not much. Let’s have it, get it over and adjourn it. I promise you we will not introduce a resolution.

D: I can give instructions along those lines. In Moscow it is now _______ hours.

K: Let’s see what happens. You can promise Moscow flatly there will not be a resolution in the near future. There will not be a resolution. We are making a very mild statement.

D: I understand.

K: It states our general position in such a vague way. We are not saying there must be a return to the ceasefire line. Just saying one way to achieve peace.

D: I understand. We would like to have consultation.

K: I promise you we will not introduce a resolution. I would hope you would not spring one on us.

D: I have specific assurances on this.

K: Let’s have an understanding that neither one of us will introduce a resolution without giving the other one notice.

D: Exactly my instructions from Moscow.

K: We will not do it I promise you without giving you time to consult with Moscow. You do the same for us.

D: Good.

K: Fine.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, Box 22. No classification marking. The blank underscore indicates an omission in the original. A notation indicates the transcript does not cover the first minute of the call.
2. At 3 p.m. earlier that day, Kissinger called Dobrynin and informed him that the United States would make a statement that it did not want to assess blame and offering some principles for a settlement in a very general way. He also promised that the U.S. Delegation would not propose a resolution and said he was counting on the Soviets not to come in with a resolution. Dobrynin responded that according to all of his information, there would be none. (Ibid.) Printed in Kissinger, Crisis, pp. 131–133.