250. Editorial Note
On September 25, 1971, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 298 regarding the status of Jerusalem by a vote of 14–0–1, with Syria abstaining. It reaffirmed the Security Council’s two previous resolutions on Jerusalem, 252 and 267, adopted in 1968 and 1969 respectively, and deplored Israel’s failure to respect those resolutions by taking legislative and administrative actions that changed the status of the city. It also called on Israel to both stop and undo such actions, including the expropriation of land and property and the transfer of people. Finally, it requested that the Secretary General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council, report on the progress of the resolution’s implementation within at least 60 days. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, page 187) Jordan had requested that the Security Council meet to discuss Jerusalem two weeks earlier, prompting Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin to tell Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco that Israel believed that the United States was “behind this [Page 903] Jordanian move” and that it would be “the cause for bad blood in U.S.-Israeli relations.” (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, September 13; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East (General), Vol. 8)
In fact, the United States had worked since June 1971 to discourage Jordan from taking the Jerusalem question to the Security Council, fearing that any Security Council meeting on the issue could not be confined to Jerusalem, “however strenuous” its “efforts to that end.” (Telegram 114987 to Amman, June 25; ibid., Box 1163, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, June 18–30, 1971) Having accepted that it could not deter Jordan on the matter, U.S. officials decided to work with Jordanian officials throughout July and August to craft the text of a resolution that would be moderate enough for the United States to support once it came up for a vote because, as Secretary of State William Rogers wrote to President Nixon: “The Israeli policy on Jerusalem has continued with such disregard of Jordanian sensibilities that our failure to give modest support to Hussein would have seriously jeopardized our relations with him.” (Memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, September 16; ibid., Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, September 1–October 1, 1971) Key instructions and commentary to the Mission to the United Nations regarding a draft resolution are in telegrams 120507 to USUN, July 3, and 154569 to USUN and Amman, August 23. (Ibid., Box 1164, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, July 1–16, 1971, and ibid., Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, August 16–September 1, 1971, respectively)