138. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts1

119651. Over the next 48 hours, our principal effort will be directed toward securing Israeli acceptance of US peace proposal. On the assumption that we can get all of the parties, we have been doing some tentative planning as to how we would proceed in getting Jarring into play. Following are some thoughts which we wish USUN to explore with Bunche confidentially in first instance. Other posts may wish comment.

1. While Jarring is acceptable to both sides, we are concerned that he has up to now failed to exercise any real initiative. If he does not grasp nettle and apply maximum imagination in getting parties together and keeping dialogue rolling, progress that we may have made could be irrevocably lost. Therefore, wish you to explore with Bunche desirability of getting Jarring to take on intermediate level assistant who can help him in negotiations, who would be imaginative in developing proposals, and who would establish kind of relationship with Jarring that would nudge him along at key points. In reviewing some possibilities, we believe best man would be Mr. Ilkka Pastinen, Finnish Deputy Representative. Finns prepared to make him available and he definitely our preference. Other possibilities are: Robert Furlonger, former Minister of Australian Embassy in Washington, now assigned Canberra, Geoffrey Murray, Canada, Thorsten Orn (Sweden), Michael Cork (Australia), Jonkeer Von Ufford (Netherlands). In discussing this matter with Bunche it is important that he understand we not be faced with fait accompli with naming of an individual by SYG who in long run would prove to be unhelpful in situation.

2. In this connection, Gromyko statement to Beam just reported signals possible fundamental difficulty.2 If Soviets have in mind that Four Powers must meet and first develop detailed guidelines before restarting Jarring, then this is a condition which likely to delay start of any talks between parties for indefinite period. You should make clear [Page 477] to Bunche, and we intend to make clear to Gromyko, that procedure we have in mind, and we made this very clear to Dobrynin here in our previous discussions, is for Jarring to start process promptly upon receipt US proposal. For our part, we will insist that Jarring process not await further refinement of mandate by Four; talks should get started on basis US proposal. Two and Four Power meetings could be pursued simultaneously with Jarring talks. If any difficulties arise with respect to prompt transmission of US proposal (without any changes in text), we would be prepared to transmit this to SYG on our own since it is an American proposal which presumably all of the parties would have accepted.

3. There is a slight technical problem on which your views are requested. Proposal is put in the form of a Jarring report to SYG. Given SYG’s sensitivities, we are willing for it to be transmitted in any way he deems appropriate. Important thing is that SYG then would put out Jarring report reflecting acceptance of parties. Hope that UN would not get itself involved, as it has in the past, with long independent checking with parties. For this reason, we are suggesting to Egyptians that they make available informally and promptly appropriate documents confirming their acceptance of US proposal, to SYG.

4. Would hope also that any such SYG announcement would indicate that parties had been invited to send representatives to meet with Jarring promptly at agreed site. We understand that SYG and Jarring have had in mind New York or Nicosia. We believe it would be desirable for SYG to begin process now of checking what would be an acceptable site for parties. On the whole, we would prefer Nicosia as conducive to a more businesslike atmosphere and closer to area and more convenient for representatives. We believe SYG and Jarring should urge that three governments send their Foreign Ministers rather than to start talks at lower levels. Assuming Israeli acceptance, we in turn intend to encourage Israelis to designate Foreign Minister Eban.

5. Simultaneously with political talks on a settlement which Jarring would be conducting with the parties, we envisage that SYG would ask UNTSO Chief of Staff to establish contact with appropriate military liaison officials in the area to work out details of limited ceasefire, including military standstill. Originally our proposal provided for a July 1 beginning on the ceasefire. Because of time needed to develop Moscow-Cairo response, this date obviously out of the question. Believe objective should be early August for beginning of fully agreed limited ceasefire, including military standstill. We will wish to brief Thant and Jarring fully on the details of standstill as we have communicated them to parties in the area and the other major powers. You will wish to note in this connection that Dobrynin July 23 informed Secre [Page 478] tary of acceptance of concept of standstill as part of limited ceasefire; Bergus believes that UAR has also accepted.3

6. In short, what we have in mind are simultaneous talks on the political side between parties under Jarring and on the military side with the Chief of Staff directly involved with technical, military liaison representatives. Reason why we believe tandem operation of this kind ought to be conducted is that if any wrinkle should develop regarding ceasefire, political talks under Jarring’s auspices would be put in train. We wish to avoid a situation where all of details of the ceasefire have to be buttoned down before the parties get involved in a dialogue on the elements of a settlement; establishment of a ceasefire and standstill should not be condition precedent to starting political talks.

7. Believe you should suggest to Bunche that Jarring ought to be alerted as to the desirability of an early trip to New York to be fully briefed.4

8. Above are all tentative, since we will be guided by views of parties.

9. Fuller cable being sent on our further ideas.5

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace Initiative For the Middle East Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared in IO, and approved by Sisco. Sent to USUN, London, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Nicosia, Stockholm, Moscow, Jidda, and Tel Aviv. A note at the end of the telegram indicates it was also sent to the White House.
  2. An informal Embassy translation of the statement is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 187.
  3. See Document 137 and footnote 4, Document 136.
  4. Buffum met with Bunche on July 27 for a “hair-down session” at which they discussed the future resumption of the Jarring Mission. Buffum expressed concern that “Jarring seems so worried about maintaining good relations with both sides that he may be reluctant to show necessary forcefulness in moving negotiating process ahead.” Bunche agreed with “this analysis of Jarring’s character” and explained that he had already spoken to U Thant, “warning him” that if Jarring “[did] not succeed in this round, entire problem will be dropped in SYG’s lap and instead of Jarring’s becoming expendable SYG will become expendable.” (Telegram 1560 from USUN, July 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1155, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, U.S. Peace Initiative For the Middle East Vol. I)
  5. Not found.