84. Briefing Memorandum From Ambassador at Large Bunker to Secretary of State Kissinger1
Panama Negotiation
Although the Department of Defense has repeatedly affirmed its support for negotiations leading to a new treaty, Clements’ latest paper (attached) in effect rules out any possibility of attaining one.2
In his paper—which is addressed directly to the President—Clements asserts, moreover, that anything less than his position on duration (defense) and lands/waters will not be “acceptable” to Defense. That has some of the quality of ultimatum to it.
Whatever may be said of the Defense Department’s inter-governmental approach, its substantive position is irrational. Rather than protect military interests over the long term, it would jeopardize them.
Attentive to Defense concerns, I compromised on the duration (defense) issue, abandoning my desire for flexibility between 25 and 50 years, agreeing instead to a minimum of 35 years. In return I expected an improvement in the land/water position.
The plain fact is that Panama probably would not even buy 25 years without some such improvement. Thus land/water is pivotal.
The new Defense position rejects my compromise on duration, and sticks to a 40-plus position which is in itself probably unacceptable to Panama and certainly unacceptable without a better offer on land/water, which Defense refuses to give.
Justifying the Defense position, Clements claims that 40-plus years, together with the unimproved land/water offer, would provide a deterrent against what he postulates as the irresponsibility of the Panamanian Governments in the next century.
He does not make clear how a few-years prolongation of the U.S. military presence or the retention of a few hundred acres of territory would have this effect. Nor does he indicate how the Defense position would provide security for the U.S. citizen employees from alleged Panamanian “whims”.
[Page 232]While it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict international irresponsibility, we are determined to safeguard our rights and interest in the Canal in the treaty we are negotiating.
The Defense position would jeopardize long-term military interests in that, by foreclosing a treaty, it would engender protracted confrontation with Panama . . . interfere with our ability to operate the waterway efficiently . . . and endanger our very presence.
We believe you will want to caution the President along the foregoing lines.
Furthermore, we believe it is time to halt this skirmishing. It is now 4½ months since I have been in truly substantive negotiation with Panama—and 1½ months since you renewed the commitment to negotiate at the OASGA.3 The supply of credibility—the President’s, yours, the Negotiators’—is running out.
And the President certainly has all the choices before him, now that Defense has in effect recommended a no-treaty choice.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Ambassador Bunker’s Correspondence, Lot 78D300, Box 4, Key Documents. Secret; Sensitive; Exdis; Stadis. Drafted by Bell; Rogers and Feldman, Mark B. concurred. Sent through Ingersoll.↩
- Only the cover sheet is attached; the paper is printed as Document 82.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 76.↩