76. Memorandum From the Deputy U.S. Negotiator (Bell) to Ambassador at Large Bunker1

PANAMA-U.S. TREATY NEGOTIATIONS:

“Management” of a New Treaty in the Congress

There follows a reconstruction of a discontinuous conversation, over a half-hour period during the OASGA session May 10, between the Secretary, Assistant Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Mailliard and myself on the above subject.

HAK: These people [the Secretary’s ministerial colleagues] sound serious. I guess we really have to get a treaty now. Besides, I just said we would.2 So?

WDR and WSM: Yes, have to.

HAK: But what of Congress? Bad time for it. Could we get a treaty, then hold it?

WSM: I think we could even move it through the Congress now, with a big effort.

SMB: But we have to get the treaty first.

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HAK: I know. You negotiators can do that. But thereafter?

WSM: Torrijos told me he could stand a delay in ratification.

HAK: Could he really? How long?

WSM: He told me he could hold off for a year or so on ratification. He even said he could stand not signing the treaty until late this year.

SMB: I doubt the latter. The former is pretty definite—all signs we get say he could stand a ratification delay.

HAK: That’s my inclination: get it, then hold off. I think a new President could get it through the Congress, am I wrong? Also, the next Congress has got to be better. This one’s a disaster.3

WSM: Agree. The chances would be a lot better. But it could probably be done now if you wanted to fight.

HAK: That’s the problem—do we want to? These people here are aggressive. Maybe we have to try. But maybe they’d understand, too.

SMB: They’d understand if Torrijos wanted them to understand. And those are the signs we’re getting, strongly.

HAK: Think we can get a treaty?

SMB: Depends on you and the President. New instructions.

HAK: I see. You’re sure it could be held?

SMB: Yes. “Pending” treaty is the only technique.

HAK: Well. There are papers on this?

SMB: Stacks.

HAK: No doubt.

SMB: One thing, please stop talking about the year 2000—you’re giving away our negotiating position.

HAK: Really? Tell me more! So, I’ll stop.

HAK: So, sign in the late summer, early fall. Then maybe hold it, maybe not. Probably the longer we hold off signing, the better. But these people won’t let us get away with that easily. Lots of pressure. What’s that man saying about me?

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SMB: Wasn’t listening. Has to be flattering, though.

HAK: That’s enough. I’ll smile.

S. Morey Bell4 Minister
Deputy U.S. Negotiator
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 84, Lot 81F1, American Embassy, Panama, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations Files, Box 125, POL 33.3–2/Jurisdiction, 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Bell. Brackets are in the original.
  2. On May 10, Kissinger read a joint U.S.-Panamanian statement to an informal session of heads of state at the OAS General Assembly. The statement affirmed the eight principles and the need for a “new, just, and equitable” treaty. For the text of the statement, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 23, pp. 881–882.
  3. Kissinger expressed a similar point of view in a May 12 meeting with Ford. During the meeting, Kissinger said: “On Panama there are two issues—the duration of the treaty and the duration of the Canal defense arrangement. Defense will buy a 25-year treaty with a 50-year defense arrangement. The JCS may buy 40 years. If these negotiations fail, we will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin America. We maybe could work out the signing the end of this year, submit it to the Senate with the understanding there will be no action until ’77, or not submit it. Panama could then ratify it first. If it collapses we will have massive problems. If you sign it you will also have massive problems.” (Memorandum of conversation, May 12; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11, May 12, 1975—Ford, Kissinger)
  4. Bell signed “SM Bell” above his typed signature.